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INTRODUCTION 
For several years, this report has been introduced by a brief review of the 
situation in the coal mining industry with a single table providing salient 
data on certain technical/economic and social aspects of relevance to 
health and safety in this sector. 
This review has lost none of its importance despite the recession in the 
coal industry as this industry alone employs as much manpower as all the 
other mineral-extracting industries combined. Furthermore, as a result 
of the harmonization of statistics in this field, valid comparisons can be 
made between different years and the different Community countries. 
This is not yet the case with regard to the other mineral-extracting indus-
tries, which work a wide variety of minerals by methods which vary widely. 
It has not yet been possible to draw up a single table grouping the essential 
data for these industries. As in last year's report, the production and man-
power figures for these other mineral-extracting industries are shown sepa-
rately country by country in Annex III. However, it has been possible to 
compile a single table for manpower, with a breakdown by method of ex-
traction : deep mining, opencast mining, quarrying and by boreholes. 
Similarly, fuel production and import figures have been brought together 
in a Community table covering coal, brown coal, crude oil and natural gas. 
The production figures are expressed in the units employed by the Statis-
tical office of the European Communities (Eurostat). 1.1. COAL MINING ACTIVITIES 
The statistics given below are drawn from the bulletin published by the 
Eurostat on 22 January 1979 and from information supplied by the na-
tional mining authorities (see following table). 
1.1.1. In 1978, the situation in the coal-mining industry was characterized by 
an increase of 3 Mio t in demand despite a further drop of almost 7 Mio t 
in deliveries to coking plants as a result of the continuing difficulties of 
the steel industry. 
Community production dropped less sharply than in previous years 
(0,9 o/o or 2 273 000 t as opposed to 2.9 o/o in 1977 and 3.6 o/o in 1976). 
Production in the United Kingdom indeed rose by 0.8 o/o, i.e. approxima-
tely 1 Mio t, whereas it had dropped in the previous year. 
Community imports also decreased by 1.7 Mio t to 44 Mio t, i.e. 18.6 o/o 
of Community production. 
Stocks held by producers and consumers dropped by 4.7 Mio t and 2.3 Mio 
t respectively (the reduction being 5.8 o/o for coal to offset the shortfall of 
production and imports and the increase in consumption. 
This increase in demand can be attributed to the electricity generating sta-
tions, whose consumption rose by over 9 Mio t whereas coking plants redu-
ced their consumption by 7 Mio t and the quantities consumed by other 
industrial and domestic customers were unchanged. 
The workforce continued to decline in all countries (2.5 o/o for the Com-
munity as compared with 3 and 2.3 o/o in the preceding years). 
Underground productivity, which had dropped slightly in the previous 
year, increased by 2.7 o/o. The productivity figures are no longer expres-
sed in kg per manshift but in kg per man-hour. If the figures are converted 
assuming the same number of hours per shift in 1978 as in 1977 
(8.71 hours/shift) the resulting OMS is 3 623 kg as opposed to 3 528 kg in 
1977. COAL MINING ACTIVITIES 
Production (Mio t) 
Percentage change 1977/197 6 
1978/1977 
1976 
1977 
1978 
o/o 
o/o 
Underground productivity per 1977 
man hour in kg 1978 
Underground productivity per 1977 
OMS in kg 1978 
Underground workers on books 1977 
(1000) 1978 
Percentage change 1978/1977 
Number of working mines at 1977 
the end of 1978 
Pithead coal stocks (10001) 1977 
at the end of.  1978 
Percentage change 1977/1978 
EUROPE 
IX 
Percentage of outprut produced by mechanized means 
Mechanized winning 1916 
1977 
1978 
Powered supports  1976 
1977 
1978 
247,7 
240,4 
238,1 
• 2,9 
■ 0,9 
405,0 
416,0 
3 528 
(3 623) 
2,7 
372,4 
363,2 
-2,5 
F. R. G.  France  Belgium 
313 
33,6 
31,7 
-5,8 
97,7 
95,3 
86,9 
87,4 
96,3 
91,3 
90,1 
- 5,2 
• 1,3 
521 
533 
4139 
(4 234) 
2,3 
123,7 
120,9 
2,3 
43 
17,3 
14,1 
18,6 
98,4 
98,8 
86,3 
89,6 
21,9 
21,3 
19,7 
- 2,8 
-7,5 
325,0j 
330,o| 
2907,01 
(2951,0)1 
1,5 
i 
39,0! 
35,8 
-8,2 
27,0 
24,0 
7,2 
7,1 
6,6 
- 2,3 
- 6,8 
283,0 
281,0 
2 717,0 
(2 698) 
■0,7 
17,9 
17,4 
• 2,8 
10,0 
5,0 
4,9 
1,9 
86,9 
87,0 
87,6 
41,7 
42,1 
46,8 
0,7 
0,3 
-63,2 
97,9 
100,0 
56,5 
61,1 
U.K. 
122,2 
120,7 
121,7 
0,8 
363,0 
374,0 
3 338,0 
(3 437,0) 
3,0 
191,2 
188,7 
-1,3 
231,0 
10,6 
12,4 
17,1 
98.6 
93,8 
96,5 
95,2 1.1.2. General review of underground accidents in coal mines 
As in the previous year, this analysis can now be presented for the whole 
of the Community of Nine in the same form ; the number of hours was 
557.16 as compared with 577.59 million in 1977. 
1.1.2.1. Accidents resulting in an absence from work of between 4 and 20 days 
numbered 55 140 giving a frequency rate (number of accidents into 
number of hours worked) of 98.97 compared with 99,59 in 1977, i.e. 
a 0,62 o/o decrease. 
1.1.2.2. Accidents resulting in an absence of between 21 and 56 days numbered 
22 283 giving a frequency rate of 39.99 compared with 41.17 in 1977, 
i.e. a 2.88 o/o decrease. 
1.1.2.3. Accidents resulting in an absence of more than 56 days numbered 6 472 
giving a frequency rate of 11.62, compared with 11.49 in 1977 (an increase 
of 1.38 o/o). 
1.1.2.4. There were 138 fatal accidents (including one group accident with 7 fata-
lities), compared with 116 such accidents in 1977 (including two group 
accidents with 18 fatalities). 
The frequency rates were : 
- 0.248 as against 0.201 in 1977 i.e. an increase of 23 o/o including the 
collective accident, although it is still below the rate for 1976 which was 
0.300 
- 0.237 as against 0.189 in 1977, i.e. an increase of 25 o/o excluding the 
collective accident. 
1.1.2.5. The total number of accident victims (i.e. fatalities plus casulaties resul-
ting in at least four days'absence from work) was 84 033, giving a frequency 
rate of 150,82, compared with 152,45 in 1977 - a 1,07 o/o decrease. 1.2. ALL MINERAL-EXTRACTING ACTIVITIES 
1.2.1. Appended to this report are separate tables for each country covering 
the same headings as last year : 
- recto 
a set of minerals selected last year as a suitable basis for an initial 
comparison ; 
- verso 
a second group comprising a wider variety of minerals, which are 
not standard throughout the Community and which account for a 
considerable volume or value of production in the country in question. 
1.2.2. Opposite each product are entries for the number of sites (or companies) 
production, and the units. 
1.2.3. A distinction is made between the three methods of extraction (deep 
mining, opencast mining and quarrying, or boreholes. 
Wherever possible, the manpower figures for these various methods of 
extraction do not include administrative and commercial staff nor the 
work force employed in downstream processing but they do include wor-
kers employed in preparation (crushing, concentration, cleaning, loading) 
the raw mineral for the market. 
1.2.4. The following Community table was drawn up on the basis of these data 
on the method of extraction and work force. WORKFORCE EMPLOYED IN THE MINERAL-EXTRACTING INDUSTRIES 
Number and percentage 
TYPE OF OPERATION 
COAL MINES 
TOTAL „„ 
N 
N 
o/o.... 
OTHER MINES 
and quarries 
TOTAL 
TOTAL. . 
N 
N 
N 
o/o... . 
N 
o/o.... 
EUROPE 
IX 
518.878 
> 188.351 
> 10.712 
> 717.941 
DEUTSCH­
LAND 
184.024 
78,5 
184.024 
7.632 
3,3 
35.493 
15,1 
43.125 
7.338 
3,1 
7.338 
234.487. 
- 100,0 
FRANCE 
54.814 
54.814 
1 
18.484 
18.484 
— 
-
73.298 
ITALIA 
163 
163 
[50.449 
50.449 
— 
-
50.612 
.NEDER­
LAND 
-
> 83 
> 83 
2.463 
2.463 
> 2.546 
BELGIQUE/ 
BELGIUM 
23.023 
23.023 
118 
11.391 
11.509 
-τ 
-
34.532 
LUXEMBG 
-
not 
available 
~ 1.000 
— 
— 
Λ, 1.000 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
248.100 
8.477 
256.577 
5.165 
39.910 
45.075 
— 
— 
-1 
IRELAND 
265 
12 
277 
18.626 
18.626 
> 911 
? 911 
> 19.814 
DENMARK 
-
-
not 
available 
-
— π 
1.3. COMMUNITY ENERGY PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS 
The statistics given in the following table are drawn from the following 
bulletins published by the Statistical Office of the European Communi­
ties : 26.3.1979 Hydrocarbons, 14.2.1979 Natural Gas, 22.1.1979 and 
16.2.1979 Coal. 
1.3.1. Developments in the coal market are analysed in 1.1. In brief, there was 
a slight drop in production and imports despite a slight increase in con­
sumption. This was covered by withdrawal from'stocks. 
1.3.2. Lignite production increased slightly in Germany in 1978 but was still 
lower than in 1976 and was declining in the other two producer countries, 
France and Italy, where the level of production is fairly low. 
1.3.3. Oil production rose sharply by 33 o/o as a result of the spectacular increase 
in UK production ; the much lower levels of production in other countries 
remained fairly stable, with a drop in Germany and an increase in Italy. 
Oil imports were decreasing, but total quantity available which had not 
varied from 1976 to 1977, increased slightly in 1978 by 6.3 Mio t. 
1.3.4. In 1978, gas accounted for 18 o/o of Community internal energy consump­
tion (7.4 o/o in 1970). It increased by 4.5 o/o which was less than the 
annual increase (14.3 o/o) for the period 1970-77. 71.4 o/o of consump­
tion was covered by Community production. Development of new fields 
is in prospect, in particular in Ireland and Denmark, while production 
from existing fields, especially in the Netherlands, could decline. 12 
PRODUCTION AND IMPORT 
OF COAL, GAS AND OIL IN THE COMMUNITY 
COAL PRODUCTION 
1977 
1978 
COAL IMPORTS 
1977 
1978 
BROWN COAL 
1977 
1978 
CRUDE OIL 
1977 
1978 
IMPORTS 
(from non Community sources) ]g7g 
1977 
1978 
NATURAL GAS 
Production (in 10.000 T.J. PCS) 1976 
1977 
. IMPORTS ' 
1977 
1978 
NATURAL GAS 
in milliards m3 
1977 
1978 
IMPORTS 
(fromnon Community sources) 1976 
1977 
1978 
Eur. 9 
247,7 
240,4 
238,1 
42,6 
44,2 
42,40 
139,8 
127,9 
128,2 
21,0 
47.2 
63,0 
511,7 
485,1 
475,6 
649,2 
649,1 
616,7 
59,4 
80,2 
141,0 
184,58 
184,56 
175,35 
16,9 
22,8 
40,1 
D 
96,3 
91,3 
90,1 
4,3 
4.0 
3,01 
134,5 
122,9 
123,6 
5,5 
5.4 
5,1 
99,8 
95,3 
91,9 
67,6 
67,2 
73,5 
15,3 
23,3 
49,9 
19,2 
19,1 
20,9 
4.4 
6,6 
14,2 
F 
21,9 
21,3 
19,6 
13,8 
15,6 
15,8 
3.2 
3,1 
2,7 
1.1 
1,1 
1.1 
120,8 
115,7 
113,1 
27.7 
29,9 
29,4 
12,3 
12,4 
18,6 
7.9 
8,5 
8,4 
3,5 
3,5 
5,3 
I 
0,2 
o.i 
10,0 
10,3 
9,8 
2.0 
1.9 
1.8 
1.1 
1.1 
1.5 
102,0 
105,4 
112,7 
60,0 
52,6 
51,1 
27,7 
35,5 
40,9 
17,1 
15,0 
14,5 
7,9 
10,1 
11,6 
NL 
3,8 
3,8 
3.4 
-
1.5 
1.6 
1.5 
62,6 
56,1. 
52,0 
342,1 
340,7 
311,1 
1.0 
6.2 
97,3 
95,7 
88,5 
0,3 
1.7 
Β 
7,2 
7,1 
6,6 
3,5 
3,2 
2.7 
-
28,9 
35,4 
32,3 
ο,ι 
ο,ι 
0,2 
1.0 
5.4 
0,03 
0,03 
0,05 
0,3 
1.5 
L 
ο,ι 
ο,ι 
0,2 
-
-
-
-
UK 
122.2 
120,7 
121,7 
2.4 
2. 
1.9 
-
11,5 
37,5 
53,4 
88,1 
68,7 
66,3 
151,7 
158,5 
151,5 
4.1 
7,0 
20,0 
43,1 
45,1 
43,1 
1,2 
2,0 
5.7 
Ir 
0,05 
0,03 
0,5 
0.7 
0,6 
-
1,8 
2.2 
2.2 
-
-
Ok 
4,2 
4.6 
5,0 
-
0,2 
0,5 
0.4 
7.6 
6,3 
5,1 
-
* Net imports le. Imports less exports : N.B. for petroleum products, the exports may be in a refined 
** The conversion figure adopted has been that used for the Dutch gas fields of 35.17 MJ/m3 equivalent 
to 8 400 KCal/m3 (where volume is measured at Oo C and 1.01325 bar). Production and imports have 
been converted on this basis. 13 
1.4. GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE MINES SAFETY AND 
HEALTH COMMISSION 
1.4.1. Meetings held 
The Mines Safety and Health Commission met on 6 April, 11 July and 
1st December 1978, preparatory meetings of the Restricted Committee 
being held on the previous days. 
In addition, there were 25 meetings of Working Parties, of which, 6 were 
held at mines. The M.S.H.C. believes that these visits are most useful, not 
only in a technical sense, but also due to the contact between the members 
of the Working Parties and producers and workers on site. To advance the 
work of these groups, 23 meetings of expert committees, and 16 meetings 
of an editorial nature were held. 
An information symposium was held on 28 and 29 September 1978 for 
the benefit of workmen's inspectors, and a conference was held on 11, 12 
and 13 October 1978 on the "Medical aspects of deep-sea diving". 
1.4.2. Group accidents (i.e. accidents resulting in the death or injury with eight 
weeks' absence from work of at least five victims). 
- On 6 April 1978, at the Rheinische Braunkohlenwerke A.G. lignite mi-
ne erectors fell 36 m from a platform and were killed. This accident was 
discussed by the MSHC on 11.7.1978 (cf. Section III). 
- On 21.11.1978, at the Bentley Mine in the United Kingdom, a man-rid-
ing train went out of control following a derailment. Seven people were 
killed and three others seriously injured. Discussion of this accident has 
had to be postponed until 1979, and will be reported on in the 17th Re-
port. 14 
1.4.3. Decisions of the Mines Safety and Health Commission 
The following were approved : 
- Proposal to Governments on two methods of "Check testing of con-
veyor belts with textile carcass". 
(meeting of 6.4.1978 - cf 2. Land Annexe VI). 
- Report on the "Healtn hazard arising from conveyor belts" 
(Meetingof 11.7.1978 - cf. 2.1.2.2.) 
- Report on "Comparative testing of conveyor belts with canvass carcass 
during 1976. Report and test results". 
(Meeting of 117.1978 - cf. 2.1.2.3.) 
- Proposal to Governments on "Safety techniques in the winning area". 
(Meeting of 11.7.1978 ■ cf. 2.9.2.; already published in Annexe VIII to the 15th 
Report). 
Proposal to Governements on the "Harmonization and application of 
safety signs at work in coal mines". 
(Meeting of 1.12.1978 - cf. 1.4.11 and Annexe VII). 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the "Harmonization of the laws of 
the Member States concerning electrical apparatus for use in potentially 
explosive atmospheres in gassy mines". 
(Meetingof 1.12.1978 - cf. 2.3.2.1.). 
With a view to preventing uncontrolled offshore blowouts of petroleum 
and gas, the following two proposals were submitted to the Member 
States' Governments : 
One on the basic information to be included in offshore drilling pro-
grammes ; 
the other on drilling wellhead safety installations offshore. 
(Meeting of1.12.1978 - cf. 2.11.2 and annexes X and XI). 15 
1.4.4. Also attached as annexes to this report are the following texts, which 
were examined on 1.12.1978, final adoption of which has had to be 
postponed until March 1979 : 
- Proposal to Governements on the "Construction of gateside packs for 
long-wall faces". 
(cf2.10-annexe VIII) 
- Report on the "Use of filter self-rescuers in .coal mines in the Commu-
nity of Mine". 
(cf. 2.1.3. and annexe IX). 
1.4.5. Information symposium for workmen's inspectors held in Luxembourg on 
28 and 29 September 1978. 
1.4.5.1. The symposium was attended by : 
- 75 workmen's inspectors from all the Community Member States 
(with the exception of Ireland and Denmark) ; 
- A delegation from the Safety and Health Commission (the workers' re-
presentative and a government representative from each of the Member 
States, together with the employers'representatives from Luxembourg 
and Belgium) ; 
- Mr. Wallin, Head of the I.L.O.'s Work Administration Department in 
Geneva, representing the I.L.O. ; 
- Mr. Stenuit, Inspector-General of Belgian Mines, who acted as rappor-
teur at the symposium. 
1.4.5.2. Dr. RECHT opened the information symposium by underlining the signifi-
cance of this work for all industrial sectors where the question of work-
men's inspectors was currently under study, with special reference to the 
general programme of safety and health at the workplace. 16 
1.4.5.3. The following papers* were given : 
- a description by the Secretary of the Safety and Health Commission 
of the history and work of the MSHC ; 
- a summary, for seven of the nine Member States, of the LL.O.'s survey 
conducted in 1974 of workers'participation in inspection work in mines, 
to which to present rapporteur, Mr. Stenuit, had contributed ; 
- papers by Mr. Brinkhoff (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Renders 
(Belgium), Mr. Nowak (France), Mr. K. Walker, Mr. Fisher and 
Mr. Craviotto (Italy). 
1.4.5.4. Another talk was given by Mr. Tracey, in which he deplored Ireland's 
sluggishness in this field, despite its long mining tradition. 
1.4.5.5. The papers were followed, on the afternoon of 28 September, by more 
statements and requests for information. 
1.4.5.6. These were summarized by Mr. Stenuit on 29 September. 
Mr. Wallin then went on to describe the role of the I.L.O., recalling the 
international agreement of 1947 on cooperation between work inspection 
officials, employers and workers. He looked forward to a shift in inspec-
tion work in the industrialized countries over the next few years, with 
increasing workers' participation's was already the case in the coal industry. 
In fact, the coal industry had played a pioneer role in this field, which had 
given rise to the LL.O.'s 1974 survey referred to earlier. 
1.4.5.7. The ensuing exchange of views concentrated on the powers of the work-
men's inspector, whether based on legislation (particularly in Belgium 
where inspectors had the right to call a halt to work in the case of immi-
nent danger) or resulting from the experience and personal qualities of 
the workmen's inspector together with other factors, as in France, the 
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. The systems va-
ried greatly from country to country, although the positive aspect of the 
work of workmen's inspectors had been encouraged in most countries. A 
case in point was the Federal Republic of Germany, where the workmen's 
* see doc 4282/ 79 F (other languages : E-D-I-N-DK appearing shortly) 17 
inspectors now enjoyed a large measure of confidence compared with 
the suspicion with which inspectors used to be regarded. 
It would appear that, in all the Member States, the workmen's inspectors 
are generally satisfied. 
1.4.5.8. However, when it came to drawing conclusions from the symposium, 
there was an evident desire on the part of all the delegations to work 
towards a long-term harmonization of the various systems, with special 
reference to the powers of the workmen's inspectors. 
Some delegations did not want the legal powers available to their Belgian 
colleagues to call a halt to work in the presence of imminent danger. 
There was a general feeling that the exchange of views had been extremely 
interesting and should be continued under the auspices of the MSHC. 
One possibility would be to constitute an ad hoc committee of experts 
under the auspices of the Working Party on Human Factors. The I.L.O. 
representative thought this would be a highly important development 
and he hoped he would be able to play his part in the ongoing work. 
1.4.5.9. The conclusions were put to the MSHC on 1 December 1978, where the 
question was referred to the Working Party on Human Factors. 
(cf Chapter G - 2.7.) 
1.4.6. Information symposium held on 12 and 13 October 1978 on the 
"Medical aspects of deep-sea diving". * 
1.4.6.1. The symposium was organized by the MSHC Secretariat, which closely 
follows and participates in the work of the European Diving Technology 
Committee (EDTC) in collaboration with the "Industrial medicine and 
hygiene" Division of the Commission's Health and Safety Directorate, the 
European Undersea Biomedical Society and the EDTC's Medical Commit-
tee. 
see doc.5204¡79 E-F-D- I -N -DK 18 
1.4.6.2. The MSHC's interest in the problem of deep-sea diving related to the 
risks run by divers. 
1.4.6.3. 170 medical experts in diving from 19 countries examined the medical 
aspects of deep-sea diving (i.e. to depths of more than 400 m) in connec-
tion with prospecting for, and exploitation of, offshore oil and gas reser-
ves. The problems presented by the enormous pressures (cf up to 40 at-
mospheres) experienced by divers clad in lightweight diving gear were the 
subject of 16 papers, discussions and round-table sessions, with attention 
focusing on what medical action should be taken in the case of an acci-
dent. 
1.4.6.4. The information symposium proper was preceded by a seminar on the 
long-term health risks run by divers. 
1.4.6.5. The recommendations resulting from this seminar and from the informa-
tion symposium will be dealt with jointly by the medical section of the 
Commission's Health and Safety Directorate and the MSHC's Working 
Party on Petroleum and Gas. 
1.4.6.6. The full record of the proceedings of the symposium has been published 
by the Commission of the European Communities in English, and German 
and French versions will be appearing shortly.* 
The first contributions are already available in the six languages of the 
Community from the MSHC Secretariat. 
1.4.7. Title of the MSHC 
1.4.7.1. When the responsibilities of the Safety and Health Commission were 
extended to all the extractive industries by the Council Decision of 
27 june 1974 (Annexe I), the terms of reference and the internal regula-
tions of the MSHC did not undergo any change. At its meeting on 6.4.78 
the MSHC decided on its new title in the six Community languages. 
1.4.7.2. In its deliberations, the MSHC took into account its new range of acti-
vities and also the fact that while the translations of the original French 
title were not always exact equivalents, they had become accepted usage 
in the countries concerned. 
* see doc. 5204/79 19 
- Organe Permanent pour la Sécurité et la Salubrité dans les Mines de 
Houille et les autres Industries extractives. 
- Ständiger Ausschusses für die Betriebssicherheit und den Gesundheits-
schutz im Steinkohlenbergbau und in den anderen mineralgewinnenden 
Industriezweigen. 
- Safety and Health Commission for the Mining and Extractive Industries. 
- Organo Permanente per la sicurezza e la salubrità nelle miniere di car-
bone e nelle altre industrie estrattive. 
- Permanent Orgaan voor de veiligheid en de gezondheidsvoorwaarden in 
de steenkolenmijnen en andere winningsindustrieën. 
- Det Stående Udvalg for Sikkerheds- og sundhedsforhold i Miner 
og anden Udvindingsindustri. 
1.4.8. Safety campaigns 
At its meeting on 11 July 1978, the MSHC decided to give a boost to the 
safety campaigns supported by the MSHC (and for which Bfrs 1.5 million 
are set aside in the budget). 
It was decided that this money should be spent in 1978 on safety in 
quarries and particularly on mobile equipment in Tuscany quarries, 
(cf. Chapter G - 2.7.). 
1.4.9. On 11 July 1978, the MSHC adopted its 15th Report (covering 1977). 
For a variety of administrative reasons - including insufficient staff in the 
Secretariat - it was not possible to print this report until mid-1979. 
1.4.10 Examiniation of the 12th, 13th and 14th MSHC Reports by the European 
Parliament on 13 October 1978. 20 
1.4.10.1. The Restricted Committee took note of the record of the relevant plenary 
sitting of Parliament on 30 November 1978, but the MSHC was not able 
to do so until 27 March 1979. 
Nevertheless, the result of this examination is included in this report. 
1.4.10.2. The MSHC Report was examined annually by the European Parliament up 
to 1974, when Parliament's Committee on the Environment, Public Health 
and Consumer Protection decided to examine the reports in batches of 
several years, together with the reports on the activities of the Steel Indus-
try Safety and Health Commission. 
1.4.10.3. The European Parliament resolution concerning the 12th, 13th and 14th 
Reports is reproduced in Annex XIV. 
1.4.10.4. This resolution praises the work of the MSHC and deplores the inadequate 
level of staffing in its Secretariat in articles 1, 2, 3, 7, 10 and 11. Articles 
3 and 7 impute the shortcomings of the MSHC to the lack of staff, parti-
cularly in the field of common statistics for all the extractive industries, 
and, in general, in non-coalmining activities resulting from the extension 
of the MSHC's responsibilities in 1974. 
1.4.10.5. The Member of the Commission of the European Communities has under-
taken to assure the efficient working of the MSHC. 
1.4.10.6. The Restricted Committee, followed by the Safety and Health Commission 
proper, have given their full backing to the European Parliament's resolu-
tion concerning the need for more staff in the Secretariat, and have stress-
ed the need for the Working Party on Health in Mines to resume its work, 
particularly on the stipulation of respirable dust limits, in view of the 
importance of the dust problem. 
1.4.11. Applicability to mines of Council decisions taken without consulting the 
MSHC. 
The 15th Report pointed out that the MSHC had obtained the agreement 
of the Commission of the European Communities that a directive on safe-
ty signs should not apply to mines. The MSHC now fears that there may 21 
be other Council Directives in the pipeline which have been drawn up 
without prior consultation of the MSHC. The case of noise limits on 
compressors has been cited, but, as it turns out, its scope does not extend 
to mines. 23 
SECTION Π 
ACTIVITIES OF THE WORKING PARTIES 
CHAPTER A 
RESCUE ARRANGEMENTS, MINE FIRES AND UNDERGROUND COMBUSTION 
2.1.1. The Working Party on its committees of experts held 18 meetings as follows: 
- 4 meetings of the full Working Party, on the 31.1.-16.6-
11-12 Sept. and 9 Nov. 1978. 
- 10 meetings of the Committees of Experts 
- on Fire-resistant conveyor belts and other long items of plant .. 5 
- on Fire-resistant fluids 1 
- on filter self-rescuers 2 
- for preparing a summary report on two recent fires/explosions. . 2 
In addition, there were 4 meetings of an Editorial Committee for the 
Fire-resistant fluids. 
2.1.2. In 1978, the activities of this Working Party gave rise to three decisions 
of the Safety and Health Commission : 
2.1.2.1. Proposal to Governments on two tests for the quality control of conveyor 
belts with fabric carcasses. 
The proposal was approved by the Safety and Health Commission on 
6 April 1978 and is appended as Annex VI. 
This document supplements the "First Report on Tests and Criteria of 
Flammability of Conveyor Belts with Fabric Core" which was published 
as Annex VI to the 12th Report of the MSHC - July 1975. 
The two fairly complicated and expensive tests described in the First 
Report - the drum friction and propane burner tests - are used for Appro­
val of types of fire-resistant belts. 24 
the two tests proposed in the latest document - the Barthel burner and critical 
oxygen index tests - are simple tests suitable for routine quality control to 
check that individual belts still exhibit the same fire-resistant properties as the 
type approved. 
(see 2.1.2.3.) 
The testing stations have agreed to carry out a three-year experimental pro-
gramme (as from 6 april 1978). After analysis of a sufficient mass of experi-
mental data for the results to be significant, the two tests will be re-examined 
and possibly codified. 
The document is submitted to the Governments as an information report as 
the testing stations have themselves reached agreement on the experimental 
programme and there is no need for government action. 
2.1.2.2. Information report on "Health hazards arising from Conveyor Belts" 
The report describes a test carried out in the Federal Republic of Germany 
to assess the effectiveness of self-rescuers in protecting users against the 
combustion products of conveyor belts and the effect of such products on 
the skin. The apparatus used for the first of these purposes involves animal 
tests using a reproduction of a mine roadway on a scale of 1 : 1 000. 
In the testing stations the tests are currently supplemented by full -scale 
trials to assess the concentration of thermal decomposition products. 
Experiments are being conducted along the same lines in non-mining sectors, 
and collaboration would be desirable. 
2.1.2.3. Information report on "Comparative Testing of Conveyor Belts with textile 
carcasses during 1976 - Report and test results". 
This document describes and compares the results of a large number of 
"round robin" tests carried out in 1976 in the testing stations of INIEX in 
Pâturages, CERCHAR in Verneuil-en-Halatte, Versuchsgrubengesellschaft mbH 
in Dortmund and NCB Scientific Control, Regional Laboratory in Mansfield-
Woodhouse. 25 
Each of these laboratories had supplied 24 m of 1 m wide conveyor belting 
with fabric carcass, which was representative of the types generally used in the 
country in question. In each laboratory, these belts were subjected to the fol-
lowing tests : 
- propane burner ; 
- drum friction (as described in Annex VI to the 12th Report) ; 
- Tremonia laboratory fire gallery (described in DIN 22 118) ; 
- Barthel Burner (NCB method of test) ; 
- determination of the critical oxygen index (ASTM D 2863-74). 
These tests confirmed the existence of as yet unexplained differences between 
the results for belts with covers of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and chloroprene 
(CR). But the series of tests has helped to determine the test conditions which 
affect the results and steps have been taken to harmonize the methods of test 
in the various laboratories concerned. 
A further cycle of tests would be desirable. These tests have, however, esta-
blished that while the Barthel burner and oxygen index methods were not 
always comparable with the propane burner and drum friction tests, they at 
least yielded sufficiently reproducible results to be used as quality control 
tests. (see 2.1.2.1.). 
In view of its size, the document has not been appended to the present Report, 
but it is available on request (in F-E-D-I-N-DK) from the Secretariat of the 
Safety and Health Commission. Bibliography. 
2.1.3. Work completed in 1978 
2.1.3.1. Information Report on the Use of filter self-rescuers in European coal mines. 
Part III : Possibilities of improvement. 
This document was not approved until 27 March 1979 by the Safety and 
Health Commission at whose request it is appended as Annex IX. 
It follows on from parts I and II of the same report ; Part I relating to design 
requirements and testing procedures (Annex X to the 13th Report), and Part II 
relating to maintenance and training (Annex VII to the 14th Report).* 
*see off-print 3919/79 in E-F-D-I-N-DK 26 
Part III describes the limits to possible improvements of this device, which is 
regarded as having reached its maximum potential. At the same time, attention 
is drawn to the merits of self-contained self-rescuers operating on oxygen produ-
ced by chemical reaction. (see 2.1.4.). 
2.1.3.2. Health criteria for fire-resistant fluids 
The medical experts of the Committee on Fire-resistant fluids completed their 
revision of the tests mentioned in the 5th Report on fire-resistant fluids. The 
new tests proposed do not involve any basic changes but rather a refinement of 
the criteria set out in the 5th Report. They will be submitted in 1979 to the 
Working Party and the Safety and Health Commission. 
2.1.4. New activities 
2.1.4.1. Self-contained self-rescuers operating on oxygen produced by chemical reaction. 
A study of this topic was undertaken by the same Committee of Experts and 
along the same lines as for filter self-rescuers, starting with design requirements, 
tests and criteria to be satisfied by these devices. The first part of the study will 
be available at the end of 1979. 
2.1.4.2. On being informed of the accidents at Schlägel und Eisen (27 Oktober 1977 -
7 dead) and Merlebach (30 september 1976 - 16 dead), the Working Party deci-
ded to set up a study and drafting group to establish the points of similarity bet-
ween these two accidents, in the course of which rescue workers were killed. 
2.1.5. Work already mentioned in previous reports. 
2.1.5.1. Fire-resistant fluids 
The Committee of Experts visited the Safety in Mines Research Establishment 
(SMRE) in Buxton on 13 and 14 June and studied the apparatus developed for 
fire-resistance testing of fluids. 
This new test will be included in the 6th Report as a harmonized test. It measu-
res the length of flame produced by the jet of atomized fluid when the igniting 
flame is held in the jet and permits graduated assessment and hence classification 
of the fire resistance of all fluids. 
Revision of the 5 th Report involves not only the health criteria previously men-
tioned but also updating of the technological criteria. This work will be comple-
ted in 1980. 27 
2.1.5.2. Protection of workers against oxygen deficiency and smoke. 
The Working party visited the Gardanne Colliery on 11 and 12 September 1978 
to acquaint itself with a method developed there in the light of local conditions : 
withdrawal into cul-de-sac workings, pressurized refuge chambers. Trials of the 
new autonomous self-rescuers with chemically produced oxygen are in progress 
in this colliery. (see 2.1.3.1.) 29 
CHAPTER Β 
WINDING ROPES AND SHAFT GUIDES, WINDING ENGINES AND WINCHES 
2.2.1. Number of meetings 
3 meetings of the Working Party on 21 February, 
7 June and 24 October 1978 
3 meetings of editorial committees. 
2.2.2. The Working Party set up three committees of 6 to 7 experts to carry out 
studies and draft documents for submission to the Working Party and pursuant 
to its remit in the following fields : 
a) highly-worked ropes and rope breaking loads, reduction of dead weight, 
rope testing conditions ; 
b) magnetic induction testing, non-destructive materials testing ; 
c) winder brakes, shaft guides, conveyance arresting devices. 
2.2.3. Work was continued on the tasks mentioned in the previous Report 
2.2.3.1. Highly-worked ropes - Maintenance of the safety standard and improvement of 
the safety of highly-worked friction winding ropes of stranded construction*. 
The Working Party completed its scrutiny of this document, which will be sub-
mitted to the Safety and Health Commission in the course of 1979*. The docu-
ment, which was drawn up by the Rope Testing Centre of the Westphälische 
Berggewerkschaftskasse in Bochum, set out the criteria for "highly-worked ropes" 
and prescribed additional supervisory measures and tests to offset the difficulty 
of determining the time of discard for such ropes (more rapid wear and marked 
reduction in the time elapsing between detection of the first signs of weakening 
and the date of discard based on a given loss of strength). 
The criteria laid down also apply to flat ropes for use on reel winders but not to 
ropes of locked-coil construction. 
* see Annex IV D°
c- 3171/2/77 is available in the six Community languages from the Secretariat 
of the Safety and Health Commission. 30 
2.2.3.2. Uniform safety regulations for winding ropes and cappings 
(doc. 5379/78) 
Work is continuing on harmonization. A select editorial committee was instruc-
ted to draw up a uniform definition of the strength loss factor. 
2.2.3.3. Measuring rope tension in multirope winding installations. 
(doc. 5937/78) 
The Working Party began its scrutiny of this document. 
2.2.4. Studies and research 
The Working Party acquainted itself with the present status of the studies and 
research work which it had proposed and for which financial assistance had been 
provided by the Commission. 
2.2.4.1. Electromagnetic rope testing 
Comparative tests of various devices from the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, 
Germany, Switzerland and Poland were carried out at the SMRE in Sheffield on 
6 ropes, mostly of locked-coil construction, one of which had artificial defects. 
These tests were carried out at the request of the Working Party to see whether 
the new devices permitted detection of a wider range of defects than at the time 
of the previous studies in 1965. The Working Party visited Sheffield in 1979 and 
found that the quality of detection had in fact been improved. An account of 
these trials will be included in the 17th Report. 
2.2.4.2. Functional and safety analysis of winding engine and winch brakes. 
The first half-yearly technical report has been submitted on this research project, 
which was undertaken in the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the Uni-
ted Kingdom following the Markham disaster. 
2.2.4.3. Rope guides. 
(Doc. 4704/78) 
Financial assistance for a study of this topic was requested by the Versuchsgrube 
Tremonia and granted by the Commission. 31 
CHAPTER C 
ELECTRICITY 
2.3.1. Number of meetings 
six meetings of the full Working Party on 11/12 January, 7/8 March, 
10/11 May, 29/30 June, 20/21 September and 28/29 November 1978. 
two preparatory meetings. 
2.3.2. In the course of the twelve days on which it met, the Working Party completed 
its scrutiny of the European Standards drawn up by CENELEC for the design 
of electrical equipment for use in potentially explosive atmospheres. 
2.3.2.1. The Working Party considered the amendments and additions required to make 
the standards applicable to gassy mines. 
It drafted a proposal for a directive of the Council of Ministers on free move-
ment of electrical apparatus for gassy mines, to which the following are appen-
ded : 
the European standards, with the amendments and additions mentioned 
above ; 
a draft standard on intrinsically safe electrical systems, which was also 
drawn up by the Working Party ; 
an explanatory memorandum. 
2.3.2.2. These documents were submitted to the Safety and Health Commission at its 
meeting on 1 December 1978 together with a report by the Working Party 
(doc. 3272/5/78). Unanimous agreement could not be reached on Art. 1421 
of European standard EN 50.018, and its adoption was put to the vote. 
2.3.2.3. The Safety and Health Commission adopted this proposal for a directive toge-
ther with its annexes, with 7 delegations voting for adoption, the Danish dele-
gation abstaining, and the German delegation voting against because particle-
proof testing of flameproof enclosures was not included in Art. 1421. 32 
The proposal for a directive of the Council of Ministers will be submitted to 
the Council by the Commission of the European Communities, for which the 
Safety and Health Commission has acted as a consultative body. This is an 
unusual procedure for the Safety and Health Commission because of its special 
terms of reference and was adopted by way of exception because gassy mines 
had been excluded from the scope of Council Directive 76/117/EEC of 
18 December 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
concerning electrical equipment for use in potentially explosive atmospheres (1) 
and of Council Directive 79/196/EEC of 6 February 1979 (2) providing for cer-
tain types of protection which may be employed to implement the former Direc-
tive. 
It was therefore desirable that apparatus for use in mines should be subject to 
the same procedure as that designed for potentially explosive atmospheres above 
ground. 
2.3.2.4. During its scutiny of the European standards, the Working Party sent Technical 
Committee 31 of CENELEC solutions to the following problems : 
maximum surface temperature of electrical apparatus ; 
switchgear with and without oil-immersed contacts ; 
padlocking of isolators to ensure that underground apparatus can be main-
tained and repaired in complete safety ; 
light alloys. 
Other problems were also considered, viz : 
General requirements : 
design of enclosures of plastic materials to preclude any ignition hazard 
resulting from electrostatic charges ; 
Flameproof enclosures : 
use of insulating materials, 
plugs and sockets, 
testing of empty enclosures, 
rules relating to switchgear, lamp holders and lamp caps and to enclosures 
of non-metallic materials. 
(1) Published OJ L 24 of 30.1.76 - pages 45/48 
(2) Published OJ L 43 of 20.2.79 - pages 20/22 33 
Intrinsic safety : 
interconnection of intrinsically safe electrical apparatus - drafting of a sup-
plementary standard on "Intrinsically safe electrical systems". 
CHAPTER D 
FLAMMABLE DUSTS 
2.4.1. Number of meetings 5 
one meeting of the full Working party on 2.oct. 1978, 
four meetings of an editorial committee. 
The Working Party continued its study of stonedusting, devoting particular 
attention to means of checking the proportion of inert dust, determination of 
the requisite percentage of non combustibles remaining the prerogative of the 
individual countries. Methods of checking the inert content were studied and 
described by a small committee. 
This work is virtually completed and will be submitted to the Safety and Health 
Commission in 1979. 
CHAPTER E 
COMMON ACCIDENT STATISTICS 
2.5. The Working Party met on 16 March 1978. 
Once it had set up a framework for common accident statistics for the coal 
mines of the Community of Six, this Working Party discontinued its activities 
for a fairly long period. As early as 1977, the United Kingdom was able to 
provide its statistics of accidents in coal mines in the same form as the founder 
members of the Community. At its meeting on 16 March 1978, the Working 
Party considered a possible layout for the extension to all extractive industries 
of the economic and social statistics which introduce the annual Report. It 
was able only to touch on the more complex problem of extending the scope 
of the accident statistics to cover all the extractive industries. 34 
CHAPTER F 
HEALTH IN MINES 
2.6. The Working Party did not meet in 1978 as the Secretariat lacked the necessary 
staff. 
The M.S.H.C. regrets this as the subject is judged to be important, and once 
again it wishes to reiterate the statement that the Secretariat must be properly 
staffed. 
CHAPTER G 
HUMAN FACTORS 
2.7.1. Number of meetings 3 
one meeting of the full working party on 16 february 1978 
one meeting of the experts on safety campaigns 
one preparatory meeting. 
2.7.2. The Working Party scrutinized a study by a group of German experts on 
"Measures relating to the safety training of mine workers employed in the mines 
of the European Community". This study was subsidized by the Commission of 
the European Communities. 
It reviews the systems, methods and arrangements for training of workers, espe-
cially in relation to safety, in each of the coal-producing countries of the Euro-
pean Community. The Working Party amended the document and enlarged the 
scope of its conclusions which are applicable not only to coal mines but also to 
other mines. This study will be submitted to the Safety and Health Commission 
in 1979.* 
2.7.3. The Working Party also considered the possibility of putting into practice one 
of the recommendations of this study, viz. the development of training methods 
which would be more effective than in the past in incluencing the attitude and 
behaviour of workers with regard to safety and hygiene at the workplace. It 
proposed that a preliminary study should be carried out, with financial assistance 
from the Commission, by the National Coal Board**. 
* Approved on 12 june 1979 ** Assistance granted in the course of 1979. 35 
2.7.4. Pursuant to the decision of the Safety and Health Commission of 11 July 78, 
which is mentioned in section 1.4.8., the Committee of Experts on Safety 
Campaings considered various aspects of safety campaigns in quarries and open-
cast mines, with particular reference to propaganda media, i.e. films, slides, 
pamphlets and posters. 36 
CHAPTER H 
VENTILATION, FIREDAMP AND OTHER MINE GASES 
2.8.1. Number of meetings 6 
3 meetings of the full Working party on 8 February, 
5/6 June and 31 October 1978 (held at Gardanne Mine). 
1 meeting of the Committee of Experts on Firedamp Monitoring 
Instruments. 
2 preparatory meetings. 
2.8.2.1. The Working party continued and virtually completed its earlier work (described 
in section 2.8.3.1. of the 15th Report) on controlling the firedamp risk arising 
during drivage and following the abandonment of cul-de-sac and other old work-
ings, in pursuance of the remit handed down by the Safety and Health Commis-
sion after the accidents at Lens-Liévin (27 December 1974), Houghton Main 
(12 June 1975) and Luisenthal (21 July 1976). 
2.8.2.2. With a view to establishing the minimum requirements in respect of measures 
to be taken in cul-de-sac workings, it examined the report by the committee set 
up in the United Kingdom after the explosion at the Houghton Main Colliery 
(South Yorkshire). The title of this document is "Report of the National Com-
mittee to examine all aspects of the ventilation of narrow drivages". 
(cf doc. 4293/78, available from the Secretariat in f- d - e). 
The results of this work will be submitted to the Safety and Health Commission 
in 1979. 
2.8.3. The Working Party began work on the additional remit handed down by the 
Safety and Health Commission on 11 July 1978. 
"Ventilation aspects of the use of heading machines with dedusting equipment". 
It studied the following documents : 
circulars from the Chief Mines Inspectorate for North Rhine Westfalia 
Doc. 291 7/77 and 3718/78 37 
Report by the Saarbergwerke AG Doc. 3719/78 
Ventilation in the vicinity of heading machines with dust collection 
equipment by Messrs Dupré and Graumann. Doc. 4934/78 
CHAPTER I 
MECHANIZATION 
2.9.1. Number of meetings 4 
Including one meeting of the full working party on 20 October 1978. 
2.9.2. The fields which the Working Party selected are as follows : 
mechanization in the winning area, which was the subject of a recommen-
dation (proposal to Governments) approved by the Safety and Health Com-
mission on 11 July 1978, and appended as Annex VIII to the 15th Report. 
safety aspects of transport by conveyor belt ; 
safety aspects of transport by diesel locomotive. 
The in-depth studies are carried out by a select study and drafting group which 
held three meetings in 1978. 
2.9.3. The document drawn up always follows the same pattern : general observations 
(and terms of reference) ; definitions ; basis for proposals - analysis of accidents 
and exceptional occurrences, most frequent causes of accidents ; proposals to 
Governments, forming the main body of the report and comprising principles, 
primary safety measures, secondary safety measures and guidance on informa-
tion, instructions and accident prevention. 
2.9.4. The document on transport by conveyor belt has been completed and will be 
scrutinized by the Working Party on 5 September 1979. 
The document on diesel locomotives will be submitted to the Working Party in 
1980. 
(see doc. 3710/77 38 
CHAPTER J 
STRATA CONTROL AND STABILITY OF GROUND 
2.10.1. Number of meetings 5 
2 meetings of the full working party on 21 April and 21 November 1978. 
3 meetings of the committee of experts. 
2.10.2. Work completed 
2.10.2.1. The working party completed the drafting of an information report on "Cons-
truction of gateside packs for longwall faces" . Although the Safety and Health 
Commission did not scrutinize this report until 27 March 1979 it directed that 
it should be appended to the present Report to ensure more rapid distribution. 
2.10.2.2. The report describes the various mechnized and non - mechanized methods of 
putting on gateside packs ; the advantages from the safety point of view consists 
in the improvement of roadway behaviour with a consequent reduction in fal-
ling of blocks of material and greater safety during transport of men and mater-
ials together with an improvement in ground stability at the face ends. Certain 
methods which eliminate leakage paths improve the ventilation and reduce 
the likelihood of heatings. 
2.10.2.3. In view of the considerable potential of these methods, the Safety and Health 
Commission proposed that further tests should be carried out with various 
types of mechanized and pneumatic/hydraulic systems for the construction of 
gateside packs under as wide a range of conditions as possible and that the re-
sults should be carefully recorded and summarized. These results would be of 
value in preparing systems to improve general safety standards in mines. 
2.10.3. Work in progress. 
2.10.3.1. Prevention of rock bursts 
As mentioned in the previous report, the importance of this topic was under-
lined by a bump which occurred at the Gardanne Colliery on 15 June 1977, 
killing one mineworker. The Working Party instructed a group of specialists to 
look into the question and to draw up a code of good practice to reduce the 
risk of rock bursts. This report will be scrutinized by the Working Party in 1979 39 
in the light of other lessons to be derived from a further rock burst which has 
occurred this year (1979) in the Federal Republic of Germany, killing five miners. 
2. 10.3-2. Work on powered supports for steep seams was resumed after receipt of the 
conclusions of the "Final Report of the National Committee on steep seam 
working in British coal mines". 
This Committee had been set up following the fall of roof which occurred at 
Seafield Colliery on 10 May 1973. 
The report is available from the Secretariat as doc. 2715/78 (e - f - d). 40 
CHAPTER K 
OIL, GAS AND OTHER MATERIALS EXTRACTED BY BOREHOLE 
2.11.1. Number of meetings 
3 meetings of the full Working Party on 2 February, 
27 June and 20 December 1978. 
4 meetings of the Committee of Experts on Well Control, 
which is primarily concerned with prevention of blowouts at offshore wells. 
The Working Party, which initially was composed exclusively of government re-
presentatives, was enlarged in 1978 to include representatives of the operators 
and workers. 
2.11.2. The Committee of Experts formed in July 1977 after the blowout on the Bravo 
platform in the Ekofisk field on 22 April 1977 has completed the first two parts 
of a series of five proposals to be submitted to the Governments. 
These two proposals were scrutinized by the Working Party and submitted on 
1 December 1978 to the Safety and Health Commission, which adopted them in 
pursuance of Articles 1 and 4 of its terms of reference. They are appended to the 
present Report as Annexes X and XL 
Basic information which should be contained in drilling programmes of 
offshore wells ; 
Drilling wellhead safety installations offshore. 
2.11.3. The same Committee of Experts has also completed two further proposals to the 
Governments : 
Production well completion offshore (doc. 2487/4/78) 
Workover programme offshore (doc. 4945/4/78) 
These proposals will be submitted to the Safety and Health Commission in 1979 
after approval by the Working Party. 
2.11.4. The Committee of experts has still to complete its report on training of rig per-
sonnel. 41 
2.11.5. The Working Party will define the tasks deriving from its remit other than those 
concerned with blowout prevention, to which it had been instructed to give 
priority. 43 
SECTION ΙΠ 
ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTS ON THE PROPOSALS OF THE 
SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION FOR THE MINING 
AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
Presentation of the replies to the questionnaire sent to national mines authorities every two 
years for updating to 1 January 1978 had to be deferred from the 15th to the 16th Report, 
where they are given in Annex V. 
This questionnaire will be updated to 1 January 1980 and will be accompanied by a critical 
analysis with appropriate commentaries in the 17th Report. 45 
SECTION IV 
4.1.1. At the end of this chapter there are the following tables : 
- A and Β : 
Frequency rates for serious injuries (A) and fatalities (B) for each of 
the countries of the Community of the Six since 1958 and frequency rates 
for fatalities (B) since 1973 and serious injuries (A) since 1977 for the 
United Kingdom. 
- C: 
Group accidents by cause for the Community as a whole. 
- D : 
Summary tables for the Community of the Six since 1958 and the United 
Kingdom since 1973. 
I a and I b : 
Victims of accidents by cause and site of accident and period of incapaci­
ty in absolute figures (a) and frequency rates (b). 
- 2a: 
Victims of accidents by location and nature of injury for periods of inca­
pacity exceeding 56 days and for fatalities in absolute figures (a). The ta­
bles of frequency rates, which are not very representative, are not includ­
ed but are available from the Secretariat. 
Tables 1 and 2 are given by country for the Community of the Nine, together 
with a Community table, and refer to 1978. They are available from the Se­
cretariat by coalfield. 
4.2. It is now possible to analyse changes between the past year and the two pre­
vious years for the Community of the Nine ; reference will no longer be made 46 
to the Community of the Six in analyses of this type. However, the distinc-
tion between the Community of the Six and the Community of the Nine is 
maintained in order to permit monitoring of long-term trends (21 years). 
4.3. Analysis of the 1976, 1977 and 1978 statistics for the Community 
As mentioned in $1.1.2., the frequency rates for the least serious accidents 
fell and those for serious and fatal accidents went up between 1977 and 
1978, whereas between 1976 and 1977 there were decreases for all the 
categories of accidents (statistically significant at 95 o/o confidence level, 
except in the case of accidents resulting in incapacity of more than 56 days). 
In the comparison between 1978 and 1977, the decreases of 0.62 o/o for 
accidents resulting in absence from work of 4-20 days and 2.88 o/o for those 
resulting in absence of 21-56 days, as well as the increases of 1.38 o/o for 
accidents resulting in absence of more than 56 days and 23 o/o for fatalities 
are not statistically significant at 95 o/o confidence level, except in the case 
of accidents resulting in absence from work of 21-56 days. 
The situation may be summarized as static with a slight improvement. 
In absolute figures, accidents resulting in more than 4 days' incapacity and 
fatalities totalled 84 033 among 320 996 registered workers who worked a 
total of 557.16 million hours. One in every 3.82 registered workers was 
thus injured (or killed) during 1978, which represents, to be more precise, a 
frequency rate of 150.82 (150.82 casualties resulting in more than 4 days' 
incapacity of fatalities per million hours worked). The 1977 figures were 
88.058 casualties among 324.100 registered workers who worked a total 
of 577.59 million hours, i.e. one casulaty per 3.68 registered workers and a 
frequency rate of 152.45, 1.05 o/o higher than in 1978. In 1976, the fre-
quency rate was 155.07, 1.69 o/o higher than in 1977 or 2.74 o/o higher than 
in 1978. (These differences are statistically significant at 95 o/o confidence 
level). 47 
4.3.3. The breakdown of these accidents by seriousness is as follows : 
absolute figures 
accidents resulting in absence from work of 
4 - 20 days 55 140 
or 65.6 o/o of the total number of accidents, with 
a frequency rate of 98.87. 
accidents resulting in absence from work of 
21 - 56 days 22 283 
or 26.5 o/o of the total number of accidents, with 
a frequency rate of 39.99 
accidents resulting in absence from work of 
more than 56 days 6 472 
or 7.7 o/o of the total number of accidents, 
with a frequency rate of 11.62 
- fatalities -. 138 
or 0.16 o/o of the total number of accidents, 
with a frequency rate of 0.248. 
This breakdown is practically identical to that for the two previous years. 4.4.  BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENTS BY MAIN CAUSES AND BY SERIOUSNESS (headings 1 - V of Table la) 
4.4.1.  Table with figures given as a percentage of'the total of (headings I - XII 
~^"—·~_^_^ INCAPACITY 
CAUSE ^^----~^_^^ 
1 
'· Falls of ground · 
II. Transport and haulage 
1"· Slipping, falling and stumbling...· 
IV. Machinery, tools, etc 
V Falling objects 
TOTAL 
4 - 20 days 
o/o 
21,2 + 
9,5
 Λ 
26,4· 4 
16,1 + 
16,7
 Λ 
90,0 „ 
21-56 days 
o/o 
19,2 τ 
10,5 
30,6 + 
15,1 Ψ 
16,8 
92,2
 Λ 
more than 
56 days 
o/o 
20,3 
15,8 
26,8 " 
13,9 + 
17,6 f 
94,4 t 
J 
. fatalities 
o/o 
31,9 τ' 
46,4 + 
8,0 + . 
7,2 + 
4.3 -
97,8 + 
total 
o/o 
20,7 _ 
10,3
 Λο,ι 
t 
27,5 + V 
15,7 +V 
16,8 -
90,9 'V 
CHANGES COMPARED WITH 1977 : 
Key : No change : C 
Increase : 
Decrease 
Note : ( ) 
or greater than 0.5 o/o Γ  less than 0.6 o/o 
less than 0.6 o/o V or greater than 0.5 o/o ' 
means not statistically significant or random variation in the mathematical sense of the term. 
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4.4.2. Comments on the above table 
As in the two previous years, these five headings or causes of accidents to-
gether represent the same proportion (around 90 o/o) of the total number 
of accidents. 
The breakdown of these accidents by period of incapacity for all five headings 
shows that this proportion increases slightly with the seriousness of the acci-
dent (90, 92.2 and 94.4 o/o for accidents resulting in 4-20, 21-56 and more 
than 56 days'incapacity respectively). The figures for fatalities do not lend 
themselves to a valid statistical comparison since their number is fortunately 
too small. 
A comparison of the figures for each of the above causes of injury shows a 
variable trend for falls of ground and falling objects but a general increase for 
"slipping, falling and stumbling" and a decrease in accidents caused by machi-
nery. This decrease could be due to the efforts being made to increase safety 
in this developing sector. 
4.5. Accident levels over a period of several years in the Community of the Six. 
4.5.1. For accidents resulting in absences of less than 56 days, data are available 
from 1971 onwards (see table below). 
The variations are slight, although mathematically significant. It may be said 
that there has been an improvement since 1971, the reference year. 
4.5.2. For accidents resulting in incapacity of more than 56 days, comparisons can 
be made back to 1958. After levelling off over the period 1958 - 1967, the 
frequency rate rose again from then until 1973, fell again in 1976 and rose 
again slightly in 1977 and 1978. Irrespective of the statistical value of these 
figures, which is only just significant, account must be taken of the progress 
made in both medical care and methods of first aid and transport of injured 
persons ; a number of persons seriously injured in 1978 would have died du-
ring the year and been classified as fatalities in 1958. 50 
4.5.3. The decrease in fatalities last year was a very considerable and significant one. 
The increase this year is therefore statistically normal (in accordance with the 
law of large numbers) since it is not significant. The frequency rate of 0.352 is 
one of the best ever achieved (0.345 in 1975 and 0.293 in 1977). ACCIDENT LEVELS SINCE 1971 (COMMUNITY OF THE SIX) 
increase/decrease on previous 
year o/o 
increase/decrease on previous 
more than 56 days-actual 
increase/decrease on previous 
increase/decrease on previous 
actual without group accident. . . 
increase/decrease on previous 
.year. ... ...... ..o/o... 
1971 
47 203 
113,96 
21 116 
50,98 
6 249 
15,09 
182 
0,440 
162, 
0,391 
1972 
40 376 
109,31 
-4(8) 
18 531 
50,17 
- 1,59 
5 763 
15,60 
♦ 3,4 (s) 
147 
0,399 
- 10 
141 
0,382 
- 2,3 
1 
1973 
37 384· 
112,77 
♦ 3,17 (s) 
17 325 
52,26 
♦ 4,17 
5560 
16,77 
♦7(8) 
137 
0,413 
♦ 3,9 
128 
0,385 
1974 
34 797 
110,97 
-1.6 (β) 
15 875 
50,62 
-3(8) 
5 054 
16,12 
-4 (s) 
143 
0,456 
♦ 10,4 
96 ' 
0,307 
- 21(S) 
1975 
33 985 
106,67 
- 3,9 (s) 
15 454 
48,5 
- 4,2 (s) 
4 795 
15,05 
-6,7(8) 
no 
0,345 
- 24 
110 Î" 
0,345 
♦ 12 
• 1976 
30 643 
101,77 
-4,8 (s) 
13 923 
46,24 
- 4,8 (β) 
4 791 
14,92 
- 0,8 
125 
0,415 
♦ 20 
109 
0,362 
♦ 4,9 
1977 
29 466 
103,90 
♦ 2.1(e) 
13 388 
47,21 
♦ 2,1 
4 357 
15,36 
♦ 2,9 
83 
0,293 
- 29.4(e) 
66 , 
0,233 
- 39,4 (8) 
1978 
27 602 
102,15 
-1.7(e) 
13 240 
49,00 
♦ 3,7 (s) 
4 443 
16,44 
♦6.6(e) 
95 
0,352 
♦ 20,1 
95 
0,352 
♦51.1 (s) 
(s) significant variation 52 
ANNEX 
Explanatory notes - Tables 1 
GDtUUL BEFWITIOKS 
1. Accident 
Bodily injury resulting from « sudd.n end .bnomal uuml eoa*· in the count of work. 
The Hine» Safety an« «oaleh cossaleaisVe statlatlee ahould only cover vlctla. of ■«"·«■ 
underground, Including accidence which occur whan nen antar and laava th. catoa and while 
the cagoe ara tn necton. 
J. Fatal aoctdant 
λα «aidant causing the daath of th- vied« within 54 days following the accident. Vlccta· 
dvtu nora than »afear th. day of cha acctdant should not ba included in tha fatal acci-
dent cetaaory hut tn Chat of nccideata reeulttng in IncepaelCy involving an absence fro« 
work of «era Chan S6 day·. 
3. Panona covarad hy tha atatlatlca 
Fit ataff and easployoes of contractor fins» who bolen» to a ainara' anelai security acha«-. 
Tha atattstlca count vleet«· and not acctdant·, everyone who la tha vicet« of an eccidenc 
while actually undanround aa well aa during deacanC and aacant ehould be Included. VlcÇiaa 
can therefore only be «inere, supervisor«, engineer· or etaff belonging to contracter firma. 
4. Skifta and masher of Koura worked 
Shift· and »unbar of houre worked by tha persona on the book· of the aine and other ataff 
betonati* to a «Inora' eoclal tneuranco ache«e( account ahould ha taken both of antra ahifta 
and overtime. 
The period of referonen adopted i· the period of actual espesura to riek; one therefore 
count· extre ahifta and overti«a In cena of tl«a actually worked and not of nianber of 
S. Accidenta rataa 
«uotber of accidenta par «illion houre worked. 
Tha frequency rataa are errlved at by dividing the nu-bsr of accidenta of a given, category 
by the total nuakor of houre apent en all typoe of work underground. 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS 
I. Fall· of Cround and lock· 
Tela category of accident· cover· falla of atona or coal fro« Ita natural altuacton 
It does not covar accidente cauaad by falli of ground reeulttng fro« one of che factor· 
Included under another category, for oxaaoW the use of explosives, explosion of Γ irada«? 
or duat. or an outbur«. Accident· cauaad by falla of atone in a caved «nate ahould be in-
cluded in thia category, on the other hand, accidenta during the »towing of vaata ahould 
be claaaed in category 5 "Falla of Objecta". Accident· cauaed by «ateriat· continuing to 
■ave after falling fro· Choir natural poaition are included under category 1 "Falla of 
ground and rock·", except where It la a c··· of «ateríala aet In notion by »o.e external 
eauaa aftar flrat coating to raat. 
Accidenta cauaed by any «nana of eranaporC «hachar atattonary or In notion, used to carry 
■on or objecta at tha faca. In ochar working·, In roadwnya, In ahafea, etaple pita, etc., 
including accident» cauaed by ehe angina· providing «otlve power for traneport. Thi· cate-
aory includes, for axaajplo, accidenta cauaed by lu«pa of coal falling fro« a conveyor bolt 
or blocke Of wood fro« a tub loaded with ttsAer, and aven thoea cauaed whan luape of coal 
are projected during their deacant dovn a fixed chute. An accident cauaed by tha gear wheel» 
or the driving «echanla« of a tranaport ayate« should also ba Included In category IT Trans-
port". 
Electrocution cauaed by a trolley «Ire ahould ba Included in category XI "Electricity
1'. 
a) Continuou· Traneport 
Transport oqutpaent which can receive produeee along the whole of lea length and «alntain 
a continuou· flov, 
b) Otacontlnuou· transport 
All other «aan· of traneport. 
Thla category ahould Includa accidente ceused particularly by akipa, cagae, ktbblae. ea 
veil a· accidenta Involving «en or objecte falling fro« th··· eagea, «kip» or kibblee, rope 
haulage·, locoaoclvoe, «onorell·. decking re»· and ochar •tallar davtcea. 
III, Fall· and «ova—nt of tha vtctl« 
a) Ubile aevlng ebeut the «ine 
Fall· of «en into e shaft or acople pit, fella In general, acunóle», «lip·, knock· and bustos. 
sprains of llene, etc., whatever Che cause, should be Included, es long es the basic cauae 
of the accident la the vieti«'· «oveaene through the «ine in the couree of or at tha piece 
of work and no «nana of transport is involved; the laccar ahould be Included In cecegory II 
"Tranaporc" or III b "Falla of vieti« during ochar acclvltiae" respectively. 
b) In Che course of other activities 
Falla of «en Into e ahaft or atapla pit, falla tn general, atuoolee, alipa, knocke and hunos, 
apralne of li«e, etc., aa long aa the fall vea cauaad basically by »o-e particular activity 
and not by the «ovoaont of the vtctl« ebout the «Ine, which la covered In III a. 
Thia category should only Inelude occidente cauaed by the victia^ falling during hie actual 
work and not during the couree of «ovlng «bout tha «ine aa under category III a 'Talle of 
vieti« while «ovlng about the sine". 
IV. Machines, tools and supports 
a) Machine ι 
Accident· caused by englnee powering e «aan· of traneport ehould be included in category II 
"Traneport". Category IV coverà occidente occurring during the etarttng up and running of 
other «achina·. 
Accidenta cmaed by «achinee falling while being «ovod will be included In category V "Falle 
of objects". 
b) Toole 
sar¿-=: Ä SÄ S¿W-- SÌA BÄÄ ¡Ä 
!oeU ehould be put IntTc.tegory V "Falle of objecte". 
c) Support· 
»Uh r.,..- «. «CU..,. ..curri», dujUj ^^'^•¿,^ΐ.'.Π.^ί.'Γ.'Ιϊ.« 
gory V "Falla of objecte". 
Category IV only cover· accident· arising fro« the wee end navoaant of «Mhlaea, teole aad 
en^tpcMtnt, It le ca**aaiaed In the enee of »upper t a ¡Egg only accident. «Marring during 
the setting up end rasaeval of thi· esjulpaemt ahould «e included In thie category. 
V. Fell» of objecte 
Accidente Involving the falling or dislodging of excavated «neertel, and of object* each M 
fraae, cl«ber, coole, propa. pip··· «ateríais, etc. 
This category include· not only aacldanta caused dtreetly by felle of excavating aaterUl 
or object·, but also those cauaed by objecte falling while being handled. 
VI. Explosiv.s 
Accidente occurring during the transport or handling of axpleelvea, Che charging of shet-
helaa, accidental or preaecure firing of aheCS, Inadequate protection of poreenne1, wnfired 
«^plosives being hit by picks or drill·, ala-flrae, long fires, reelduea and poisoning by 
twaes fro« explosive». 
«here the uae of explosives eet· off an exploelon of fire-deep or dust or even e heetlng 
or a fire, Che accident ahould be included In cecegory VII or IX roepecclvely. 
VII. Ignición» or exploelon» of firede«« and coal duat 
Thla include· poisoning or suffocation by the gaaae so produced. An expleeien of ftrodaan) 
or coal duat brought about by the uae of electricity ehould be «leeatfiod under category 
VII. Aa a general rule. If che causas of an aacldent Include the Ignition or explosion or 
ftrodaatp or duat, It should always be Included in category VII. 
VIII. Outbursts of gas - Dooxygonatlo«, euffocetton or poisoning by natural gaaee (CO), 
ÍH*. CO. H2lY 
a] Outburate of ga» 
Accident· cauaed by ejected «atortele of roof falla caused by »odden outbursts of gaa. In 
accordane« with the rule eet out for category VII, If the outburst ta followed by en easle· 
eion of firede««, eny occidente caused thereby should be Included In category ΑΊΙ "ignitions 
or explosions of flredeap or explosion» of coal duat". 
b) Deoxyganatton and polaoning by natural ga··· (CO]. CRg ,C0, P.l) 
This includa» accidenta cauaed by leek of oxygen, by ouffooatlon (CI·., CO]) ud by pol »em in* 
(CO, H,S). If ouffoceclon or poisoning Is brought ebout by gee produced by expleelvea or by 
ea exploelon of firede«« or coal duet, or even by a heating or fire, the accident ehould be 
cleeelfled under those catagorlae. If suffocation or poisoning la caused by exhauat fuss·· 
fro« dleeet engines, the accidenta ahould bo Included In cateaery IV, "Explosive·". 
IX. Moatlnxa or ftres 
This Includes poisoning or suffocation by the gaaee produci, Injuriée fro« buree, roof 
falíe. filia of objecte, etc. folioving e hasting or fir. In the «Ine. A fir. relieving .n 
esploslon of flradaap or coei duet ehould be thia eetogory. 
Ie ienerä!, If tha accident te due to eeverel eo-olned couses including a heating br a firo. 
t Should -lw.y. ba included In cecegory IX "Heeclnge or fire." uni... «no of che esusas la 
tao ignition or exploelon of flredeee or coal duat, In thi· UK ce·· the accident would 
be included In category VII, 
X. Inrushes 
Accidents occurring when old working· «re broken Into or whan dead ground I· enanuntered. 
Isjurtea fro« projected «aterlei, fella of objecte, fell· of ground drowning, «e, 
XI. Electricity 
Accident· caused by electricity - bume, shock·, eloetroeutUn. If eloctrlelty souses th« 
accidental firing of explosives, an «plosion of f 1 rod·«* or coal duet or ·""»·»·' * 
fire, the reeulttng accident ahould bo Include« In these etageri., in th. following order 
of priority ι 
1. Explosion of flredeap or dust 
2. A heating or fire 
1. Exploelves 
XII. Other csusss 
This category cover· accidents vhtah cannot be clssslflsd under categories I to XI. that 
Is to eay* accidence of which It I· not pOMlbile Λ· eetahllah the exact eauae. Thla oa-
tegory nay elio be used to record occident· covered by oasBproeaed air. 
SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
Thla «eans the placa where the vieti« vee et the tlao of the acold.ne, whleh aey be diffé-
rant froa the vieti·'· noraal pleca of tork. 
I. Production feces 
This co-arises th. working fece including che part between the face or etaple hole and the 
•towed or caved waate but doa» not Include roads of any kind except dunay roade. 
ï. Head tnti excluding ehafta end eteple pits 
This alee coverà the erea where loading, ttaberlng and steelwork ere eerrled out i—edi.t, 
ly behind the face. In the csss of slusher peeking the aurrlng eroe extends up to sad In-
cluding the Una of propa. 
Develepoont headings ahould ba considered as drift·. 
3. Shaft· and »tapia pits 
This also covers th. tssudtata approach to lnaoto eapoelelty whore aleo oor» end »toree ere 
loaded and unloaded froa the ease·. 
*. Other place» 
This heeding covere ell the vieti«· of eceldent· not Included under the three preceding 
FOL 100 OF IISCAFACITT 
Accidenta ehould be brohen down aa follow· according to perioda of Incapacity ι 
- Accidente Involving en absence of becveon 4 and 20 calender daya 
- Accidenta Involving en absence of betveen 21 end S* calendar days 
- Accidente Involving an abaence of «ora than 34 calendar daye 
- Fatal accidenta. 
The dey of the occident doe» not count. The nussber of deye of Incapacity to ba taken Into 
conaidaraclon la defined by Che effecctve abaence «f the «t«er froa work. 
tete-CENSUAL DEFINITIONS 
ANNEX 
Explanatory notes  Tables 2 
I. Accident 
Bodily injury resulting froa e sudden and abnort  xcnrnal causo in the courae of work. 
The Mine Safety and Health Coaeiaaion'« statistic· should only cover vlctia· of accidente 
underground, including accident· which occur when non enter and l.ave th« cage» and while 
the cages are in notion. 
2. Fatal accident 
An accident cauelng the death of the vlctla wiehin 56 day· following the accident. Victia· 
dying aor· than 56 day» after th« day of the accident ahould not be included in the fatal 
accidents category but in thet of accidence reeulttng in incapacity involving en abaence 
froa work of acre than 56 day·. 
3. Persons covered by the etatistics 
Fit ataff and «aployaos of contractor fira· who belong to a alner'e eoeiel security scheaa. 
Th« atatiacica count victia· and not accidenta; everyone who is the victia of an accident 
while actually underground aa well as during doaeent and aacant ehould be included. Victiae 
can therefore only b« «tnere. eupervleor·, engineer· or etaff belonging to contractor fir«·. 
4. Shifts and nunfear of hour« worked 
Sblfta and nuaber of hours worked by th« person»  the books of the aine end other etaff 
account should be taken both of extra shifts  belonging Co a arnera' social inaurance ach« 
and overtina. 
The period of reference adoptad ia th« portod of actual exposure to riak; extra shifts and 
overtisM oust therefor be counted in terns of tine actually worked and not of number of 
houre paid. 
5. Accident rates 
Nuaber of accident· par «Ullon hours worked. 
Th« frequency rat«· are arrived at by dividing Che nuaber of accidents of a ti"«" category 
by th« total nuaber of hour» spent on all type» of work underground. 
9. Location of the injury 
When an accident ha· resulted in aultiple injurie» to different part« of th« body and on« 
of the injuries ia clearly aer« aerioua than tha others, thia accident ahould b« classified 
In the group relating to the part of th« body most seriously Ínjured¡ for example, a frac-
ture of the leg, together with grating of a hand, ehould bo classified In category VI "Lower 
Habe" and not in cetegury V "Hand·". 
I. Head and neck 
Covere in particular the skull, the scalp, brain injuries, che eara, the aouth (including 
th« lip·, teeth and tongue), the no··, the face, the neck but not the eye» which are in-
cluded in category II. 
II. Eyss 
Aleo covar· the «y« socket and tha optic nerve. 
Covere the back (vertebra· and adjacent «úselas, the apinal «errou), tha thorax (ribs, 
sternum, bronchi, lung·), the abdoaon (including internal organ·, kidney·, liver, ·ρΙ·«η), 
tha abdoaen and the genital organe. 
The ahouldere and wriacg are regarded a· pert of the upper liaba (category IV) end not 
of the trunk or hende (cetegory V). 
The bipa and the ankle· are regarded as pert of the lowar liabe (category VI) end not 
aa part of the trunk or feet (cetegory VII). 
IV. Upper ljab» (excluding the hand») 
Thi· include· injuries to Che »boulder·, including the coller bone end ehoulder blade«, 
injuries to th« arm», elbows, forearms end wrists. 
V. Hand» 
The wrists ara not regarded ea part of the hands but of the upper limbs (category IV), 
VI. Lower liaba (excluding feet) 
Thia includes the hip·, thigh·, knees, lege end ankle·. 
VII. feet 
The enkle· ere not regarded a· pert of the feet but of the lower Unto« (category VI). 
Vili. Multiple locations 
Thia group, covering «ultiple location·, should only be uaad when the victia hae Buffered 
•everal injurie· to different pert« of hi· bodv, nona of which ia eleerly acre serious then 
tha other·. 
The category «ay cover injurie» to the head and trunk, the hand and one or «»re limbs, tha 
trunk and one or «ore limb» or an upper end e lower linb. 
IX. Not apecifled 
This group ahould only be uaad whan there la no evidence of the exact locetlon of the Injury. 
10. Heture of th« Injury 
When an accident he· resulted In leverei injuries to different pert· of th· body end one 
of the« is eleerly «ore serious then the others, the occident should be classified in the 
group releting co che noie serious injury. 
1. Amputations end enucleation» 
This Include· treuaetic avulaion of the eye. 
2. Fractures with or without dislocation 
Thi» include* staple fractura·; fractures with Injurie· to the soft pert· of the body, 
cloaad or compound fracture·; fractures with internel or nerve damage, fracture· with luxa-
tions, contusion» and cruahlng·. 
3. Luxation», twists and apralne 
LUXATIONS 
Thia cover» minor luxations and dislocations, treuaetic luabago, lumbago sciatica caused 
by »train; it doe· not Include luxations with fracture covered by cetegory 2. 
TWISTS AND SPRAINS 
This cover· rupture·, torn end lacerated muscles, tendons, ligaments end joints a· well «· 
hernie due to atrain and slipped disca, except when they ara associated vlch open wound·. 
4. Concussion end internel injury 
This cetegory includes internel bruising, internal bleeding, internal lacerations end rup-
tures except where associated with fractures. 
It does not include internal injuries accompanied by fractures which ere covered by cete-
gory 2. 
5. Open wounds, com  ■ and «oscular «bra»ions 
Thia covere leeeration·, flesh wounds, cute, contusion·, scalp wound·, loa· of e nati or 
an aer, wounda with nerve Injuries, haemarthosia, heenatoae end bruises, contusions and 
bruiaaa with superficial wounds. It dooa not include traumatic amputation, enucleations 
or avulaion of an eye, which ere covered by cecegory I, compound fracture·, contusions end 
crushing· accompanying e fracture which ere covered by cetegory 2, concussion covered by 4, 
burns with wound· covered by 6. 
6. Burns and harmful affecta of electrictly end radiation 
Cover· burna free fire, boiling liquid, friction, cheatcel substances (external burn· öhly), 
burn· with wound·, electrocution, electric ahock and burns caused by electricity, the ef-
fect of X-rays, radioactive substances, ultra violet rey· end Ionising redletton. 
It dosa not cover burna causad by the absorption of e corrosive or caustic •ubaCance which 
ere cleasified in cetegory 7. 
7. Poisoning end suffocetion 
This category covers the effect· of the injection, ingestion, absorption or Inhalation of 
toxic, corrosive or caustic substances. 
Asphyxiation or suffocetion by compression or roof fall; asphyxiation due to the suppression 
or reduction of oxygen in the atmosphere, the entry of e foreign bodies into the raapiratory 
system, to cerbon monoxide or other toxic gases. 
8· Multiple injuries or those not specified (including coetplicetion«) 
Thi» cetegory include» those cesa· in which the vieti« he» suffered several injurtea of dif-
ferent type«, none of which is clearly «ore serious then Che other·, and those which ere 
not covered in any other category. 
It eleo cover· Che variou» early complications of injuriée end pathological reactions, which, 
however, ehould only be classified in this group when the nature of the originel injury ia 
not known.
 
v ' 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Accidents ahould ba broken down according to two periods of incepecity : 
- accidents involving en «bienes of more then 56 celender dey» 
- fatal accidente. 
The dey of th« eccident doea not count. The nuaber of deye of incepecity to b« taken iato 
consideration ie defined by the effective absence of the miner frees work. 
U) Comparative table of number of persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958-1978 per '000,000man-hours 
(frequency) 
COMMUNITY
 
V
I ΠΧ since 1977) 
U Falls 
2) Haulage and tran 
3) Movement of pi 
4) Machi and 
supp·■.' 
7) Explos 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp. 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Ele 
12) Other causes 
1958 
4,846 
2,602 
2,003 
1,098 
1,962 
0,023 
0,017 
0,002 
0,002 
0,010 
0,985 
13,551 
1959 
4,490 
2,347 
1,823 
1,064 
2,161 
0,020 
0,030 
0,008 
1,012 
12,954 
1960 
4,571 
2,310 
2,185 
1,264 
2,105 
0,017 
0,010 
0,002 
0,010 
0,513 
12,986 
1961 
4,434 
2,371 
2,185 
1,423 
2,353 
0,012 
0,001 
0,001 
0,018 
0,428 
13,227 
1962 
4,387 
2,521 
2,282 
1,712 
2.375 
0,018 
0,071 
0,001 
0,007 
0,404 
13,781 
1963 
4,337 
2,520 
2,261 
1,818 
2,406 
0,010 
0,006 
0,002 
0,012 
0,390 
13,781 
1964 
4,509 
2,346 
2,326 
1,848 
2,442 
0,011 
0,001 
0,003 
0,008 
0,364 
13,861 
1965 
4,215 
2,416 
2,354 
1,773 
2,415 
0,013 
0,011 
0,002 
0,002 
0,006 
0,289 
13,506 
1966 
4,186 
2,173 
2,320 
1,815 
2,362 
0,007 
0,016 
0,001 
0,001 
0,007 
0,354 
13,242 
1967 
4,060 
2,037 
2,354 
1,790 
2,638 
0,019 
-
0,003-
0,005 
0,337 
13,246 
1968 
4,261 
2,139 
2,795 
1,945 
2,858 
0,015 
0,002 
0,002 
0,002 
0,010 
0,341 
14,370 
1969 
4,492 
2,118 
3,023 
1,865 
3,185 
0,019 
0,004 
0,021 
0,333 
15,160 
1970 
4,135 
2,016 
3,084 
2,011 
3,308 
0,011 
0,025 
0,009 
0.014 
0,434 
15,047 
1971 
4,109 
1,953 
3,117 
1,876 
3,506 
0,00? 
0,007 
0,002 
0,007 
0,509 
15,088 
1972 
4,08 
1,93 
3,47 
1.75 
3,62 
0,008 
_ 
0,003 
0,008 
0,73 
15,60 
1973 
4,29 
2,11 
3,88 
2,01 
3,63 
_ 
_ 
0,003 
0,009 
0,006 
0,84 
16,77 
1974 
4,15 
1,91 
3,89 
1,98 
3,62 
0,01 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
0,53 
16,12 
1975 
3,61 
2,28 
3,38 
2,29 
3,08 
0,006 
_ 
0,003 
0,003 
0,16 
0,37 
15,05 
1976 
3,« 
2.H 
3,67 
2,15 
3.0Θ 
0,01 
-
0,003 
0,01 
0.« 
14,92 
1577 
2.31 
1,82 
3,05 
1,67 
1,93 
0,01 
-
_ 
0,70 
11, M 
1978 
2,36 
1,83 
3,12 
1,62 
2,04 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,62 
11,6? Β. 
Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958-1978 
per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
COMMUNITY VI (IX since 1977) 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
0,253 
0,147 
0,057 
0,011 
0,045 
0,009 
0,032 
0,016 
-
0,002 
0,016 
0,023 
0,610 
1959 
0,242 
0,141 
0,063 
0,028 
0,077 
0,010 
0,036 
0,010 
0,003 
0,002 
0,007 
0,021 
0,590 
1960 
0,235 
0,146 
0,047 
0,012 
0,024 
0,002 
0,002 
0,006 
-
0,001 
0,007 
0,024 
0,507 
1961 
0,217 
0,168 
0,056 
0,021 
0,041 
-
_ 
0,003 
0,001 
0,006 
0,004 
0,029 
0,546 
1962 
0,234 
0,124 
0,045 
0,037 
0,062 
0,002 
0,375 
0,007 
-
0,005 
0,008 
0,032 
0,932 
1963 
0,217 
0,167 
0,060 
0,013 
0,046 
0,001 
0,001 
0,005 
0,003 
0,005 
0,008 
0,021 
0,547 
1964 
0,175 
0,178 
0,045 
0,030 
0,037 
0,002 
0,001 
0,002 
0,005 
-
0,003 
0,014 
0,492 
1965 
0,177 
0,149 
0,051 
0,024 
0,037 
0,002 
0,053 
0,006 
0,005 
0,001 
0,004 
0,013 
0,522 
1966 
0,208 
0,160 
0,060 
0,023 
0,030 
0,001 
0,030 
0,004 
-
-
0,003 
0,017 
0,536 
1967 
0,192 
0,128 
0,044 
0,024 
0,036 
0,002 
-
0,012 
-
0,002 
0,004 
0,015 
0,457 
1968 
0,160 
0,115 
0,054 
0,017 
0,040 
0,006 
0,044 
0,006 
-
-
0,006 
0,012 
0,460 
1969 
0,176 
0,145 
0,038 
0,023 
0,031 
-
-
0,004 
-
-
0,006 
0,015 
0,438 
1970 
0,135 
0,132 
0,039 
0,027 
0,025 
0,002 
0,037 
-
-
0,011 
0,004 
0,016 
0,429 
1971 
0,133 
0,104 
0,043 
0,029 
0,041 
0,005 
0,005 
0,027 
-
-
-
0,053 
0,440 
1972 
0,092 
0,141 
0,043 
0,019 
0,038 
-
-
0,022 
0,003 
0,003 
0,003 
0,035 
0,399 
1973 
0,13 
0,12 
0,04 
0,02 
0,02 
-
-
0,012 
-
0,003 
0,003 
0,06 
0,413 
1974 
0,11 
0,08 
0,05 
0,02 
0,04 
-
0,13 
-
-
-
-
0,02 
0,456 
1975 
0,10 
0,11 
0,047 
0,047 
0,038 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,003 
0,35 
1976 
0,07 
0,09 
0.06 
0.05 
0,0* 
0.006 
0,06 
0,006 
-
-
0,003 
0,02 
0,*2 
1977 
0.05 
0,03 
0.02 
0,02 
0,t1 
0,01 
-
-
0.01 
-
-
0,01 
0.20 
1978 
0,08 
0,11 
0,02 
0,02 
0,01 
0,00 
-
-
" 
m 
0,25 COMPARATIVE TABLE OF UNDERGROUND GROUP ACCIDENTS 
years 1960-1978 
CAUSES J I960 
1. Falls of ground Π 
2. Haulage and transport 
?. Movement of personnel] 
4· Machinery, ¡landing of 
tools and supports 
5. Falling objects 
6· plosives 
Explosions of firedamp j 
or foni dust 1— 
α 
Sudden outburst of fl 
firpdanm suffocation bvínc 
9· Underground combustici 
i0_ Inrushes of water 
11. Electricity . 
12. Other causes 
TOTAL i 2 
a 
2  10 
196I 
Η 
1 
η 
7 
1962 
Η 
3 
Β O 
3 18 
1963  1964 i 1965 
7Ì 
—I ■ I I—1—J—1—j— 
Η 
ι 1 
! , 
Η 
a 
ZÍJ 
2 
T" 
røliT  Ir«  b 
M 
3  52 
r-t-t-r 1 
Ι ι I ! 
1 ' ! ! 
(38 
5 14 
—+-"-1 ( 1—|—1—'——1—1—1—Γ 
ifjres t 1 t. ι ι ι ι ι 1 
10 
t-\ t 1 1 1 1 ' ' 1 1 
t t i ι 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
-J—1—| 1 1—Η—r—+—' ■ 
1 . . ¡ 1 . i 1 i I 1 
1 
1-1— 
7 
m-
5  55p 
1 1 1 .1 
2  5  14 
1 
1 1 
Ι ι 1 
1966  1967  1968 
If η Vi 
I 1 I 1 I I 1 I 
1 1 1 1 1 ' ' 1 
ill 
1969 
Ula 
1 
1 
Ι Ι Ι ! 1 1 1 1 1 II 
ÍI I l'I 1 1 1 ITI M 
h 
6 
5 
. ,,...ιιιι .J—1 1 
1 
3 4 
I 
1 
il 
1 
1 
3 11 
1 
21 
ι 1 
I I 
1 1 
1 1 
1  17 
..i.... 
Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι ι ι 1 l l 1 1 I 1 
1 1 1 1 1 l'i l'I l'I 
I 1 i I 1 I 1 I 1 M '' I 
. 1 1 1 1 r · 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 
1 
3 4 M 
I 
4' 
Γ Τ I 1 1 
I 1  -I 
11  lì  2  H 
197c 
Ni a 
.,1 
b ï 
2 
1 1 1 
1971 
a b 
--£ 
1972 
Kla b 
, ι—Ι 
Í 11-.4. l_i 
1 ' 1 ■ ι ι ι 1 1 
. ι ι μι 4- ι ι ι 1 
M 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 ' 
.1.1-4-1 lili 
1  me 
i 11 
Milli 
ι 
8 
III 
II I ! ! ! I i 1 
1 M 1 I 1 I I I  I 1 1 ' ■ 1,11 
MIMIMI 
1  1116 
Ι  , μ ι 
1973 
Β a b F 
2 9 1 
1974 Ι 1975 197É 
a b IHIalb H a 
1 
ι I--I-4— 
5 
ι 14-4-4— 
Ι Ψ \ — 
ill 
444-
* 
i i 1 
1 1 1 1 1 III 
MUÍ III 
ι ι ι t 1 IMI 
-Η-f  1 ι 
11 
5 
ι g i i 1 
42 E . 1 
. Il 
Ι Ι II Ι lil 
1.1 ιι I-..1-+4-Í-
Ι ι 14-t- i 1 ι i 
-11 1 ι i Ini 
2  9 : 
. 
î 6 «7 Ι 
li Γ r 
b 
16 
197· 
Tí a 
1 
! 
b 
/ 
] 
1 
978 
a b 
J 
197S 
B a 
/ 
bT 
— 
(l) Accudente involving more -than five casualties of type (a), 
(υ) Humber of groups accidents. 
(a) Casualties were unable to resume work below ground for at least eight weeks. 
(b) Casualties died within eight weeks. 
-J 1 
fcsjBjsaseaesea 
¡Ί β ¡J 
m fi,.s-
3CT 
3,227 
377ΗΓ 
13,761 
13,660 
13,506 
ΓΤ 
1-3,242 
13,246 
L4.370 
-5,047 
88 
— 
197: 
1974 
'ftn 
L,60 
38  1,555 
1,722 
kf$t f * 
75 MIHF.-3 3.V CT V Afp HFAL'H 
o' accidents underground in coal mines 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures)  YEAR 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 
1978 
IX - 557.159.302  Table 1a 
X^ SiTE OF THE ACCIDENT 
""V. Perlad ot 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS ^sjnMpKiiy 
I FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II TRANSPORT. TOTAL 
ai Continuou, Transport 
-sntinuaus Transport 
III FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about the mine 
the course ot other activities 
IV MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
hines 
b) Tools 
V FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI EXPLOSIVES 
VII IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
Vili OUTBURSTS OF GAS. DE-OXYGENATION. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU­
RAL GASES (CO,. CH.. CO. H,S). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) Oe-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural G ases 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI ELECTRICITY 
XII. ΟΤΉΕΗ CAUSES 
TOTAL 
Production (aces 
1 
4 to 
20 
days 
7387 
1282 
218 
1064 
3875 
6*7 
3228 
«16 
599 
951 
2666 
M 28 
22 
-
1 
1 
-
-
3 
133S 
22253 
21 to 
se 
days 
('I 
2735 
5,5 
150 
395 
21« 
235 
1908 
1691 
282 
3,7 
1062 
1805 
6 
-
-
-
1 
-
1 
3B9 
9316 
^56 
days 
822 
2,0 
80 
160 
525 
5? 
«8 
457 
110 
59 
288 
57V 
3 
-
-
-
-
1 
-
91 
2713 
Fatal 
acci­
dents 
27 
11 
5 
6 
5 
5 
7 
3 
-
4 
3 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
54 
total 
10971 
2078 
453 
1625 
6548 
939 
5609 
6371 
994 
1357 
4020 
6510 
32 
-
1 
1 
-
1 
4 
i 
1816 
34336 
Headings oxcludlng 
shatts and staple-pits 
2 
4 to 
20 
days 
3048 
590 
104 
486 
2306 
406 
1900 
1901 
236 
621 
1044 
1899 
10 
-
8 
3 
5 
-
-
4 
756 
10522 
21 to 
56 
days 
("1 
1075 
265 
57 
208 
1177 
177 
1000 
706 
139 
204 
363 
684 
2 
-
1 
-
1 
-
-
-
190 
4100 
>56 
days 
(»1 
369 
129 
31 
98 
351 
61 
290 
206 
69 
55 
82 
182 
-
2 
2 
-
-
-
-
37 
1279 
Fatal 
acci­
dents 
15 
2 
-
2 
I 
-
1 
1 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
19 
total 
4507 
986 
192 
794 
3835 
644 
3191 
2814 
445 
880 
1489 
2765 
15 
-
11 
5 
fi 
-
-
4 
983 
15920 
Shafts and staple-pits 
3 
4 to 
20 
days 
<
JI 
33 
133 
3 
130 
284 
47 
237 
78 
17 
48 
20 
187 
2 
-
-
-
-
-
63 
780 
21IO 
56 
days 
(") 
7 
94 
1 
93 
188 
16 
172 
32 
B 
19 
5 
71 
-
-
-
-
-
25 
417 
>56 
days 
I
3) 
4 
48 
1 
47 
6? 
7 
60 
4 
" 
4 
-
39 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
6 
168 
Fatal 
acci­
dents 
-
7 
1 
6 
4 
-
4 
-
■ 
-
-
2 
-
-
_ 
-
• -
-
-
-
-
13 
total 
44 
282 
6 
276 
543 
70 
473 
114 
20 
69 
25 
299 
2 
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
94 
1378 
Other places 
4 
4 to 
20 
daya 
1245 
3213 
227 
2986 
8107 
3389 
4718 
2692 
272 
882 
1588 
3010 
14 
-
1 
1 
-
1 
2 
11 
3289 
21585 
21to 
56 
days 
(»1 
465 
1434 
104 
1330 
3306 
1205 
2101 
938 
Hb 
307 
536 
1188 
4 
_ 
-
-
1 
-
9 
1105 
8450 
>S6 
days 
120 
603 
58 
545 
794 
315 
479 
235 
43 
82 
110 
342 
1 
-
1 
1 
-
1 
1 
5 
209 
2312 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
2 
44 
2 
42 
1 
-
1 
2 
2 
-
-
1 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
2 
52 
total 
1832 
5294 
391 
4903 
12208 
4909 
7299 
3867 
367 
1271 
2234 
4541 
19 
2 
2 
-
3 
3 
25 
4605 
32399 
Totat ol 
accidents underground 
5 
4 lo 
20 
days 
<") 
11713 
5218 
552 
4666 
14572 
4489 
10083 
8887 
1069 
2500 
5318 
9224 
48 
-
10 
5 
5 
1 
5 
18 
5444 
55140 
21 to 
56 
days 
('1 
4282 
233B 
312 
2026 
6B14 
1633 
5181 
3367 
574 
877 
1966 
3748 
12 
-
1 
-
1 
2 
-
10 
1709 
22283 
>56 
days 
('1 
1315 
1020 
170 
850 
1737 
440 
1297 
902 
m 
200 
480 
1137 
7 
343 
6472 
Faial 
acci-
dents 
44 
64 
8-
56 
11 
-
11 
10 
b 
-
4 
6 
1 
_ 
-
-
■-
-
-
2 
138 
total 
17354 
8640 
1042 
7598 
23134 
6562 
16572 
13166 
1821 
3577 
7768 
14115 
68 
-
14 
8 
6 
4 
7 
33 
749S 
84033 
Group 
accidents l
f) 
6 
56 
days 
<"l 
3 
3 
3 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
7 
7 
" 
total 
10 
10 
10 
("Numbf'of ho'irj wrifktrt by pit s'a" erM9nr>oloyw»3 if conlr arior tin««, who bplong 
{*i Aecida>if*i if .·&.<*■* mnt* ΙΙ,*Λ Itv« c»·· ml (.*« (i * whoiiitrer deri η» *· - úname io 
loa miners' soci-li insuran.-.n 
rsrsumewoitt undeiqiound lot 
hem«! 
it leas) e<Qht weeks) MINES SAFETY ANO HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Il minus 
COUNT RY 
COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates)  YEAR  1978  IX 
Table lb 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 557.159.308 
^S. SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
^s. Period of 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS ^incapacity 
1 FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II. TRANSPORT. TOTAL 
a) Continuous Trensport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about the mine 
b) in the course of other activities 
IV MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
Production laces 
1 
410 
20 
days 
('1 
13,26 
2,30 
0,39 
1,91 
6,95 
1,16 
5,79 
7,57 
1,08 
1.71 
4,78 
V.FALLS OF OBJECTS | 7,41 
VI. EXPLOSIVES ; „ „. 
VIL IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL OUST 
VIII OUTBURSTS OF GAS. DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO,. CH.. CO. H.S), 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts Ol Gas 
b) De-oxygenatlon and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X INRUSHES 
XI ELECTRICITY 
XII OTHER CA' 
TOTAL 
0,00 
0,00 
_ 
-
0,01 
0,01 
2,45 
39,94 
21IO 
56 
days 
(■) 
4,91 
0,98 
0,27 
0,71 
3,85 
0,42 
3.42 
3,04 
0,51 
0,62 
1.91 
3,24 
0,01 
-
_ 
0,00 
-
0,00 
0,70 
16,72 
>56 
days 
I") 
1,48 
0,43 
0,14 
0,29 
0,94 
0,10 
0,84 
0,82 
0,70 
0,11 
0,52 
1,03 
0,01 
-
_ 
0,00 
-
0,16 
4,87 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0,05 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
-
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
-
0,01 
0,01 
0,00 
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
0,10 
total 
19,69 
3,73 
0,81 
2,92 
11,75 
1,69 
10,07 
11,43 
1,78 
2,44 
7,22 
11,68 
0,06 
0,00 
0,00 
_ 
0,00 
0,01 
0,01 
3,26 
61,63 
Headings excluding 
shads and staple-pits 
2 
410 
20 
days 
5,47 
1,06 
0,19 
0,87 
4.14 
0,73 
3,41 
3,41 
0,42 
1,11 
1,87 
3,41 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
-
0,01 
1,36 
18.B9 
21 to 
56 
days 
P) 
1,93 
0,48 
0,10 
0,37 
2,11 
0,32 
1,79 
1.27 
0,25 
0,37 
0,65 
1,23 
0,00 
0,00 
-
0,00 
-
-
-
0,34 
7,36 
>56 
days 
(') 
0,66 
0,23 
0,06 
0,18 
0,63 
0,11 
0,52 
0,3? 
0,12 
0,10 
0,15 
0,33 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
-
-
-
0,07 
2,30 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0,03 
0,00 
-
0,00 
0,00 
-
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.03 
total 
. 8,09 
1.77 
0,34 
1,43 
6,87 
1.16 
5,73 
5,05 
0,80 
1,58 
2,67 
4,96 
0,03 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
-
— 
0,01 
1,76 
28,57 
Shafts and staple-pits 
3 
410 
20 
days 
P) 
0,06 
0,24 
0,01 
0.23 
0,51 
0,08 
0,43 
0,14 
0,02 
0,08 
0,04 
0,34 
0,00 
-
_ 
-
-
-
0,11 
1,40 
21 to 
56 
days 
0,01 
0,17 
0,00 
0,17 
0,34 
0,03 
0,31 
0,06 
0,01 
0,03 
0,01 
0,13 
_ 
-
-
-
-
0,04 
0,75 
>56 
days 
C) 
0,01 
0,09 
0,00 
0,03 
0,12 
0,01 
0,11 
0,01 
-
0,01 
-
0,07 
. 
_ 
-
-
-
0,01 
0.30 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
_ 
0,01 
0,00 
0,01 
0,01 
-
0,01 
-
-
-
-
0,00 
. 
_ 
-
-
-
. 
0,02 
total 
0,08 
0,51 
0,01 
0,50 
0,97 
0.13 
0,85 
0,20 
0,04 
0,12 
0,04 
0,54 
0,00 
_ 
-
-
-
0,17 
2.47 
Other places 
4 
4 to 
20 
days 
CI 
2,23 
5,77 
0,41 
5,36 
14,55 
6,08 
8,47 
4,83 
0,40 
1,58 
2,58 
5,40 
0,03 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,02 
5,90 
38,74 
2tto 
56 
days 
0,83 
2,57 
0,19 
2,39 
5,93 
2,16 
3,77 
1,68 
0,17 
0,55 
0,96 
2,13 
0,01 
_ 
0,00 
_ 
0,02 
1,98 
15,17 
>56 
days 
I
a) 
0,22 
'Ί,οβ 
0,10 
0,98 
1,43 
0,57 
0,86 
0,42 
0,08 
0,15 
0,20 
0,61 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
-
0,00 
0,01 
0,38 
4.15 
Fatal 
acci­
dents 
0,00 
0,08 
0,00 
0,08 
0,00 
-
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
-
-
0,00 
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
0,00 
0,09 
total 
3,29 
9,50 
0,70 
8,80 
21,91 
8,81 
13,10 
6,94 
0,65 
2,28 
4,01 
8,15 
0,03 
0,00 
0,00 
0,01 
0,01 
0,04 
8,27 
58,15 
Total ot 
accidents underground 
5 
410 
20 
days 
P) 
21,02 
9,37 
0,99 
8,37 
26,15 
8,06 
18,10 
15,95 
1,92 
4,49 
9,54 
16,56 
0,09 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
0,00 
0,01 
0,03 
9,7? 
98,97 
21 to 
56 
days 
('1 
7,69 
4,20 
0,56 
3,64 
12,23 
2,93 
9,30 
6,04 
0,94 
1.57 
3,53 
6,73 
0,02 
0,00 
_ 
0,00 
0,00 
-
0,02 
3,07 
39,99 
>56 
days 
('1 
2,36 
1,83 
0,31 
1,53 
3,12 
0,79 
2,33 
1,62 
0,40 
0,36 
0,86 
2,04 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,01 
0,62 
11,62 
Fatal 
acci­
dents 
0,08 
o.n 
0,01 
0,10 
0,02 
-
0,02 
0,02 
0,01 
-
0,01 
0,0? 
0,00 
_ 
-
-
-
0,00 
0,25 
total 
31.15 
15,51 
1,87 
13,64 
41,52 
11,78 
29,74 
23,63 
3.2? 
6,42 
13,94 
25,33 
0,12 
0,03 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,06 
13,46 
150,82 
Group 
accidents'
1) 
6 
56 
days 
('1 
Fatal 
acci­
dents 
0,01 
0.01 
total 
-oí Ved by pit staH and employees o' contractor firms who belong toa miners' social Insurance scheme 
- nettles (I ·. who etthe* died or were υηιΜβ to resume work underground tor at le«st eight weeks). 
1. 0,00 means 0,005 2. - means 0 mathematically. iw;t>.;^FFiTANnitC 
COMMISSIOM 
COUNTRY 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures) 
Tibi· 2a 
1978-IX 
, 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
1 Head and neck 
II Eyes 
'funk 
IV Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands) 
lands 
COAL-RELC 
€ 
1 
3 
0 
11? 
VI Lower limbs B c 
(p*rliidingleet)'*i 
Vil Feel 
VIII Mull'pl** locations 
IX Not specified 
TOTAL 
17 
? 
»1 
mputatir 
and 
nuclefllir 
1 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
3 
ns 
total 
2 
3 
0 
1 
112 
5 
17 
* 
m 
Mferter II 
days 
76 
193 
29* 
902 
6,5 
*u 
73 
2597 
Fracture 
h or will 
jislocatk 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
30 
16 
0 
0 
? 
D 
20 
68 
w-p In , 
5 
out 
η 
total 
106 
209 
29» 
902 
6*7 
»1» 
93 
';■■ ' V: 
2665 
iiii«, , v 
Luxations. 
twist and 
sprains 
3 
> 56 
days 
ι 'a. 
12 
332 
68 
67 
*02 
65 
η 
'. 
1020 
',l m*ur. 
Fatal 
occi. 
dents 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
: 
1 
»r.e ,Λ(Ι·Τ> 
total 
12 
332 
68 
67 
«02 
65 
75 
Ì 
i 
1021 
■ 
Concussion 
and Inter-
nal Injury 
4 
days 
(»I 
28 
1 
25 
9 
■ 
63 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
3 
0 
3 
3 
9 
total 
31 
1 
28 
12 
72 
Open wounds 
contusion 
and muscular 
abrasions 
5 
>56 
days 
(*) 
200 
79 
2*3 
2*7 
730 
61* 
266 
151 
2 
S32 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
* 
0 
3 
1 
0 
2 
0 
6 
0 
16 
totat 
20* 
79 
2*6 
2*8 
730 
616 
266 
157 
2 
25*8 
Burns and 
tinrrntulnllecls 
of electricity 
end radialton 
6 
>56 
days 
(51 
2 
* 
* 
2 
7 
5 
0 
2 
3 
29 
Fatal 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
total 
2 
* 
* 
2 
7 
5 
0 
2 
3 
29 
Poisoning 
and 
iuHoeatlon 
7 
days 
Í5) 
:.· :■ 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
,' \-
1 
1 
i«f Low· 
1 
6 
6 
total 
'■"'■ ,·:
:
 
7 
7 
YEAR 557.159.302 without Belgium 
MAN-HOURS WORKED!
1) 
Multiple Injurie* 
ofthose not 
specified ('ι 
Β 
-•56 
days 
15) 
13 
19 
6 
6 
6 
7 
0 
1* 
18-
89 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
2 
0 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
* 
25 
36 
total 
15 
19 
11 
6 
6 
7 
0 
18 
*3 
TOTAL 
4 to 
20 
days 
(') 
*115 
7337 
8*92 
*951 
12588 
8838 
3880 
2513 
270 
125 *798* 
21 to 
56 
days 
(·> 
1239 
262 
3636 
1673 
7637 
3667 
205* 
1026 
21288 
->56 
days 
332 
106 
803 
618 
182* 
1678 
762 
325 
2* 
6*7? 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
*0 
0 
27 
1 
0 
* 
0 
36 
3) 
139 
total Comparative table of number of persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958 ■ 1978 per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
FEDER A*L REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
4,843 
2,550 
2,497 
0,767 
2,537 
0,015 
0,011 
-
-
0,004 
0,010 
0,487 
13,721 
1959 
4,779 
2,569 
2,463 
0,914 
2,719 
0,011 
0,016 
-
-
-
0,014 
0,522 
14,007 
1960 
4,886 
2,445 
2,348 
0,920 
2,738 
0,010 
-
-
0,003 
-
0,012 
0,457 
13,819 
1961 
4,797 
2.458 
2,512 
0,867 
2,945 
0,009 
0,002 
-
0,002 
-
0,014 
0,503 
14,109 
1962 
4,682 
2,501 
2,608 
1,046 
3,077 
0,008 
0,123 
-
-
-
0,006 
0,488 
14,539 
1963 
4,663 
2,433 
2,646 
1,213 
3,038 
0,006 
0,010 
-
-
0,004 
0,012 
0,473 
14,499 
1964 
4,894 
2,385 
2,744 
1,242 
3,242 
0,006 
_· 
-
-
-
0,009 
0,477 
14,999 
1965 
4,732 
2,411 
3,032 
1,234 
3,344 
0,005 
0,014 
0,005 
-
-
0,002 
0,354 
15,133 
1966 
4,721 
2,067 
2,852 
1,244 
3,272 
0,005 
0,013 
-
-
-
0,010 
0,414 
14,5<>8 
1967 
4,524 
1,913 
2,974 
1,124 
3,642 
0,017 
-
0,003 
-
-
0,006 
0,396 
14,599 
1968 
4,618 
1,994 
3,300 
1,396 
3,773 
0,011 
0,004 
-
0,004 
-
0,011 
0,429 
15,540 
1969 
4,736 
2,195 
3,399 
1,291 
4,036 
0,007 
0,004 
-
-
-
0,026 
0,402 
16,096 
1970 
4,321 
2,007 
3,370 
1,382 
4,166 
0,008 
-
-
-
-
0,012 
0,532 
15,798 
1971 
4,354 
1,724 
3,246 
1,597 
3,313 
-
0,012 
-
-
-
0,008 
0,632 
14,886 
1972 
4,20 
1,81 
3,48 
1,38 
3,49 
-
-
-
-
-
0,01 
0,96 
15,31 
1973 
4,30 
1,80 
3,98 
1,61 
3,49 
-
-
-
-
-
0,005 
0,99 
16,19 
1974 
4,08 
1,68 
4,15 
1,58 
3,37 
0,01 
_ 
-
-
-
-
0,52 
15,40 
1975 
3,69 
2,16 
3,37 
2,16 
2,97 
-
-
— 
-
-
0,009 
0,32 
14,69 
1976 
3,*7 
1,89 
3.» 
1,85 
2,02 
0,01 
0,02 
— 
. 
-
0,01 
0,*0 
14,16 
1977 
3.67 
1,7* 
*,09 
7,09 
3,03 
. 
— 
-
-
. 
0,01 
0,36 
U.99 
1978 
3,48 
1,77 
M7 
1,90 
3,3*> 
-
-
-
-
-
0,01 
0,20 
H.87 
oo Β. 
Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958-1978 
per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
1) Falle of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
0,268 
0,179 
0,094 
0,010 
0,065 
0,009 
0,011 
0,005 
-
-
0,022 
0,025 
0,687 
1959 
0,290 
0,169 
0,097 
0,027 
0,041 
0,003 
0,012 
0,003 
0,003 
0,003 
0,008 
0,025 
0,680 
1960 
0,263 
0,182 
0,070 
0,012 
0,039 
0,003 
_ 
0,002 
-
0,002 
0,002 
0,036 
0,611 
1961 
0,216 
0,196 
0,086 
0,027 
0,065 
-
_ 
0,004 
0,002 
-
0,005 
0,049 
0,651 
1962 
0,280 
0,149 
0,059 
0,037 
0,072 
0,004 
0,660 
0,002 
-
-
0,010 
0,049 
1,344 
1963 
0,260 
0,178 
0¡089 
0,019 
0,072 
-
0,002 
_ 
0,006 
0,004 
0,002 
0,025 
0,657 
1964 
0,200 
0,300 
0,071 
0,028 
0,054 
0,002 
0,002 
_ 
0,009 
-
0,004 
0,017 
0,587 
1965 
0,184 
0,191 
0,070 
0,025 
0,058 
-
0,019 
0,002 
0,005 
-
0,005 
0,023 
0,582 
1966 
0,197 
0,175 
0,094 
0,030 
0,048 
-
0,056 
0,002 
-
-
-
0,027 
0,629 
1967 
0,206 
0,150 
0,076 
0,020 
0,063 
-
_ 
0,007 
-
-
0,003 
0,017 
0,542 
1968 
0,148 
0,126 
0,079 
0,014 
0,051 
0,004 
0,061 
_ 
-
-
0,004 
0,022 
0,509 
1969 
0,192 
0,143 
0,056 
0,034 
0,049 
-
. 
0,004 
-
-
0,004 
.0,022 
0,504 
1970 
0,113 
0,128 
0,058 
0,031 
0,035 
-
. 
. 
-
0,012 
0,004 
0,027 
0,408 
1971 
0,147 
0,103 
0,032 
0,032 
0,047 
-
0,008 
0,008 
-
-
-
0,083 
0,460 
1972 
0,10 
0,16 
0,06 
0,03 
0,06 
-
. 
0,004 
-
'-
0,004 
0,04 
0,46 
1973 
0,08 
0,13 
0,06 
0,02 
0,02 
-
-
0,005 
-
-
0,005 
0,09 
0,420 
1974 
0,12 
0,07 
0,06 
0,02 
0,04 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,03 
0,34 
1975 
0,12 
0,12 
0,06 
0,05 
0,05 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,005 
0,41 
1976 
0,06 
0,10 
0,07 
0,03 
0,05 
0,005 
0,01 
0,01 
-
-
0,005 
0,03 
0,377 
1977 
0,07 
0,09 
0,05 
0,0* 
0,02 
-
0,0* 
• 
0,01 
0.02 
0.» 
1978 
0,13 
0,H 
0,05 
0,04 
0,03 
Ο,ΟΊ 
0.4Ü 
• 
CTS MINES 3AF&TY *ΝΓ t'É-M-TH 
COMMISSION 
ConniK - Slatlslies LI» vidimi 
Ol acridenls unuV<jmund in coal minos 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures)  1978 - Bundesrepublik Table ι a 
YEA
R Deutschland-186.850.520 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 
^\^ SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
^s. Period ol 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS ^sin^Pacity 
1 FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II TRANSPORT. TOTAL 
a) Continuous Tranepert 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
al while moving about the mine 
b) in the course ol other activities 
IV MACHINES. TOOLS ANO SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
V FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI EXPLOSIVES 
VII IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL OUST 
VIII OUTBURSTS OF GAS. DE-OXYGENATION. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO,. CH.. CO. H,S). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts ol Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gar.es 
IX HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X INRUSHES 
XI ELECTRICITY 
XII OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
1 ') Number ol hou>, worved" by pil sun » ni employ*** 
Production laces 
1 
4 to 
20 
days 
('1 
1666 
172 
72 
100 
173* 
-
173* 
7*7 
1*0 
m 
32* 
1543 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3 
80 
59*5 
ot contino 
Zito 
56 
days 
l'I 
1075 
155 
69 
86 
1782 
-
1282 
Ml 
116 
152 
335 
978 
-
-
-
-
-
1 
-
1 
30 
*125 
or tiiim w 
>56 
days 
373 
93 
37 
56 
317 
-
317 
187 
57 
20 
110 
352 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
. 
12 
133* 
ho belong 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
1* 
6 
3 
3 
* 
-
* 
5 
3 
-
2 
3 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
. 
-
32 
Ιο * miner 
total 
3128 
*26 
181 
2*5 
3317 
-
3337 
15*2 
316 
*55 
771 
2876 
-
-
-
-
-
1 
-
* 
122 
11.435 
(' sooal if' 
Headings pxcluding 
shafts and staple-pits 
2 
4 to 
20 
days 
('1 
1152 
61 
20 
»1 
956 
-
956 
*31 
76 
216 
139 
633 
-
-
2 
-
2 
-
-
3 
55 
3293 
suranre sr 
21 to 
56 
days 
("1 
581 
60 
18 
*2 
660 
-
660 
285 
80 
10* 
101 
33* 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
21 
19*1 
hume 
>56 
days 
('1 
225 
*3 
1* 
29 
179 
-
178 
100 
*6 
26 
78 
11* 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
11 
S71 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
η 
-
. 
-
1 
-
1 
1 
1 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
11 
total 
1967 
16* 
52 
112 
1795 
-
1795 
817 
203 
3*6 
268 
1081 
-
2 
-
2 
-
-
3 
87 
5916 
Shafts and staple-pits 
3 
4 to 
20 
days 
6 
*0 
2 
38 
16* 
6 
158 
25 
6 
18 
1 
59 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
11 
305 
2tto 
56 
days 
6 
51 
. 
51 
150 
-
150 
23 
7 
. 1* 
2 
*7 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
. 
* 
281 
>56 
days 
(
al 
3 
25 
1 
2* 
61 
2 
59 
3 
-
3 
-
26 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
118 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
-
6 
1 
5 
( 
-
* 
-
-
-
-
2 
-
-
-
-
' -
-
-
-
-
12 
total 
15 
122 
* 
118 
379 
8 
371 
51 
13 
35 
3 
13* 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
15 
716 
Oilier places 
4 
4 to 
20 
days 
(■l 
236 
211 
23 
188 
130* 
1 
1303 
311 
62 
201 
51 
668 
-
-
1 
1 
-
-
-
2 
55 
2793 
21 to 
56 
days 
(") 
163 
235 
16 
219 
888 
-
888 
156 
39 
78 
39 
382 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
6 
28 
1851 
■56 
days 
49 
169 
20 
1*9 
22* 
-
22* 
65 
25 
26 
Η 
133 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2 
Η 
656 
Faial 
acci-
dents 
1 
15 
-
15 
1 
-
1 
1 
1 
-
-
I 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 
20 
total 
449 
630 
59 
571 
2*17 
1 
2*16 
538 
127 
307 
10* 
im 
-
-
1 
1 
-
-
10 
98 
5327 
Total of 
accidents underground 
5 
»to 
20 
days 
3060 
484 
117 
367 
«15« 
7 
4151 
1519 
28* 
720 
515 
2903 
-
-
3 
1 
2 
1 
-
8 
201 
12336 
21 to 
56 
days 
('1 
1825 
501 
103 
398 
2980 
-
2980 
1067 
2*2 
3*8 
477 
17*1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
7 
83 
8205 
-■ 56 
days 
f') 
650 
330 
72 
25R 
780 
2 
778 
355 
128 
75 
152 
625 
-
-
-
-
» 
-
-
2 
37 
2779 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
2* 
27 
* 
23 
10 
-
10 
7 
5 
-
2 
6 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 
75 
total 
5555 
13*2 
296 
10*6 
7928 
9 
7919 
2948 
659 
11*3 
11*6 
5275 
-
-
3 
1 
2 
1 
-
17 
322 
23395 
Group 
accidents f
1! 
6 
56 
days 
<>l 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
?-*, *·:ξ- i·»·»!- iti-ïl.>.j«i^tri»tnsri*iv«'-i' td t.«t ί· t .>^*»«>M*t «J >d κ» s 
f*.r ¡ρ·*-**, · η, -i 
tt*ti>>tij rftjjn ».ν'». υι"ΐ·»α.οο*ν-; In -il t«*«il «tout *Λ#·<5\ MIN«-« SAFCTV AND HHAUH 
COMMISSION 
Conu«i';i?t.iHrtir.r, nn vlctin-.s 
ol ar.cld«»nls IIIKÌW.IICUIHJ ¡n cool minos 
COUNIRY 
COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates)  YEAR
 
197
8 - Bundesrepublik EJêulafihlanc 
MAN-HOURS WORKED o 186.850.520 
^v. SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
>^ Period ol 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS \i
n"P«
cl,Y 
1. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II. TRANSPORT. TOTAL 
■) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about the mine 
b) in the course ot other activities 
IV. MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
V.FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VII IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREOAMP AND COAL OUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO,. CH«. CO. H,S). 
TOTAL \ 
a) Outbursts olGss 
b) De-oxygen ahon and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII. OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
Production laces 
1 
4 to 
20 
days 
C) 
8,92 
0,92 
o,38 
0,5* 
9,28 
-
9,28 
*,00 
0,75 
1,51 
1,73 
8,26 
-
-
. 
0,02 
0,43 
31,82 
2110 
56 
days 
(*) 
5,75 
0,83 
0,37 
0,46 
6,86 
-
6,86 
3.23 
0,62 
0,81 
1,79 
5,23 
-
-
0,01 
0,01 
0,16 
22,08 
-56 
days 
C") 
2,00 
0,50 
0,20 
0,30 
1,70 
-
1,70 
1,00 
0,31 
0,11 
0,59 
1,88 
. 
-
-
-
-
0,06 
7,14 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0,07 
0,o3 
0,02 
0,02 
0,02 
-
0,02 
0,03 
0,02 
-
0,01 
0,02 
. 
-
-
-
-
-
0.17 
total 
16,7* 
2.28 
0,97 
1.31 
17,86 
-
17,86 
8,25 
1.6! 
2.« 
*.i: 
15,3! 
. 
-
-
0,0 
0,0 
0,6! 
61,21 
4 to 
20 
days 
(') 
6,17 
0,33 
0,11 
0,22 
5,12 
-
5,12 
2.31 
0,41 
1,16 
0,7* 
3.39 
0,01 
-
0,01 
0,02 
0.29 
17,62 
Headings excluding 
shafts and staple pits 
2 
21 to 
56 
days 
(') 
3,11 
0,32 
0,10 
0,22 
3,53 
-
3,53 
1.53 
0,43 
0,56 
0,5* 
1,78 
_ 
-
-
. 
-
0,11 
10,39 
> 56 
days 
i'l 
1,20 
0,23 
0,28 
0,16 
0.95 
-
0,95 
0,5« 
0,25 
0,1* 
0,15 
0,61 
_ 
-
-
-
-
0,06 
3,59 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0,05 
-
-
-
0,01 
-
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
• 
-
. 
„ 
-
-
-
-
-
0,06 
lotat 
10,53 
0,98 
0,28 
0,60 
9,61 
-
9,61 
*.37 
1,09 
1.85 
l.»3 
5,79 
0,01 
-
0,01 
-
0,02 
0,47 
31,66 
4 to 
20 
days 
0,03 
0,21 
0,01 
0,20 
0,88 
0.03 
0,85 
0,13 
0.03 
0.10 
0,01 
0,32 
_ 
-
-
-
-
0,06 
1,63 
Shells and staple -pits 
21 to 
ss 
days 
PI 
0,03 
0,27 
. 
0,27 
0,80 
-
0,80 
0,12 
0.» 
0.07 
0,01 
0.25 
_ 
-
-
-
-
0,02 
1,50 
3 
>se 
days 
O 
0,02 
0,13 
0,01 
0,13 
0,33 
0,01 
0,32 
0.02 
-
0.02 
-
0,1* 
. 
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
0,63 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
_ 
0,03 
0,01 
0.03 
0,02 
-
0,02 
-
-
-
-
0,01 
. 
-
-
-
-
0,06 
lots) 
0,08 
0,65 
0,02 
0,63 
2,03 
0,0* 
1,99 
0,27 
0,07 
0,19 
0,02 
0,72 
. 
-
-
-
-
0,08 
3,83 
Other places 
4 ' 
410 
20 
daya 
m 
1,26 
1,13 
0,12 
1,01 
6,98 
0.01 
6.97 
1.8« 
0,33 
1,09 
0,27 
3,58 
0,01 
0,01 
-
-
0,01 
0,29 
It.SS 
21 to 
se 
days 
<*> 
0,87 
1,26 
0,09 
1,17 
4,75 
-
*,75 
0,83 
0,21 
0,42 
0.21 
2,04 
. 
-
-
-
0,03 
0,15 
9,94 
>se 
days 
0,26 
0,90 
0,11 
0,80 
1,20 
-
1,20 
0.35 
0,13 
0,14 
0,07 
0,71 
. 
-
-
-
0,01 
0,07 
3,51 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0,01 
0,08 
-
0,08 
0,01 
-
0,01 
0.01 
0,01 
-
-
0,01 
. 
-
-
-
-
0,01 
0.11 
total 
2,*0 
3,37 
0,32 
3,05 
12,9* 
0,01 
12,91 
2,88 
0.6B 
1.6* 
0,56 
6,34 
0,01 
0.01 
-
-
0,05 
0,52 
29,51 
Total of 
accidents underground 
5 
410 
20 
days 
m 
16,38 
2,59 
0,63 
1,96 
22,25 
0,0* 
22,21 
8,51 
1.52 
3.85 
2.76 
15,5* 
0.02 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,0* 
1,08 
66,02 
21 to 
se 
days 
(·) 
9,77 
2,68 
0,55 
Ml 
15,95 
-
15,95 
5,71 
1.30 
1,86 
2,55 
9.32 
. 
-
-
-
0,0* 
0.44 
43.91 
>se 
days 
3,48 
1,77 
0,39 
1,38 
»,17 
0,01 
4,16 
1.90 
0,69 
0,40 
0.81 
3.3* 
. 
-
-
-
0.01 
0.20 
14.87 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0.13 
0,1* 
0,02 
0,12 
0,05 
-
0,05 
0,0* 
0,03 
-
0,01 
0,03 
-
-
-
-
-
0,01 
0,40 
total 
29,75 
7,18 
1.58 
5,60 
42,43 
0,05 
42,38 
15.78 
3,53 
6,12 
6,13 
28,23 
0.02 
0,01 
0,01 
0.01 
0.09 
1.72 
125.21 
Group 
accidents CI 
6 
se 
days 
(») 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
('1 Number ot hour« worlted by pit sla« s^d employ«»«?* ole 
&ß*do9rfa-T»6Mrvmor9lhmnthmc*n**tim (I .·. «who mhtmr d 
' •iCsi«'*d *·'!'· vs 
ΙΗΓΓΤ.« wtvo belong to · mèntKS' social Insurenc* 
I or ssssjssj unsabf* to NMMM work umitr^nund lor MINE; Í FÏTY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common Sl;ill:.tirs on virtlnn 
ni accidenti, uwlernrnund in co.il miner 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures) 
Tibi· 2s 
YEAR  1978 - Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
186.850.520 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PEHIOD OF INCAPACITY 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
ι Head and neck 
II. Eyes 
III Trunk 
IV Upper limbs 
fexcluding the hands) 
1«) 
V. Hands 
VI Lower limbs 
(excluding leet) ·'*) 
vil Feet 
VIII Multiple locations 
IX. Nol specified 
TOTAL 
< 
>5β 
days 
(*) 
0 
2 
0 
1 
51 
2 
7 
0 
63 
mputallons 
and 
nuclealions 
I 
Fslsl 
acci-
dents 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
total 
1 
3 
0 
1 
130 
2 
9 
1 
147 
Fractures 
wilh or without 
dislocation 
2 
>5β 
days 
(»1 
47 
115 
157 
557 
3*7 
282 
18 
1523 
Faial 
acci-
dents 
22 
13 
0 
0 
2 
0 
15 
52 
total 
225 
390 
258 
2578 
*48 
685 
39 
*623 
>5β 
days 
'") 
1 
12 
1* 
32 
99 
55 
1 
21* 
Luxations, 
twist and 
sprains 
3 
Falal 
acci-
dents 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
total 
* 
100 
112 
187 
*37 
71* 
2 
1551 
Concussion 
and Inter-
nal injury 
4 
>5β 
days 
(■> 
22 
0 
8 
0 
30 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
2 
0 
3 
3 
8 
total 
157 
0 
19 
6 
182 
Open wounds 
contusion 
and muscular 
abrasions 
S 
>5e 
days 
(■) 
89 
48 
75 
92 
261 
221 
125 
15 
0 
929 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
3 
0 
3 
0 
0 
2 
0 
3 
0 
11 
total 
2229 
5*2 
1466 
2289 
58*6 
2537 
1539 
188 
0 
16636 
Burns and 
harmful elfects 
ol electricity 
and radiation 
β 
>56 
days 
(5) 
0 
* 
1 
2 
5 
2 
0 
1 
0 
IB 
Falal 
acci-
dents 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
total 
16 
71 
28 
42 
36 
13 
6 
10 
0 
222 
Poisoning 
and 
sullocation 
7 
>se 
days 
(5) 
0 
0 
Falal 
acci-
dents 
m$i 
lotai 
.:ΐ:ί.;:¥::;χ
::ϊ:¥:·: 
0 
0 
y.yï/.-y. 
:MÍÍÍ¡ 
:':':■!·*-:-:-;■ 
isis 
0 
0 
Multiple injuries 
or those not 
speellied ι
1! 
a 
>5β 
days 
(5) 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
total 
3 
23 
2 
0 
3 
3 
0 
0 
0 
34 
TOTAL 
9 
410 
20 
days 
1,1 
1828 
512 
1044 
17*6 
4034 
1604 
1*61 
107 
0 
12336 
2110 
56 
days 
1,1 
618 
72 
728 
690 
3823 
1161 
1023 
81 
0 
8196 
>se 
days 
(·) 
160 
55 
21* 
286 
909 
671 
*S9 
35 
0 
2779 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
29 
0 
19 
0 
0 
* 
0 
23 
0 
75 
total 
2635 
639 
2005 
2702 
8775 ' 
3**0 
2953 
2*6 
0 
23395 
OS 
* 4· ·*>■·.· "4H.i**n1 «jv fit -Vi. ■■•i *lt 'hi,*·? ol Tn-ilferTnr f¡. *-« »■h.; titir..ig It· % η imi ι «.nel») i-*ti'»jnc· ir items 
ι ,rjir»fi'f [|i,i:«iitj ej 
.►•n *«l»ta.Hirtth<» vul'-■•■fr ■'..hsii" -W ■ι»*'* M ri Ulf. 
ι'l Th« hips ind Int enkle* tra Included und«r J 
t*i CalenoV day« Comparative table of number ôf persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958 -1978 per
T000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
BELGIUM 
1) Falle of ground 
2) Haulage and traneport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
5,911 
4,132 
1,354 
2,804 
0,414 
0,027 
_ 
0,011 
-
-
0,011 
0,260 
14,924 
1959 
4,294 
2,979 
0,998 
2,085 
0,371 
0,007 
■_ 
. 
-
- -
-
0,255 
10,989 
1960 
4,324 
2,709 
1,008 
2,386 
0,354 
0,032 
_ 
. 
-
-
0,016 
0,260 
11,089 
1961 
4,071 
2,770 
1,062 
2,097 
0,301 
0,018 
_ 
. 
-
- , 
0,018 
0,301 
10,638 
1962 
4,439 
3,331 
1,136 
2,461 
0,445 
-
. 
. 
-
0,010 
0,010 
0,351 
12,161 
1963 
4,432 
3,565 
1,066 
2,414 
0,547 
0,019 
_ 
. 
- ■ 
, -
0,009 
0,198 
12,250 
1964 
4,417 
3,419 
0,961 
2,310 
0,397 
0,018 
0,009 
_ 
-
-
-
0,268 
11,799 
1965 
3,574 
2,866 
.0,771 
2,126 
0,292 
. 
0,031 
0,021 
-
0,010 
0,333 
10,024 
1966 
3,568 
3,269 
0,936 
2,146 
0,349 
0,013 
_ 
0,013 
.-
-
0,015 
0,362 
10,669 
1967 
3,850 
2,960 
0,903 
2,265 
0,459 
0,056 
. 
— 
• 
-
-, 
0,278 
10,771 
1968 
3,676 
3,220 
1,122 
1,903 
0,358 
0,049 
. 
_ 
-
0,016 
0,228 
10,572 
1969 
5,075 
3,169 
1,186 
2,353 
1,244 
-
0,019 
_ 
-
-
0,019 
0,175 
13,240 
1970 
4,673 
3,018 
1,144 
1,801 
1,242 
-
.. 
_ 
-
-
-
0,195 
12,097 
1971 
3,989 
3,365 
1,496 
2,469 
1,870 
0,025 
_ 
_ -
-
0.025 
-
0,324 
13,563 
1972 
4,6 
2,8 
1,3 
1,7 
' 1,5 
0,03 
_ 
^ β 
. 
-
-
0,2 
12,13 
1973 
4,02 
3,33 
1,41 
2,58 
1,44 
. 
_ 
_ 
-
-
0,03 
0,36 
13,16 
1974 
3,99 
2,43 
1,70 
2,18 
1,84 
i. 
_ 
-
-
0,03 
0,41 
12,61 
1975 
2,79 
2,39 
Χ. 89 
1,66 
X.46 
— 
— 
-
-
0,03 
0,06 
9,71 
1976 
2.T7 
2,98 
1,06 
1.81 
J,63 
0,03 
. 
. 
-
-
0,17 
10,47 
1977 
2,55 
•2.21 
0,93 
1,55 
1,16 
- ' 
. 
-
-
-
0,07 
8,49 
1978 
3.« 5 
2.74 
1,13 
1,94 
1,98 
-
-
_ 
-
0,00 
-
0,16 
11,37 
ι Β. 
Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958-1978 
per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
BISUilUM 
.1) Eboulements 
2) Moyens dc tranaport 
3) Circulation du personnel 
4) Machines, maniement d'outils et 
de soutènement 
5) Chutes d'objets 
6) Explosifs 
7) Explosions de grisou et de 
poussières 
8) Dégagements Instantanés, asphy-
xies psr gaz naturels 
9) Feux de mines et Incendies 
10) Coups d'eau . 
11) Courant électrique 
12) Autres causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
0,223 
0,101 
0,011 
0,005 
0,016 
0,011 
-
0,016 
-
0,011 
0,021 
0,005 
0,420 
1959 
0,213 
0,124 
0,027 
0,014 
-
0,014 
-
.0,014 
0,007 
-
-
-
0,413 
1960 
0,299 
0,157 
0,008 
0,016 
0,008 
-
0,016 
-
-
-
0,024 
0,008 
0,536 
1961 
0,266 
0,168 
0,035 
0,027 
-
-
-
-
-
0,044 
-
0,009 
0¿549 
1962 
0,246 
0,142 
0,010 
0,047 
0,010 
-
■ -
0,047 
- ' 
0,047 
-
.0,019 
0,568 
1963 
0,264 
0,245 
0,057 
-
0,019 
-
-
-
-
0,019 
0,009 
0,028 
0,641 
1964 
0,222 
0,Í66 
0,028 
0,018 
0,018 
-
-
-
-
-
0,009 
0,009 
0,471 
1965 
0,239 
0,166 
0,011 
0,052 
-
-
0,011 
0,041 
0,011 
-
0,011 
-
0,542 
1966 
0,324 
0,187 
0,025 
0,025 
' -
. 
-
0,013 
-
-
-
0,013 
0,587 
1967 
0,264 
0,180 
-
0,028 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,014 
0,042 
0,528 
1968 
0,179 
0,114 
0,033 
0,065 
0,016 
0,016 
-
-
-
-
0,033 
-
0,456 
1969 
0,214 
0,097 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,019 
-
0,330 
1970 
0,268 
0,170 
-" 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,024 
-
0,462 
1971 
0,100 
0,125 
0,049 
0,025 
-
-
-
0,025 
-
-
-
0,324 
1972 
0,08 
0,18 
0,03 
-
0,03 
-
-
0,18 
-
-
-
0,03 
0,53 
1973 
0,21 
0,21 
-
0,03 
-
-
-
0,06 
-
-
0,03 
0,54 
1974 
0,06 
0,06 
0,03 
-
0,03 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,20 
1975 
0,03 . 
0,16 
-
0,09 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,29 
1976 
0,07 
0,03 
0,07 
0,03 
0,03 
.. 
-
-
• 
-
-
. 
β, 2* 
1977 
0,03 
0.07 
0.03 
0.03 
-
-
m 
m 
m 
m 
9 
• 
0,193 
1978 
0,04 
0,16 
-
0,04 
0,04 
0,28 
o MIM*
-*. 3Ar-feTY AVO HÇALIH ! 
COMMISSION 
Condon Stellette? on vi. lims 
ol accii'inu undoi ground «n coal minns 
COUNTRY 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures)  197-8-BELGIUM 
Table 1a 
YEAR 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 24.798.880 
^N. SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
\ Period ol 
CAUSESOFACCIDENTS .^Ni^city 
I. FALLS OFOFtOUNOS AND HOCKS 
It TRANSPORT, TOTAL 
' ·) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL . 
a) while moving about the mine 
b] in the course ol other Activities 
IV MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machin«3 < 
b) Tools 
c) Supports ■ 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VII IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUS Γ 
VIII OUTBURSTS OF GAS. DE-OXYGENATION. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
BAL GASES (CO,. CH.. CO. H,S). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts ol Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural G ises . 
IX. HEATING"; OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
Production asees 
1. 
4 to 
30 
days 
■ (Ί 
1771 
56 
50 
t 
131 
22 
109 
6*4 
62 
151 
421 
558 
8* 
32** 
zito 
56 
days 
("1 
206 
19 
16 
3 
26 
6 
20 
121 
20 
14 
87 
91 
-
. 
1 
464 
>5β 
deys 
('I 
58 
10 
7 
3 
9 
2 
7 
31 
9 
2 
20 
26 
-
4 
138 
Fatal 
, acci­
dents 
1 
0 
0 , 
0 
. 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
/ 
0 
1 
total 
2036 
85 
73 
12 
'166 
30 
136 
796 
91 
177 
528 
675 
, fl9 
3847 
' Headings excluding 
shafts and staple-pile -
2 
4lo 
20 
days 
('1 
793 
197 
57 
140: 
339 
66 
273 
481 
34 
160 
287 
560-
82 
2452 
2110 
se 
days 
1') ■ 
98 
51 
21 
30 
45 
17 
28 
55 
a 
6 
41 
75 
' 
6 
330 
>5β 
days 
("1 
« 
28 
10 
18 
15 
3 
12 
12 
: 1 
2 
9 
. 9 
" 
0 
90 
Falal 
acci-
dents 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
-0 
0 
0 
0 
.0 
0 
-
è 
917 
277 
88 
189 
•399 
86 
313 
548 
43 
168 
337 
644 
88 
2873 
Shells and staple-pits 
3 
4lo 
20 
days 
(
3I 
26 
46 
0 
46 
B7' 
17 
70 
33 
4 
19 
10 
96 
20 
308 
21IO 
58 
days 
l'I 
Γ 
12 
1 
'1 -
12 
3 
9 
1 
0 
1 
0 
7 
-
0 
33 
>5β 
days 
('I 
'1 
, 10 
0 
10 
0 
0 
0 
1 
. 0 
1 
0 
6 
0 
18 
Falal 
acci-
dents 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
' 
0 
1 
total 
28 
69 
Γ 
68 
99 
20 
79 
35 
* . 
21 
10 
109 
/ 
20 
'360 
Olhar places 
. 4 
410 
20 
days 
('1 
169 
182 
37 
145 
237 
18 
219 
187 
15 
82 
90 
331 
1 
45 
1152 
2110 
56 
days 
19 
48 
10 
38 
39 
9 
30 
20 
2 
6 
12 
32 
0 
9 
167 
>5β 
days 
('1 
0 
20 
3 
17 
* 
0 
* 
* 
1 
2 
1 
8 
. 
0 
0 
36 
Falal 
acci-
denta 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
' 1 
0 
0 
0 
• 
0 
1 
* 
total 
108 
252 
50 
202 
280 
27 
253 
212 
19 
90 
103 
371 
M 
55 
1359 
4 to 
20 
days 
<Ί 
2759 
481 
1** 
337 
79* 
123 
671 
13*5 
115 
*22 
808 
15*5 
1 
231 
7156 
Tolal ot 
accidents underground 
5 
21IO 
se 
days 
(·) 
324 
130 
*8 
■ 82 
122 
35 
. 87 
19? 
30 
27 
1(0 
205 
0 
16 
99* 
>5β 
days 
(»1 
85 
68 
20 
48 
28 
5 
23 
48 
11 . 
7 
30 
w 
0 
4 
282 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
1 
4 
0 
* 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
P' 
1 
7' 
total 
3169 
683 
212 
*71 
' 9** 
16? 
781 
1591 
157 
156 
97B 
1799 
1 
252 
8439 
Group 
accidents <*> 
e 
58 
days 
("l 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
h ■ 
I ') Number of hours worfc»*, by pit its" end employe« of contractor lirms who belong lo a miners' social insurance srhertm 
(*i Arn.··««, invsjt·. ¡M nw· man (rv* cMuell'es (' β! whft eil^er tl'-d o* were «neb» to if mm* W*Ï'»II ipyitr^fftM (or at ι*·<*ι eiqhl w*efc«) MINCE ÇAFEIY AMO HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
CnirriKin 'Jlallstlej on vicllmr. 
ol acrideiils i'iidi.*rg'ound in mal mines. 
COUNTRY 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates)  YEAR 1978 - BELGIUM 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (■) 24.798.880 
Tabla 1b 
^^ SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
^S. Period ol 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS ^""P*
0"* 
1. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II. TRANSPORT. TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transport 
b, Discontinuous Transport 
III. FALLS AND MOV EMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about lha mine 
b) in the course of other activities 
IV. MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machinée 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
V.FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VM IGNI1 ION S OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
Vili OUTBURSTS OF GAS. DE-OXYGENATION. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO,. CH,. CO. H.S|. 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) Da-oxyganatlon and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX HFAT ING S OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
Production faces 
1 
4 to 
20 
days 
(") 
71. 41 
2,26 
2,02 
0,24 
5,28 
0,89 
*.« 
25,97 
2,50 
6,*9 
16,98 
22,50 
3r» 
130,91 
21 to 
se 
days 
ro 
8,31 
0,77 
0,05 
0,12 
1,05 
0,2* 
0,61 
*,βθ 
0,81 
0,56 
3,51 
3,67 
0,04 
18,71 
-56 
days 
1") 
. 2,3* 
0,40 
0,28 
0,12 
0,36 
0.08 
0,28 
1,25 
0,36 
0,08 
0,61 
1,05 
0.11 
5,5( 
Falal 
acci-
dents 
0,0* 
-
-
-
-
- . 
. 
-
-
-
-
. 
0,0 
total 
82,10 
3.43 
2,9* 
0.48 
6,69 
1,21 
5,48 
32,10 
3,67 
7.1* 
21,29 
27,22 
3,5! 
155,13 
Headings excluding 
shafts and staple-pits 
2 
4 to 
20 
days 
P> 
31,98 
7.9* 
2,30 
5,65 
13,67 
2,66 
11,01 
19,41 
1,31 
6,*5 
11,51 
22,51 
3,31 
98,88 
21 to 
06 
days 
P) 
3,95 
2,05 
0,85 
1,21 
1,81 
0,69 
1,13 
2,22 
0,32 
0,2* 
1,65 
3,02 
0,2* 
13,31 
>5β 
days 
P) 
1.05 
1.13 
0,40 
0,72 
0,60 
0,12 
0,48 
0.(8 
0,0* 
0,08 
0,36 
0,36 
-
-
_ 
3,63 
Fila! 
acci-
dents 
-
0,04 
-
0,04 
-
-
• 
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
0,04 
total 
36,98 
11,17 
3,55 
7,62 
16,09 
3.47 
12,62 
22.10 
1,73 
6,77 
13,59 
25,97 
4 
3.55 
115,68 
Shafts and staple-pits 
3 
4 to 
20 
daya 
P) 
1.06 
1,85 
-
1,85 
3,51 
0,69 
2,82 
1.33 
0,16 
0,77 
0,*( 
3,87 
i 
0,81 
12,%2 
21 to 
56 
days 
Ρ) 
0,04 
0,48 
0,0* 
0,4* 
0,48 
0,12 
0,36 
0,0* 
-
0,0*' 
-
0,28 
. 
1,33 
>5β-
days 
Ρ) 
0,04 
0,40 
-
C,40 
-
-
. 
0,0* 
-
0.0* 
-
o* 
. 
0.7: 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
0,04 
-
0,0* 
-
ν 
. 
-
-
-
-. 
; 
. 
0.» 
total 
1,13 
2,78 
0,04 
2.74 
3,99 
0,81 
3,19 
1.41 
0,16 
0,85 
0,40 
4,40 
0,81 
14.52 
Other places 
4 ' 
4 to 
SO 
days 
P) 
6,73 
7.3* 
1.49 
5,85 
9,58 
0,73 
8.83 
7,54 
0,60 
3,31 
3,63 
13,35 
0.04 
1.81 
46,37 
21 to 
58 
days 
P) 
0,77 
1.94 
0,40 
1,53 
1,57 
0,36 
1.21 
0.81 
0,08 
0,24 
0,48 
1,29 
0,26 
6,73 
>se 
days 
P) 
-
0,81 
0,12 
0,69 
0,16 
-
0.16 
0,16 
0,04 
0,08 
0,04 
0,32 
i 
-
1.45 
Falal 
acci-
dents 
-
0,03 
-
0.08 
-
-
-
0,04 
0,04 
-
-
-
. 
0,0* 
0,16 
total 
7,50 
10.16 
2.02 
8,15 
11,29 
1,09 
10,20 
8,55 
0,77 
3,63 
4,15 
14,96 
0,04 
2.22 
54.71 
4 to 
20 
daya 
P) 
111,17 
19.40 
5,81 
13,59 
32.02 
4.96 
27.06 
54.24 
4.64 
17,02 
32,58 
62,30 
0,04 
9.31 
288,48 
Total ol 
accidents underground 
s 
21ΙΟ 
se 
days 
Ρ) 
13,07 
5,24 
1,94 
3.31 
4,92 
1.41 
3,51 
7,94 
1.21 
1,09 
5,65 
8,27 
_ 
0,65 
40.08 
>56 
days 
P) 
3,43 
2.74 
0.81 
1.94 
1,13 
0,20 
0,93 
1.94 
0,44 
0,28 
1,21 
1,98 
„ 
0,16 
11,37 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0,0* 
0,16 
"** 
0,16 
• 
-
-
.0,0* 
0,0* 
-
-
-
. 
0,0* 
0,28 
tout 
127.71 
27,5* 
8,55 
IB, 99 
38,07 
6.57 
31,49 
64.16 
6,33 
18,39 
39,44 
72,5* 
. 
0,0* 
10,16 
3*0,21 
Group 
accidents PI 
6 
56 
days 
PI 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
<■) Mutwoef ol hour» wotted by pit staff and ensployeee of cositractor firme wtto belong to 
(»> Accidents mvofvmg more than fiv* casuaftl« (I s who sithsr f>f<i O' wff s unsbe !o 
(•iCerendardJnr». 
miners' soci» insu ranee schema 
wotkmtOirvmjndtoteilmwiiiQHwmk*) MIK t«* AfEÎV ANU HEALTH 
ΓϋΜΜΙ9Γ.Ι0Ν 
Comtn .η SUiiaticîi inj 
et accidents ι nitter ground in CPÄI mines 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures) 
Table ï« 
YEAR 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 
1978-BELGIUM 
24.798.880 
NAJ une OF THE INJURY 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
Fractures 
with or without 
dislocation 
2 
Luxations, 
twist and 
sprains 
3 
Concussion 
and Inter-
nal injury 
Open wounds 
contusion 
and muscular 
abrasions 
5 
Burns and 
harmful elf eels 
ol electricity 
and radiation 
6 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
7 
Multiple injuries 
Of those not 
specified ι') 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
>56 
days 
Fata! 
acci-
dents 
>56 
days 
I») 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
>56 
days 
I
s) 
Fetal 
acci-
dents 
>56 
days 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
>56 
days 
(·) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
>56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
>56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
>56 
days 
(S) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
4 to 
20 
days 
C) 
21 to 
56 
days 
(') 
>56 
days 
Í
1) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I Head and neck 
II Eyes 
0 
IV Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands)  12  29 
0 '  82 
VI Lower limhs 
Including (eel)'  39  84 
45  45 
VIII Multiple locations 
IX Not specified 
147  151  113  114  282 
'.Ν··ρ·0·*η| tir ¡t, j»Of Vastly fir »un inf í>mpt-ya**i»tf ru .ft »et Ο' ι, 
Ί a, liaf*njf 1rpn"(.a*
!*j»ifi 
■■JhMShf ΊΛ··ν »tf.V l -WH-1'. -" ' 'l|r*"H 'I >. I-.| .·.!. 
•rrt w*m n «it.το ίο β •"•rer'· »orla' cnuranre »chame  l
4) The hip· and the enklas »ra Included under .Losser limbi" 
I'lCniindRrdays 
29o Comparative table of number of persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958-1978 per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
FRANCE
 X 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools «nd 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
5,027 
1,980 
1,505 
0,914 
1,890 
0,043 
0,047 
0,004 
-
-
0,014 
2,956 
14,380 
1959 
4,665 
1,695 
1,118 
1,022 
2,187 
0,051 
0,088 
_ 
-
-
-
2,768 
13,594 
1960 
4,744 
1,920 
2,873 
1,621 
1,893 
0,031 
_ 
_ 
-
-
0,004 
0,793 
13,909 
1961 
4,416 
2,106 
2,334 
2,523 
2,292 
0,017 
_ 
_ 
-
-
0,029 
0,362 
14,079 
1962 
4,222 
2,196 
2,458 
2,991 
2,073 
0,051 
0,004 
_ 
-
-
0,004 
0,240 
14,239 
1963 
4,177 
2,364 
2,368 
3,096 
2,278 
0,009 
_ 
. 
-
-
0,014 
0,354 
14,660 
1964 
4,308 
2,278 
2,383 
3,042 
2,074 
0,013 
_ 
_ 
-
0,018 
0,009 
0,227 
14,347 
1965 
3,941 
2,153 
2,087 
2,272 
1,839 
0,037 
_ 
-
-
-
0,014 
0,174 
12,517 
1966 
3.927 
1,858 
2,239 
2,639 
1,785 
0,010 
0,029 
. 
-
0,005 
-
0,200 
12,692 
1967 
3,634 
1,918 
2,174 
2,773 
2,114 
0,011 
-
0,005 
-
-
0,005 
0,185 
12,819 
1968 
4,162 
1,946 
2,815 
3,016 
2,386 
-
-
. 
-
0,006 
0,006 
0,233 
14,570 
1969 
4,044 
1,556 
3,226 
3,070 
2,537 
0,050 
-
-
-
-
0,014 
0,291 
14,788 
1970 
3,761 
1,666 
3,372 
3,332 
2,515 
0,016 
0,087 
-
-
0,032 
0,024 
0,294 
15,099 
1971 
3,721 
1,959 
3,667 
2,373 
4,566 
-
-
. 
-
-
0,009 
0,314 
16,609 
1972 
3,79 
1,89 
4.51 
2,63 
4,96 
0,02 
-
. 
-
0,01 
0,01 
0,43 
18,24 
1973 
4,38 
2,37 
4,79 
2,84 
5,00 
-
. 
-
0,01 
0,04 
-
0,67 
20,09 
1974 
4,52 
2,36 
4,11 
2,98 
5,12 
-
0,08 
0,03 
-
9,01 
0,63 
19,85 
1975 
3,75 
2,63 
4,29 
2,94 
4,11 
0,03 
-
0,01 
0,01 
-
0,03 
0,64 
18,44 
1976 
3,82 
2,53 
4,81 
3,17 
4,11 
-
_ 
. 
0,01 
-
0,03 
0,(9 
10,97 
1977 
3,88 
2.« 
5.39 
3.13 
3,94 
0,03 
— 
0,02 
-
-
0,02 
0,M 
19,31 
1978 
4.88 
3.11 
7.43 
3.52 
3,86 
0.05 
-
0,05 
-
0,03 
0,03 
0,63 
23,60 Β. 
Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958-1978 
per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
FRANCE * 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools sad 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
0,235 
0,115 
0,007 
0,018 
0,025 
-
0,115 
0,043 
-
. 
-
0,036 
0,594 
1959 
0,192 
0,085 
0,018 
0,040 
0,007 
0,026 
0,121 
0,026 
-
. 
0,011 
0,029 
0,555 
1960 
0,186 
0,082 
0,027 
0,016 
0,004 
-
-
0,019 
-
. 
0,012 
0,008 
0,354 
1961 
0,219 
0,122 
0,008 
0,008 
0,017 
-
-
0,004 
-
0,004 
- . 
-
0,382 
1962 
0,167 
0,077 
0,043 
0,030 
0,030 
-
0,004 
-
-
-
0,009 
0,009 
0,369 
1963 
0,120 
0,121 
0,009 
0,009 
0,009 
0,005 
-
0,019 
-
. 
0,024 
0,014 
0,330 
1964 
0,127 
0,141 
0,009 
0,036 
0,018 
0,005 
-
0,009 
-
. 
-
0,014 
0,359 
1965 
0,164 
0,052 
0,042 
0,009 
0,019 
0,009 
0,155 
-
. 
0,005 
-
-
0,455 
1966 
0,214 
0,126 
0,024 
0,015 
0,015 
0,005 
-
0,005 
. 
. 
0,010 
0,005 
0,419 
1967 
0,159 
0,088 
0,016 
0,016 
0,011 
0,005 
-
0,027 
-
0,005 
-
0,005 
0,332 
1968 
0,177 
0,101 
0,025 
0,006 
0,031 
0,006 
0,038 
0,019 
-
. 
-
-
0,403 
1969 
0,149 
0,186 
0,014 
-
0,014 
. 
-
0,007 
-
-
0,007 
0,007 
0,384 
1970 
0,143 
0,127 
0,016 
0,032 
0,016 
0,108 
0,127 
-
. 
0,016 
-
-
0,484 
1971 
0,117 
0,108 
0,071 
0,027 
0,045 
0,018 
-
0,072 
-
. 
-
0,009 
0,468 
1972 
0,07 
0,08 
0,01 
-
-
_ 
-
-
0,01 
0,01 
-
0,03 
0.21 
1973 
0,20 
0,07 
0,01 
0,02 
0,04 
. 
-
0,01 
. 
_ 
-
-
0,37 
1974 
0,11 
0,12 
0,01 
0,03 
0,03 
_ 
0,58 
_ 
0,01 
_ 
-
-
0,89 
1975 
0,06 
0,07 
0,03 
-
0,03 
-
-
— 
— 
w 
-
-
0,18 
1976 
0,09 
0,10 
0,03 
0,10 
0,01 
0,01 
0.23 
. 
. 
. 
-
-
0,60 
1977 
0.01 
0,00 
-
-
0,02 
m 
m 
. 
■ 
— 
. 
0,07 
0,11 
1978 
0,14 
0,05 
-
0,02 
0,00 
0,02 
0,00 
_ 
-
-
0,23 
-J MtriFS SAI fiTY AUD HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common Slati-tics on victims 
ol accidents unsOiground In coal minos 
COUNTRY 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures)  1978-FRANCE 
YEAR 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (■) 58.553.703 
Table 1a 
^-s. SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
"N. Period ol 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS ^i^**» 
1. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II. TRANSPORT. TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transpon 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III FALLS AND MOV EMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
a| while moving about th« mine 
b) In the course ol other activities 
IV. MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
V.FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VII IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS. DEOXYGENATION. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO,. CH.. CO. H,S|, 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts ol Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gaaes 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII. OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
Production laces 
1 
4 to 
20 
days 
('I 
1Í43 
9Θ 
44 
54 
886 
293 
593 
851 
50 
362 
439 
655 
-
-
1 
1 
-
-
3 
-
173 
3810 
~T~T~ 
2110 
56 
days 
PI 
506 
65 
32 
33 
496 
147 
349 
398 
46 
138 
214 
275 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
. 
-
40 
1781 
>5β 
days 
CI 
183 
37 
20 
17 
135 
45 
90 
107 
24 
25 
58 
86 
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 
-
12 
561 
. 
Fatal 
acci-
dente 
4 
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
1 
-
_ 
1 
. 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
6 
lotai 
1836 
700 
96 
104 
1517 
485 
1032 
1357 
120 
575 
712 
1016 
2 
-
1 
1 
-
-
4 
-
225 
6158 
Headings excluding 
shalta and staple-pits 
2 
4 to 
20 
days 
PI 
431 
61 
15 
46 
409 
185 
224 
351 
54 
172 
125 
309 
-
-
3 
3 
-
-
_ 
1 
141 
1706 
21 to 
se 
days 
PI 
189 
54 
9 
45 
268 
105 
IE] 
186 
33 
8! 
71 
143 
Τ 
■ 
1 
1 
-
_ 
18 
860 
. 
>5β 
days 
(»1 
73 
30 
1 
26 
93 
42 
51 
54 
16 
21 
17 
35 
3 
-, 
2 
2 
-
-
. 
-
6 
296 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
3 
1 
-
1 
-
-
0 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4 
total 
696 
146 
28 
118 
770 
332 
438 
591 
103 
275 
213 
487 
4 
-
6 
5 
1 
-
. 
1 
165 
2866 
Shalta and staple-plls 
3 
410 
20 
days 
(»I 
1 
34 
1 
33 
33 
24 
9 
14 
2 
9 
3 
29 
-
-
-
-
-
-
. 
-
17 
128 
21 lo 
SS 
days 
('1 
-
22 
-
22 
26 
13 
13 
6 
1 
4 
1 
14 
-
-
-
6 
74 
>56 
days 
('1 
-
11 
■ 
11 
1 
c 
1 
• 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
. 23 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
·-
-
-
1 
-
-
■ -
-
-
total 
1 
67 
1 
66 
65 
42 
23 
20 
3 
13 
4 
49 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
23 
225 
4 to 
20 
daya 
PI 
133 
218 
25 
193 
890 
535 
355 
337 
16 
201 
120 
669 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
2 
3 
193 
2466 
Other places 
4 
21ΙΟ 
56 
days 
m 
67 
164 
20 
144 
523 
277 
246 
210 
23 
103 
84 
306 
-
-
-
-
-
56 
1326 
>ss 
daya 
('1 
30 
104 
12 
92 
»1 
125 
76 
45 
Í 
21 
i; 
9i 
1 
1 
-
-
1 
2 
19 
502 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
1 
2 
0 
2 
— 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
• 
3 
total 
231 
488 
57 
431 
1614 
937 
C77 
592 
48 
328 
216 
1094 
1 
-
1 
1 
-
-
3 
5 
268 
4297 
410 
20 
days 
P) 
1708 
411 
85 
326 
2218 
1037 
1181 
1553 
122 
744 
687 
1682 
1 
-
4 
4 
-
-
5 
4 
524 
8110 
Total ol 
accidents underground 
S 
21IO 
se 
days 
Ρ) 
762 
305 
61 
244 
1313 
542 
771 
800 
103 
327 
370 
738 
2 
-
1 
-
1 
-
-
-
120 
4041 
>5β 
days 
Ρ) 
286 
182 
36 
146 
435 
217 
218 
206 
49 
70 
87 
226 
3 
-
3 
3 
-
-
2 
2 
37 
1382 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
8 
3 
0 
3 
-
-
-
1 
-
-
1 
-
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~ 
13 
lotel 
2764 
901 
182 
719 
3966 
1796 
2170 
2560 
274 
1141 
1145 
2646 
7 
-
8 
7 
1 
-
7 
6 
eel 
13546 
Group 
accidents PI 
β 
56 
daya 
P> 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
('I Numbs» of hours worked hy pit Haft «,ηΊ employees 
{*\Arf ·>η 'î.nvO'.T'O l.li..*ih-f.li<í'fP«JI"
ltl»M (19 
O (-..(«TO'*· dey* 
ol contractor firms who belong lo a miners' social Insurance scheme. 
■';t'«f «JM e* w-v· unto*· to rtwrme wort undrnqround fot «t itati eight WMkii MfNFS SAFETY »NO HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Cnitinnui Statistics on victims 
ul accidents nndcijiround in inai nines 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates)  1978 - FRANCE 
YEAR 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 58.553.703 
Talrt· lb 
^V. SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
"^»w Period of 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS \|ζ"Ρ""» 
1. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III. FALLS AND MOV E MENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about lhe mine 
b) In tha courue ol other activities 
IV MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
V.FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS. DE-OXYGENATION. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO,. CH* CO. HÆ), 
TOTAL V 
AlOutburslsolGas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII. OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
Production laces 
1 
4 to 
20 
daya 
P) 
19,52 
1,67 
0,75 
0.92 
15,13 
5,00 
10.13 
14,53 
0,85 
6.18 
7,50 
11,19 
-
0,02 
0,0? 
. 
0,05 
_ 
2.55 
65,07 
21 to 
SS 
daya 
P) 
8.64 
1.11 
0.55 
0,56 
B.47 
2.51 
5,96 
6,80 
0,79 
2.36 
3,65 
4.70 
0.02 
-
-
. 
-
m 
0,68 
30,42 
>5β 
daya 
P) 
3,13 
0,63 
0,34 
0.29 
2.31 
0,77 
1,54 
1,83 
Ml 
0,43 
0,99 
1.47 
-
·-
-
. 
o,o; 
. 
0.21 
9,51 
Falal 
acci-
dente 
0,07 
. 
-
-
. 
-
·-
0,02 
-
. 
0,02 
-
ο,ο; 
-
-
. 
-
. 
-
0,1 
lotai 
31.36 
3,42 
1,64 
1,78 
25,91 
8,28 
17.62 
23,18 
2,05 
8,97 
12.16 
17.35 
0,03 
0.02 
0.02 
-
0,07 
. 
3.84 
105,17 
Headings excluding 
ahafta and staple-pits 
2 
4 to 
20 
daya 
P) 
7.36 
1.04 
0,26 
0.79 
6.99 
3,16 
3,83 
5,99 
0.92 
2.94 
2.13 
5,28 
-
0,05 
0,06 
-
-
0,02 
2.41 
29,14 
21 to 
se 
daya 
P> 
3.23 
0,92 
0,15 
0.77 
4.58 
1.79 
2,78 
3,18 
0,56 
1,40 
1.21 
2.44 
0,02 
0,02 
-
0,02 
-
_ 
0,31 
14,69 
>s> 
days 
P) 
1,25 
0,51 
0,07 
0,44 
1,59 
0,72 
0,87 
0.92 
0.27 
0,35 
0,29 
0,60 
0,05 
0,03 
0,03 
-
-
. 
0.11 
5,a 
Fatal 
danta 
0,05 
0,02 
-
0,02 
. 
-
-
-
-
m 
-
. 
-
-
■ 
-
-
. 
0,0 
total 
11,89 
2.« 
0,48 
2,02 
13,15 
5.67 
7,48 
10,09 
1.76 
4.70 
3,64 
8,32 
0,07 
-■ 
0,10 
0,09 
0,02 
-
0,02 
2,82 
48,95 
Shafts and staple-pita 
3 
4 to 
20 
daya 
P) 
0,02 
0,58 
0,02 
0,56 
0,56 
0,41 
0,15 
0,24 
0.03 
0.15 
0.05 
0,50 
-
-
• 
-
-
. 
0,29 
2,19 
21 to 
SB 
daya 
P) 
-
0,38 
-
0,38 
0.44 
0,22 
0,22 
0,10 
0,02 
0,07 
0.02 
0,24 
-
-
• 
-
-
-
0,10 
1,26 
>S8 
daya 
P) 
-
0,19 
-
0,19 
0,10 
0,09 
0,02 
-
-
. 
-
0,10 
-
-
~ 
-
-
. 
0,3« 
Fatal 
.acci-
denta 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
. 
-
¿ 
-
-
™ 
• -
-
. 
-
• 
total 
0,02 
1.14 
0,02 
1.13 
1.11 
0.72 
0.39 
0.34 
0.05 
0,22 
0,07 
0,84 
-
-
" 
-
* 
-
0,39 
3,84 
Olhar places 
4 ' 
4 to 
20 
daya 
P) 
2.27 
3.72 
0,43 
3,30 
15,20 
»,n 
6,06 
5,76 
0.2? 
3,43 
2,05 
11.77 
0,02 
-
™ 
-
0,03 
0,05 
3.30 
42.12 
21 to 
56 
days 
P) 
1.14 
2.80 
0.34 
2.« 
8,93 
4.73 
4.20 
3,59 
0.39 
1,76 
1,43 
5,23 
-
-
" 
-
-
-
0.86 
22.65 
>5S 
daya 
P) 
0,51 
1,78 
0,20 
1.57 
3.43 
2.13 
1.30 
0,77 
0.15 
0,41 
0,20 
1,69 
-
0,02 
0,02 
-
0,02 
ο,ο: 
o.» 
8.51 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
0,02 
0,03 
-
0,03 
-
-
-
-
• 
. 
-
-
-
-
-
0,0 
total 
3,95 
8,33 
0,97 
7,36 
27,56 
16,00 
11,56 
10,11 
6,82 
5,60 
3,60 
18,68 
0,02 
0,02 
0,02 
-
0,05 
0,08 
4.58 
73.3S 
Total of 
accidents underground 
5 
4 to 
20 
days 
P) 
29,17 
7.02 
1,45 
5,57 
37,88 
17,71 
20,17 
26,52 
2.1» 
12,71 
11,73 
28,73 
0,02 
0,07 
O.U' 
-
0,09 
0,07 
8.95 
138,51 
21 to 
56 
daya 
P) 
13.01 
5.21 
1,04 
4.17 
22.42 
9.26 
13.17 
13,66 
1,78 
5,58 
6,32 
12,60 
0,03 
0,02 
0,02 
-
-
2.05 
69,01 
>56 
days 
P) 
4,88 
3,11 
0,61 
2,49 
7,43 
3.71 
3.72 
3.52 
0.W 
1,20 
1,49 
3,86 
0,05 
0.05 
0,0b 
-
0,03 
0,03 
0,63 
23,60 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0.14 
0,05 
-
0,05 
-
-
-
0,02 
-
-
0,02 
-
0,02 
-
-
-
-
-
0.22 
total 
47,20 
15,39 
3,11 
12.28 
67,73 
30,67 
37,06 
43,72 
4,68 
19,49 
19,55 
45,19 
0,12 
9.14 
0,12 
0,02 
0.12 
0.10 
11.63 
231,34 
Group 
accidents Pi 
6 
56 
days 
PI 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
ι ') Number ol hour» worked by pH staff »od emoloye« of contractor firms 
l^Accíostrifíimwlvatitjmrti» fi » who either d+od or were 
t*t Ι*»τ»ΙΜ|Λ d>"V». 
belong to a miners' 
»to ι 
social insurance 
uAdejrQrouna for at (··»! eíçhl weeks) MINES AFCTY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on victims 
ot accident·; underground) in coal mines 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures) 
Tibia 2s 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I. Head and neck 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
>56 
daya 
P) 
II. Eyes 
III Trunk 
IV Upper limbs 
(excluding tha hands) 
V Hands 
VI Lower limbs 
(excluding feet) Pi 
28 
Fatal 
acci-
Fractures 
with or without 
dislocation 
2 
>5S 
daya 
P) 
38 
53 
240 
100 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
12 
40 
53 
240 
100 
Luxations. 
twist and 
sprains 
3 
>5β 
daya 
40 
14 
10 
92 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
40 
14 
10 
92 
Concussion 
end Inter-
nal Injury 
4 
days 
P) 
17 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
17 
Open wounds 
contusion 
and muscular 
abrasions 
5 
>5§ 
daya 
PI 
47 
66 
128 
159 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
48 
66 
128 
159 
Bums and 
harmful effects 
ol electricity 
and radiation 
β 
>56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
7 
>5β 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
1978-FRANCE 
YEAR 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (■) 58.553.703 
Multiple injuries 
of those not 
apecilied f'l 
■ 
>5β 
days 
(5) 
12 
Falal 
acci-
dent« 
12 
4 to 
20 
days 
P) 
743 
698 
1134 
1052 
2260 
1273 
21IO 
56 
days 
P) 
232 
55 
807 
380 
1375 
645 
>56 
days 
P) 
17 
180 
139 
413 
355 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
1054 
770 
2124 
1571 
4048 
2273 
37  37  650  367  122  1139 
Vili Multiple locations  24  28  28  12  14  251  150  74 
IX Not specified 
,9  30 
32  32  5*2  546  164  164  562  563  48  53  8110  4041  1382  13 
ι- f js—· ; ' ' | ι,, ■ 
"rW'fiitH» et lnyirt «Qfktrt lYfH i*:*n etnoemrir^e·* ofeénlfacOr Γ 
|·| -r.cfcir*.nri i«jX;p*ÌF *ltnrtj 
-. ·ν...ηΓ,:ιη> i»nr1lri»jiMM i»· mr 'ti-lajd iiniSej» Uf >r"*· HmhS, 
ren «jbp Wl«0 to ■ miner « eoctai insurer«:·) senerne  ι*)Th« hip« and the anhlee are inciuoeo unoer .Lower ittnoa 
l'i Calender davs 
478 
69 
135« Comparative table of number of persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958-1978 per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
ITALY 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outburst of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes Of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
1,355 
1,335 
0,668 
1,169 
1,169 
0,167 
-
-
-
-
-
0,334 
6,197 
1959 
1,378 
0,984 
0,394 
0,984 
1,698 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,591 
6,299 
1960 
1,808 
1,205 
1,005 
0,603 
1,808 
-
- -
-
-
-
-
0,603 
7,032 
1961 
-
0,676 
1,578 
0,902 
2,029 
0,225 
. 
-
-
-
-
0,451 
5,861 
1962 
0,792 
1,847 
1,056 
1,584 
2,375 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
7,654 
1963 
0,366 
1,465 
0,732 
1,465 
3,296 
0,366 
. 
-
-
-
-
-
7,690 
1964 
0,893 
1,787 
1,787 
3,127 
3,574 
-
. 
. 
-
-
-
-
11,168 
1965 
5,572 
-
-
7,164 
0,796 
-
• 
-
-
-
-
1,592 
15,124 
1966 
6,360 
0,707 
0,707 
7,067 
'-
-
-
-
-
3,360 
18,201 
1967 
5,580 
0,797 
1,594 
13,552 
6,377 
-
. 
-
-
-
-
3,189 
31,089 
1968 
0,182 
0,812 
0,812 
7,304 
6,493 
-
. 
-
-
-
-
0,812 
17,043 
1969 
3,656 
-
1,462 
8,043 
3,656 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
16,817 
1970 
-
-
-
6,896 
-
-
-
-
-
-
5,172 
12,068 
1971 
5,958 
3,404 
1,702 
2,553 
1,702 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,851 
16,170 
1972 
2,20 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2,20 
1973 
-
-
3,25 
-
-
. 
-
-
-
-
-
3,25 
1974 
-
-
-
1,64 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,64 
1975 
-
-
-
4,00 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4,00 
1976  1977  1978 
I 
/ 
/ 
F 'oducti m 
i 
i 
} 
/ 
/ 
/ 
ψ 
stoppe I  i 
I 
00 Β. 
Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958-1978 
per'000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
ITALY 
1) Falle of ground 
2) Haulage and traneport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Mschlnery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other ceuses 
TOTAL 
1958 
0,167 
-
. 
-
-
0,501 
. 
0,167 
-
. 
. 
. 
0,835 
1959 
. 
0,197 
-
-
0,197 
_ 
. 
-
-
. 
0,394 
1960 
0,201 
-
. 
-
-
. 
-
_ 
. 
0,201 
1961 
0,225 
-
. 
-
-
_ 
-
_ 
-
0,226 
1962 
_ 
-
. 
-
-
_ 
-
_ 
. 
-
1963 
0,366 
-
-
-
-
_ 
. 
_ 
. 
0,366 
1964 
. 
. 
. 
-
-
. 
. 
_ 
• 
-
1965 
_ 
. 
. 
-
-
_ 
. 
_ 
_ 
-
1966 
„ 
-
_ 
-
-
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
-
1967 
_ 
0.797 
_ 
0,797 
-
_ 
_ 
. 
«, 
1,594 
1968 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
-
¿ 
m 
m 
„ 
-
1969 
_ 
_ 
_ 
-
-
— 
_ 
β 
m 
-
1970 
— 
_ 
„ 
_ 
-
_ 
„, 
β 
m 
-
1971 
_ 
. 
m 
m 
-
_ 
„ 
m 
m 
-
1972 
2,20 
. 
.. 
. 
-
. 
m 
. 
β 
2 20 
1973  1974  1975 
I  1 
_ 
1976  1977  1978 
/ 
τ 
/ 
/ 
é 
Production-
stopped 
i 
/ 
f 
i 
L· 
f 
00 Comparative table of number of persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958 -1978 per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
NEDERLANDS 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
1,326 
1,511 
0,324 
0,617 
0,401 
, 
-
-
. 
-
-
0,262 
4,441 
1959 
1,464 
1,562 
0,386 
0,402 
0,515 
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
0,161 
4,490 
1960 
1,305 
1,898 
0,187 
0,780 
0,492 
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
0,390 
5,051 
1961 
1,829 
1,924 
0,514 
0,915 
0,819 
_ 
-
-
. 
-
-
0,210 
6,212 
1962 
2,238 
2,590 
0,580 
1,015 
0,642 
_ 
-
-
. 
-
0,021 
0,497 
7,583 
1963 
1,742 
1,826 
0,630 
1,050 
0,630 
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
0,147 
6,025 
1964 
2,017 
1,952 
0,472 
1,094 
0,923 
0,021 
-
-
. 
-
0,021 
0,129 
6,629 
1965 
1,923 
2,808 
0,774 
1,282 
0,862 
_ 
-
. 
-
. 
-
0,088 
7,737 
1966 
1,688 
2,621 
0,605 
2,066 
0,958 
_. 
-
-
. 
. 
-
0,353 
8,291 
1967 
2,466 
1,866 
0,766 
0,833 
0,866 
„ 
-
-
. 
. 
-
0,700 
7,497 
1968 
2,450 
2,407 
1,160 
1,031 
1,590 
_ 
-
-
. 
-
-
0,301 
8,939 
1969 
2,737 
2,562 
1,165 
1,689 
1,106 
_ 
-
-
. 
. 
-
0,116 
9,375 
1970 
2,634 
2,634 
0,905 
1,894 
0,659 
. 
. 
-
_ 
. 
-
0,165 
8,891 
1971 
2,528 
1,820 
0,404 
3,033 
1,213 
. 
-
. 
_ 
_ 
-
0,202 
9,201 
1972 
2,06 
2,19 
1,03 
1,81 
1,55 
. 
-
. 
_ 
-
0,52 
9,15 
1973 
4,219 
2,443 
0,888 
1,554 
0,888 
. 
_ 
_ 
_ 
-
0,666 
10,659 
1974 
1,041 
2,603 
0,521 
4,686 
1,562 
_ 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
10,413 
1975  1976  1977  1978 
) 
/ 
ƒ 
f 
Production stopped 
oo Β. 
Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958-1978 
per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
NEDERLANDS 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
0,262 
0,077 
-
0,015 
-
-
m 
-
-
-
-
0,355 
1959 
0,064 
0,145 
-
0,016 
0,016 
. 
— 
-
-
-
-
0,241 
1960 
0,034 
0,067 
-
-
-
-
. 
-
-
-
0,017 
0,119 
1961 
0,114 
0,095 
• 
-
-
. 
. 
-
-
0,019 
-
0,229 
1962 
0,062 
0,062 
. 
0,041 
-
. 
-
-
-
-
0,166 
1963 
0,084 
0,105 
-
-
-
-
. 
-
-
-
0,189 
1964 
0,043 
0,172 
-
-
0,043 
. 
-
. 
• 
. 
0,258 
1965 
0,044 
0,177 
-
0,022 
-
. 
-
. 
• 
-
0,243 
1966 
0,050 
0,126 
. 
-
-
_ 
_ 
. 
• 
. 
0,176 
1967 
0,100 
• 
. 
0,067 
-
m 
. 
. 
. 
-
0,1*7 
1968 
0,172 
0,08* 
. 
-
0,0*3 
β 
. 
. 
. 
. 
0,301 
1969 
0,038 
-
0,058 
0,117 
-
. 
. 
• 
. 
• 
0,233 
1970 
0,082 
0,163 
. 
-
-
. 
m 
. 
. 
. 
0,2*7 
1971 
0,101 
• 
-
-
-
a 
_ 
. 
-
. 
0,101 
1972 
. 
0,26 
-
-
-
_ 
. 
. 
. 
-
0,26 
1973 
■ 
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
1974 
-
-
-
-
0,521 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
-
1975  1976  1977 
/ 
1978 
/ 
/ 
Production stopped 
f 
0,521|/ 
1 
1 
f 
00 Comparative table of number of persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958-1978 per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1 
1958  1959  1960  1961 
h 
1962  1963 
Jot available f c 
1964 
¡lowing 
1965 
' the sy 
1966 
item oj 
1967 
'classifi 
1968 
cation 
1969 
used in 
1970  1971  1972 
the Community of S 
1973 
ix . 
1974  1975  1976  1977 
1,05 
1.69 
2,03 
1,09 
0,82 
0,01 
. 
-
-
-
1,03 
7.75 
1978 
1,02 
1,53 
1,72 
1,02 
0,82 
0,01 
-
-
-
-
),92 
7,07 Β. 
Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958-1978 
per'000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1) Palls of ground 
2) Baulage and traneport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objecte 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal duet 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  196*  1965  196*  1967  1968  1·«  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975 
Not available following the system of classification used in the Community of Six 
J 
1976  1977 
0,02 
0,07 
SI 
-
-
. 
. 
. 
0,11 
1978 
Ú,o3 
0,12 
_ 
_ 
-
m 
-
-
β 
„ 
_ 
-
0,15 MINIS SArtlï ANO HEALTH 
rOMMIfílON 
CenimenSlali
eti'"S on victims 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDINO TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures)  YEAR  1978 - UNITED KINGD(M
,
e
 
1« 
^s. SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
'
xs. Period ol 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS ^N^P««» 
1. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III FALLS ANO MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about tha mine 
b) in the coursa Ol olhar activities 
IV. MACHINES. TOOLS ANO SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
V FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREOAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS. OE-OXYGENAT10N. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BV NATU-
RAL GASES (CO,. CH.. CO. H,S). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII. OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
Production faces 
1 
4 to 
20 
days 
("1 
2807 
956 
52 
90, 
112« 
332 
792 
1974 
3*7 
1« 
1482 
1372 
22 
-
-
999 
9254 
21 to 
56 
daya 
(»1 
948 
306 
33 
273 
339 
82 
257 
S69 
100 
43 
426 
461 
5 
-
-
318 
2946 
>se 
days 
l'I 
208 
100 
16 
8' 
64 
10 
54 
132 
20 
12 
100 
110 
3 
— 
-
63 
680 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
8 
5 
2 
3 
1 
-
1 
1 
-
. 
-
. 
-
-
-
-
15 
total 
3971 
1367 
103 
1264 
1528 
424 
1104 
2676 
467 
200 
2009 
1943 
30 
-
-
1380 
12895 
Headings excluding 
shalta and staple-pits 
2 
4 to 
20 
days 
CI 
672 
271 
12 
259 
602 
155 
447 
638 
72 
73 
493 
397 
10 
3 
3 
478 
3071 
21to 
56 
days 
(·) 
207 
100 
9 
91 
204 
55 
149 
ISO 
18 
12 
ISO 
132 
1 
-
-
145 
969 
>se 
days 
1») 
45 
28 
3 
25 
65 
16 
49 
40 
6 
6 
28 
24 
-
-
-
20 
222 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
3 
-
-
-
-
-
-' 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3 
tolal 
927 
399 
24 
375 
871 
226 
645 
858 
96 
91 
671 
553 
11 
3 
3 
643 
4265 
Shads and staple-pita 
3 
4 to 
20 
days 
('I 
-
13 
-
13 
-
-
-
6 
-
-
6 
3 
2 
-
15 
39 
21IO 
SS 
daya 
<"> 
-
9 
-
9 
-
-
-
2 
-
-
2 
3 
-
-
15 
29 
>5β 
days 
-
2 
-
2 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 
-
-
6 
9 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 
-
-
total 
-
24 
-
24 
-
-
-
8 
-
-
β 
7 
2 
-
36 
77 
410 
20 
days 
<") 
707 
2602 
142 
2460 
5676 
2835 
2841 
1852 
129 
396 
1327 
1322 
11 
-
1 
5 
2996 
15174 
Other placea 
4 
21 to 
96 
days 
(·» 
216 
987 
58 
929 
1856 
919 
937 
552 
31 
120 
401 
468 
4 
-
1 
3 
1012 
5099 
>S6 
daya 
("I 
41 
310 
23 
287 
365 
190 
175 
121 
8 
30 
83 
102 
1 
-
1 
1 
176 
1118 
Falal 
acci-
dente 
-
25 
2 
23 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
25 
total 
964 
3924 
225 
3699 
7897 
3944 
3953 
2525 
168 
546 
1811 
1892 
18 
-
3 
9 
4184 
21416 
WAN-HOURS WORKED (')  286.881.331 
Total ol 
accidenta underground 
S 
4 to 
20 
daya 
(>) 
4186 
3842 
206 
3836 
7402 
3322 
4080 
4470 
548 
614 
3308 
3094 
47 
3 
3 
1 
5 
4488 
2753B 
21 to 
56 
daya 
(') 
1371 
1402 
100 
1302 
2399 
1056 
1343 
1303 
149 
175 
979 
1064 
10 
-
-
1 
3 
1490 
9043 
>56 
days 
(•I 
294 
440 
42 
39B 
494 
216 
278 
293 
34 
48 
211 
237 
4 
-
1 
1 
265 
2029 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
11 
30 
4 
26 
1 
-
1 
1 
-
-
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
~ 
43 
total 
5862 
5714 
352 
5362 
10296 
4594 
5702 
6067 
731 
837 
4499 
4395 
61 
3 
3 
3 
9 
6243 
38653 
Group 
sccidents t
1) 
6 
56 
days 
('1 
Fatel 
acci-
dents 
total 
■ 'l Number o> hours worked by pit staff and employees ol contractor firms who belong to a miners* social Inaurine· scheme. 
(·; Accident* ittvohrinq mon» than five reanel ties (i.e. who either ffted or were unable to resume work underground lor st lernt etøhl weeks) 
f\C«i*ttdirij*iye MINEF SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics un victims 
ol accifienir undeiground in coal mines 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates)  YEAR 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 
SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS 
Period ol 
incapacity 
I FALLS OF GROUNDS ANO ROCKS 
Production (aces 
1 
4to I 21 to 
20 I 55 
days days 
I») 
9,78 
PI 
3,30 
>56 
days 
P> 
0,72 
Falal 
acci-
dents 
0,02  13,83 
Headings excluding 
analta and staple-pits 
2 
4 to 
20 
days 
P) 
2,34 
2110 
56 
days 
P) 
0,72 
>56 
days 
0,15 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0,01  3,23 
Shells and staple-pita 
3 
4 to 
20 
days 
P> 
21to 
56 
days 
P) 
>56 
days 
P) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
Other places 
4 ' 
4 to 
20 
days 
P) 
2,46 
21 to 
56 
days 
P) 
0,75 
>56 
days 
P) 
0,14 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
3,35 
1078 - UNITED KINGDOM
 
1
b
 
?Rfi SRI 3fi1 
Total ot 
accidents underground 
5 
4 to 
20 
days 
P) 
14,58 
21 to 
58 
days 
(*) 
4,77 
>56 
days 
P) 
1,02 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
Õ.Õ3  20,42 
Group 
accidents ('I 
6 
56 
daya 
P) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
3,33  1,06  0,34  0,01  4,76  0,94  0,34  0.09  1,39  0,04  0,03  0,00  0,08  9,06  3,43  1,08  0.0B  13,67  13.38  1,53  0,10  19,91 
0,18  0.11  0,05  0.00  0,35  0,04  0,03  0,01  0,08  0,49  0,20  0,03  0,00  0,78  0,71  0.34  0,14  0,01  1.22 
3,15  0,95  0,29  0,01  4.4C  0,90  0,31  0,08  1,30  0,04  0,03  0.00  0,08  8,57  3,23  1,00  0,08  12,8  12,67  4,53  1,38  0,09  18,68 
02 
07 
III. FALLS AND MOV EMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about the mine 
b) In the course ot other activities 
3,91  1,18  0,22  0,00  5,32  2,09  0,71  0,22  3,03  19,78  6,46  1.27  27,52  25,79  1.72  0,00  35,88 
1,15  0,28  0,03  1.47  0,54  0,19  0,05  0,78  9,87  3,20  0,66  13,74  11,57  3,68  0,75  16,01 
2.76  0.89  0.18  0,00  3,84  1,55  0.51  0,17  2,24  9.90  3,26  0,60  13,77  14,21  0.96  0,00  19,87 
IV. MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
6,87  1,98  0,46  0,00  9.32  2,22  0,62  0,13  0,02  0,00  0,02  6,45  1,92  0,42  8,79  15,57  4,54  1,02  0,00  21,14 
1,20  0,34  0,06  1,6!  0,25  0,06  0.02  0,33  0,4*  0,10  0,02  0,58  1,90  0,51  0,11  2,54 
0,50  0,14  0,04  0,6!  0,25  0,04  0,02  0,31  1,38  0,41  0,10  1,90  2,13  0,60  0,16  2,91 
5,16  1,48  0,34  0,00  7,a  1.71  0,52  0,09  2.33  0,02  0,00  Or 02  4,(2  1,39  0,28  6,31  11,52  3,41  0,73  0,00 
V.FALLS OF OBJECTS  4,78  1,60  0,38  6,71  1,38  0.46  0,0  1,92  0,01  0,01  0.00  0,02  4,60  1,63  0,35  6,59  10,78  3,70  0,82 
15,67 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  0,07  0,01  0,01  0,11  0,03  0,00  0,03  0,00  0,00  0,04  0,01  0,00  0,05  0,16  0,03  0.01  0,21 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII OUTBURSTS OF GAS. DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES ICO.. CH.. CO. H.S). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) De-oxygf nation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
0,01  0,01  0.01  0.01 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES  0,00  0,00  0.00  0,01  0.00  0,00  0,00  0,01 
XI ELECTRICITY  TCoT  ■6TDT  TCHT  -BTW  ■OTOT  TCTT  -tw  χοτ 
XII OTHER CAUSES  3,48  1,10  0,21  4,80  1,66  0,50  0,06  2,24  0,05  0,05  0.02  0.12  10,44  3.52  0.61  14,58  15,64  5.19  0,92  21,75 
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35 
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0 
0 
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8 
• I'.ngtn ■ 
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1183 
muuria" 
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0 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0 
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0 
0 
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>5β 
dsys 
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0 
0 
0 
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23 
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4 to 
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27538 
211ο 
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135 
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β 
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denta 
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0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
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8 
26 
43 
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ANNEX I 
TERMS OF REFERENCE AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 
OF THE MINES SAFETY COMMISSION 
Decisions from the Council of Ministers of 
9 July 1957, 11 March 1965 and 27 June 1974 95 
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE M. S. C. 
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
DECISION 
of 9 July 1957 
concerning Che terms of reference and rules 
of procedure of the Mines Safety Commission 
Having taken note of the Recommendations adopted by the Conference 
on Safety in Coalmines and of the proposals submitted by the High Author-
ity in connection with the Conference's final Report, which afford a working 
basis for the improvement of safety in coalmines, and 
having regard to their Decisions at the Council's 36th and 42nd sessions 
on September 6, 1956 and on May 9 and 10, 1957, setting up the Mines Safety 
Commission, 
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES MEETING 
AT THE SPECIAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, 
- hereby lay down that the terms of reference of the aforesaid Commission 
shall be as follows: 
1. The Commission shall follow developments regarding safety in coalmines, including 
those regarding the safety regulations instituted by the public authorities, and 
assemble the necessary information concerning progress and practical results ob-
tained, more especially in the matter of accident prevention. 
To secure the necessary information, the Commission shall apply to the Governments 
concerned. 
The Commission shall evaluate the information in its possession and submit to the 
Governments proposals for the improvement of safety in coalmines. 
2. The Commission shall help the High Authority to work out a method of compiling 
intercomparable accident statistics. 
3. The Commission shall ensure the prompt forwarding to the quarters directly concerned 
(including in particular mines inspectorates and employers' and workers* associa-
tions) of relevant information assembled by it. 
4. The Commission shall ascertain, by regular contact with the Governments, what action 
is being taken to implement the proposals of the Conference on Safety in Coalmines, 
and such proposals as it may itself draw up. 
5. The Commission shall propose such study and research as it deems most indicated for 
the improvement of safety, with notes as to the way in which these can best be ef-
fected. 
6. The Commission shall facilitate the exchange of information and experience among 
persons responsible for safety matters, and propose appropriate measures for this 
purpose (e.g. organization of study sessions, establishment of documentation ser-
vices) . 
7. The Commission shall propose appropriate measures for ensuring the necessary liaison 
among the rescue services of the Community countries. 96 
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8. The Commission shall submit annually to the Council of Ministers and the High Author-
ity a Report on its activities and on developments regarding safety in coalmines in 
the different member States. In this connection, it shall in particular examine the 
statistics compiled on accidents and incidents in coalmines. 
- The Representatives of the Governments further lay down that the rules 
of procedure of the Commission shall be those set forth in the Annex to 
the present Decision. 
- The Representatives of the Governments trust that the High Authority will 
arrange for the Commission to start work at the earliest possible moment. 
This Decision was adopted by the Council at its forty-fourth session, 
on July 9, 1957. 
For the Council, 
J. REY 
President. 97 
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RULES OF PROCEDURE 
of the Mines Safety Commission 
CHAIRMAN 
Article 1 
The Chairman of the Mines Safety Commission ahall be a Member of the High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. 
Article 2 
The Chairman shall conduct the work of the Commission in accordance with these 
Rules of Procedure. 
MEMBERS 
Article 3 (I) 
The Commission shall consist of 36 members appointed by the Governments; each 
country shall have four members, of whom two shall be representatives of that country's 
Governments, one of the employers and one of the workers. 
Each Government shall send in writing to the Chairman a nominal roll of the 
members appointed by it. It shall notify the Chairman of all changes in this. 
Each Government may appoint for any particular meeting of the Commission one or 
two advisers, whose names it shall send to the Chairman. 
I.L.O. PARTICIPATION 
Article 4 
Representatives of the International Labour Organization shall be invited to 
attend the proceedings of the Commission in a consultative capacity. 
ORGANIZATION 
(a) Restricted Committee 
Article δ 
A Restricted Committee shall be set up, to consist of Governments representa­
tives on the Commission. 98 
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Article 6 
The Chairman of the Commission shall act as Chairman of the Restricted Committee. 
Article 7 
The function of the Restricted Committee shall be to ensure permanent liaison 
among the Governments of the member States and between them and the Commission, more espe-
cially for the purpose of exchanging relevant information. The Restricted Committee shall see 
to the preparation of the Commission's act/vities. 
Article 8 (1) 
The Restricted Committee shall be convened by the Chairman. 
The Chairman shall be required to convene it when asked to do so by the represent-
atives of five or more Governments. 
(b) Working Parties 
Article 9 
The Commission of the Restricted Committee may set up Working Parties of experts 
to consider specific technical matters. 
Article 10 
The Working Parties shall decide their own modus operandi. 
Article 11 
The Restricted Committee shall be given reports by the Working Parties on the 
results of their proceedings, which it shall submit to the Commission with the comments 
of its members. 
In the event of differences of opinion within the Working Parties, the views 
expressed shall be given, together with the names of those expressing them. 
SECRETARIAT 
Article 12 (1) 
The High Authority shall be responsible for the secretarial arrangements in 
connection with the work of the Commission, the Restricted Committee and the Working 
Parties. 
These arrangements shall be under the charge of a High Authority staff member 
appointed to act as Secretary. 
All documents shall be in the six official languages of the Community. 99 
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WORKING PROCEDURE 
Article 13 
The Chairman shall fix the agenda and the dates of meetings after consultation 
with the members of the Restricted Committee. 
Article 14 (1) 
The Chairman shall allow to speak any member of the Commission or representativa 
of the International Labour Organization asking to do so. 
The Chairman may allow advisers to speak. 
Article IS 
The members of the High Authority shall have the right to attend meetings of the 
Commission and of the Restricted Committee, and to speak there. 
The Chairman may bring with him advisers, whom he may allow to speak. 
Article 16 
Where the Commission or the Restricted Committee deems it desirable to obtain 
information concerning the various aspects of safety in coalmines, it shall request this 
from the Governments of the member States. 
Article 17 (1) 
24 members shall constitute a quorum. Conclusions shall be adopted by major-
ity of the members present. 
Proposals by the Commission under 1,3 of its terms of reference shall, however, 
require a vote in favour by two-thirds of the members present, and by not less than nineteen 
members in all. 
Any dissenting opinions shall be brought to the attention of the Governments 
should the members expressing them so request. 
(1) Amended having regard to decision of the Council of the European Corrrmmitiee of 1 Jan-
uary 1973 (Official Journal of the European Communitiee L2 of 1 January 1973). I OP 
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THE COUNCIL 
DECISION (1) 
of March 11, 1965 
of the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States assembled in the Special 
Council of Ministers to modify the decision 
of July 9, 1957 
concerning the terms of reference and rules 
of procedure of the Mines Safety Commission 
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES ASSEMBLED 
IN THE SPECIAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS -
having regard to the decision of July 9, 1957 regarding the terms of 
reference and rules of procedure of the Mines Safety Commission, and 
having regard to the High Authority's proposal of January 7, 1964, 
and 
seeing that this decision in no way affects Article 118 of the Treaty 
setting up the European Economic Commununity, 
DECIDE: 
Article 1 
The terms of reference of the Mines Safety Commission laid down by the decisior 
of July 9, 1957 are replaced by the provisions in the annex. 
Article 2 
The provisions of Article 17 of the rules of procedure annexed to the Decision 
of July 9, 1957 are replaced by the following provisions: 
"Should the Mines Safety Commission or the Restricted Committee consider it 
desirable to receive information regarding the various fields for which it is 
responsible, it shall apply to the Governments of the member States." 
This decision was adopted by the Council at its one-hundredth session, on 
March 11, 1965. 
For the Council 
M. MAURICE-liOKANOWSKI 
P; JS. ïent 
(1) See "Journal officiel de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier" no. 46 
o- 22nd March 196S. 101 
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ANNEX 
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE MINES SAFETY COMMISSION 
1. The Commission shall follow developments regarding safety and measures to avoid at work-
ing-points conditions which represent a danger to health in coalmines, including to this 
end the safety regulations instituted by the public authorities and assemble the necessary 
information concerning progress and practical results obtained. 
To secure the necessary information, the Commission shall apply to the Governments con-
cerned. 
The Commission shall evaluate the information in its possession and submit to the Govern-
ments proposals for the improvement of safety and health conditions in coalmines. 
2. The Commission shall help the High Authority to work out a method of compiling inter-
comparable statistics on accidents and damage to health attributable to vocational 
activities in coalmines. 
3. The Commission shall ensure the prompt forwarding to the quarters directly concerned 
(including in particular mines inspectorates and employers' and workers' associations) 
of relevant information assembled by it. 
4. The Commission shall ascertain, by regular contact with the Governments, what action 
is being taken to implement the proposals of the Conference on Safety in Coalmines, 
and such proposals as it may itself draw up. 
5. The Commission shall propose such study and research as it deems most indicated for 
the improvement of safety, and of healthy working conditions in coalmines, with notes 
as to the way in which these can be effected. 
6. The Commission shall facilitate the exchange of information and experience among per-
sons responsible for safety matters and the maintenance of healthy working conditions, 
and propose appropriate measures for this purpose (e.g. organization of study sessions, 
establishment of documentation services). 
7. The Commission shall propose appropriate measures for ensuring the necessary liaison 
among the rescue services of the Community countries. 
8. The Commission shall submit annually to the Council of Ministers and the High Autority 
a Report on its activities and on developments regarding safety and protection of health 
in coalmines in the different member States. In this connection, it shall in particular 
examine the statistics compiled in these fields. 102 
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COUNCIL DECISION 
of 27 June 1974 
on the extension of the responsibilities of the Mines Safety and Health Commis-
sion to all mineral-extracting industries 
(74/326/EEC) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular Article 145 
thereof ; 
Having regard to the draft of the Commission ; 
Whereas the Council resolution of 21 January 1974 (
4) 
concerning a social action programme envisages an 
action programme for workers which aims inter alia 
at improvement in safety and health conditions at 
work : 
Whereas the Safety and Health Commission should 
be assigned the task of extending to all mineral-
extracting industries the preventive action which has 
hitherto been confined to coal mines ; 
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parlia-
ment (') ; 
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and 
Social Committee ; 
Whereas the representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States meeting within the Council agreed 
to assign this task to the Safety and Health Commis-
sion, 
Whereas the representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States meeting within the special Council 
of Ministers, by Decision of 9 and 10 May 1957, set 
up a Mines Safety and Health Commission whose 
terms of refeience as laid down by Decision of 9 July 
1957(
2) of the representatives of the Governments uf 
the Member States meeting within the Special 
Council of Ministers, amended by Decision of 11 
March 1965 (') are to follow developments in safety 
and in the prevention of occupational risks to health 
in coal mines and to draw up proposals appropriate 
for the improvement of safety and health in coal 
mines ; 
Whereas this body has proved to be an effective and 
suitable instrument for safeguarding the health and 
safety of workers in coal mines ; 
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS : 
Article 1 
1. Preventive action against risks of accident and 
occupational risks to the safety and health of workers 
in all mineral-extracting industries except simple exca-
vation, excluding the protection of the health of 
workers against the dangers arising from ionizing radi-
ations which is subject to special regulations pursuant 
to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community shall be the responsibility of the 
Mines Safety and Health Commission within the 
terms of reference laid down by Decision of 11 March 
1965 of the representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States meeting within the special Council of 
Ministers. 
Whereas problems of safety similar to those in coal 
mines also exist in other mineral-extracting indus-
tries ; 
Whereas the prevention of occupational accidents and 
diseases, as well as occupational hygiene, are among 
the objectives of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community ; 
(') OJ No C 40, 8. 4. 1974, p. 64. 
(-') OJ No 28, .11. 8. 1957, p. 487/57. 
(
5) OJ No 46, 22. .1. 1965, p. 698/65. 
2. Mineral-extracting industries shall be taken to 
mean the activities of prospecting and of extraction in 
the strict sense of the word as well as of preparation of 
extracted materials for sale (crushing, screening, 
washing), but not the processing of such extracted 
materials. 
Î. Simple excavation shall be taken to mean work 
whose purpose is not the extraction of materials for 
use. 
(') OJ No C 1.1, 12. 2. 1974, p. I. 103 
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Article 2 
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the fifth 
day following its publication in the Official Journal 
of tbc European Ca in m uni t ies. 
2. It shall apply : 
— to the underground activities of the mineral-
extracting industries : as from the day laid down in 
paragraph I ; 
—> to the other aciivities of the mineral-extracting 
industries : as from 1 January 1976. 
Done at Luxembourg, 27 June 1974. 
For the Council 
77«· Pres Uè n I 
K. GSCHE1DLE 105 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
OF THE VARIOUS WORKING PARTIES 
OF THE SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
(Update September 1979) 
(Updated September 1979) 
ANNEX II 107 
C - VENTILATION, FIREDAMP AND OTHER MINE GASES 
Chairman : Mr RHYDDERCH 
A. General terms of reference 
The Working Party on Ventilation and Mine Gas will 
examine general problems of ventilation, particularly 
where prevention of firedamp explosions is concerned 
and other means or measures should be applied in order 
to suppress or control firedamp. 
In addition to the study of firedamp explosions occur-
ring in the Community, attention will also be devoted 
to usable results of research in the field of firedamp 
outbursts, in particular where maximum permissible 
levels in ventilation air of firedamp and other 
poisonous gases are concerned, and the advance estima-
tion of firedamp emission before a working is started. 
Attention will also be devoted to appropriate speeds 
for the flow of ventilation air, measures to be taken 
in the event of deceleration of the fow of air, measures 
for the stabilization of ventilation and the means and 
procedures for monitoring ventilation. 
B. Special terms of reference 
1. Examination of the special requirements for workings 
with auxiliary ventilation in which dust control and 
air conditioning equipment is used 
2. Examination of controlled partial recirculation of air 
in drivages. 
3. Presentation of proposals for the selection of combi-
nations of suitable materials for the impellers and 
housings of auxiliary fans. 108 
C 
4. Preparation of a report on "Methane under armoured 
conveyors". 
5. Preparation of a second report on "Ignitions of fire-
damp by power loaders and heading machines" including 
proposals to the Governments on automatic methane 
monitoring, ventilation of the space between the road-
head and the body of the machine, horizon control and 
automatic extinguishing of ignitions. 
6. Preparation of a report on "Heavy gas emissions". 
7. Preparation of a report on "Effects of firedamp on 
the risk of explosion with coal dusts (in collaboration 
with the Working Party on "Flammable Dusts"). 
8. Drafting of uniform requirements and specifications 
for the design and use of CH¿ monitoring instruments. 
9. Preparation of a report on "Use of diesel engines 
underground in mines". 
10. Drafting conclusions concerning outbursts of coal and 
gases. 109 
D - WINDING ROPES AND SHAFT GUIDES, 
WINDING ENGINES AND WINCHES 
Chariman : Mr LINTZEN 
Terms of reference 
1. Follow-up of progress made in the testing of winding 
ropes by means of appropriate instruments in order to 
obtain information concerning its application in the 
mines of the Community and the United Kingdom. 
2. Testing of couplings for circular and flattened 
winding ropes. 
3. Arrangements for the installation and inspection of 
capeis. 
4. Testing of guides for winding cages in drafts and 
guide mechanisms for cable haulage in roadways. 
5. Maintenance required to ensure safe operation of 
winding ropes and balance ropes. 
6. Use of studies on the dynamic behaviour of shaft and 
roadway ropes. 
7. Exchange of views on the properties operating condi-
tions and strength of winding ropes of particular 
interest. 
8. Discussion on accidents involving winding and hauling 
ropes and their couplings, which could provide new 
information. 110 
E - STRATA CONTROL AND ROCK MECHANICS 
Chairman : Mr J.S. MARSHALL 
The Working Party is instructed to examine, by ex-
changing experience and by evaluating the results of 
research, whether it is possible to draw up measures 
or practical directives for the prevention of falls 
of ground, taking into account the individual features 
of coal measures and workings. 
1. In particular : In the interest of better roof control, 
particularly within the context of working schedules, 
it will study : 
1.1. general measures to be taken into consideration in 
avoiding falls of ground, in the light of the type of 
measures and conditions of workings, e.g. sequence of 
working the seams, features of the working areas 
(length, speed of advance, etc.), type and characte-
ristics of the lining ; 
1.2. specific measures to deal with individual difficulties 
which may or may not foreseeably arise in the long 
term, such as disturbance zones, protective banks, 
working of a face at right-angles to the end of an 
old seam, etc. 
1.3. specific measures to be taken when starting off a face 
in order to prevent abrupt subsidence of the roof. 
2. It will also compare mining regulations on support 
and draw up minimum roof control requirements, taking 
into account the characteristics of the various faces 
(overall seam thickness, dip, dead rock ...). Ill 
F- ELECTRICITY 
Chairman : Mr STASSEN 
Terms of reference 
1. Comparing adopted safety and accident prevention 
provisions relating to : 
a) electric shock, 
b) fire hazard, 
c) explosion hazard. 
2. Ascertaining the present position in Community coun-
tries with regard to safety regulations on underground 
electrical networks of low and medium voltage (up to 
1 100 V) and feeder cables for movable equipment, 
with due regard to the specifications for the said 
cables. 
3. Reporting on steps to be taken when work has to be 
carried out on electrical equipment under voltage. 
4. Studying the construction of high-tension cables (of 
up to 6 000 V) used underground, and protective 
equipment. 
5. Study of the problem of stray currents. 
6. Periodic reports on oil-powered contactors used in 
gassy environments. 
7. To follow the development of techniques designed to 
eliminate entirely the production of sparks on elec-
trical contact lines (battery motors excluded). 
9. The Mines Safety and Health Commission instructs the 
Working Party on Electricity : 112 
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9.1. to continue to take due note of the results of the 
work of the CENELEC Committee of Experts entrusted 
with harmonizing the rules covering the design of 
electrical equipment for use in explosive atmosphere ; 
9.2. to propose, if appropriate, modifications to the above 
documents of CENELEC to make them applicable to coal 
mines in countries of the European Community ; 
9.3· to prepare the models of the certificates of conformi-
ty and control for Group I electrical apparatus (in 
collaboration with D.G. Ill of the EC - Commission) ; 
9.4. to compare the rules covering installation and use of 
underground electrical equipment now current in each 
to the Community countries, particularly in respect 
of the dangers of firedamp ignition ; to ensure that 
the rules are uniform or to examine the equivalence 
of certain rules, so that such equipment can be used 
without modification in all the Community countries. 13 
G - HUMAN FACTORS AFFECTING SAFETY 
Chairman : Mr LINTZEN 
Terms of reference 
1. Community safety campaigns. 
2. Recommendation on the employment of foreign and young 
workers. 
3. Practical measures for the prevention of accidents, 
taking into account psychological and sociological 
factors. 
4. Ways in which workers participate in the inspection 
of mining activities with regard to safety and health. 114 
I - MECHANIZATION 
Chairman : Mr MEDAETS 
Taking into consideration current techniques in 
winning and roadway driving linings and roadway con-
veyors, the working party is instructed to study 
particular ways of preventing accidents connected 
with mechanization. 
In particular, it is to : 
a) compile a schedule for machinery manufacturers of the 
minimum work safety requirements for mechanical pro-
tection of machines and equipment ; 
b) study safety provisions such as : visual and acoustic 
signalling, operating controls and in particular the 
ability to stop machines from any point on the face or 
roadway, taking account of modern means of telecom-
munication and remote control, electrical protection 
of motors in the event of overloading or jamming of 
equipment, lighting, etc. 115 
K - OIL, GAS AND OTHER MATERIALS EXTRACTED BY BOREHOLE 
Chairman : Mr DE KORVER 
A. Terms of reference 
1. In the light of information available on safety and 
health hazards and the causes of accidents during 
prospecting, boring and extracting to obtain petro-
leum, gas and other materials in the Community coun-
tries ; the working party is instructed in particular : 
a) to evaluate lessons to be drawn from several serious 
accidents which occurred during the evacuation of 
platforms off shore : recommandation on exercises for 
the rescue of men falling over board, for the evacua-
tion of platforms, fire fighting, etc... 
b) to form a study and editorial group which will study 
the problem of accident statistics in the specific 
field outlined under 1. in collaboration with the 
working party on Common Accident Statistics ; 
c) to make proposals in the field of initial and refresher 
training for personnel of all ranks ; 
d) to maintain contacts with the organizations and confe-
rences working in this field, in particular with the 
"London Conference of Safety and Pollution Safeguards 
in the Development of North West European Offshore 
Mineral Resources" and particularly with its group III, 
with the "Inter-Governemental Maritime Consultative 
Organization", with the "International Labour Office" 
and the "European Diving Technology Committee". 
B. Special terms of reference 
The Committee of experts on "Well Control", which pre-
pared the proposals on the prevention of blowouts, is 
instructed to update or elaborate these recommandations 
in line with technical progress. 116 
L- COMBUSTIBLE DUSTS 
Chairman : Mr. KOCH 
Terms of reference 
Taking into account the mechanism of dust combustion 
and of flame propagation and the various factors which 
may influence this, including the fact that methane 
is frequently involved in this phenomenon, the working 
party is instructed to carry out a study of precau-
tions against dust explosions, in particular : 
a) dust neutralization (dust control in situ, stone 
dusting, spraying, dust fixation by means of spreading 
salts and coagulating pastes etc.), this study to in-
clude the comparative analysis of the regulations and 
instructions applied in the Community countries, along 
with the methods of application of the different pro-
cesses , 
b) dust barriers of various types to halt dust explosions, 
mixed dust-methane explosions and pure methane explo-
sions . 
The working party may make any suggestions for research 
work considered necessary to advance the knowledge of 
the phenomena studied and to promote safety in these 
fields. 117 
M- HEALTH IN MINES 
Chairman : Mr RHYDDERCH 
Studying, from the standpoint of technical prevention 
and industrial medicine, the prevention of environ-
mental risks to the health of workers in coal mines, 
and other extractive industries. 
1. To update the general directives concerning airborne 
dust control methode in coal mines during the use of 
power loaders and heading machines, particularly in 
connection with powered supports, underground crushers 
and rubber tyred transport vehicles. 
2. Dust measurement (methods, frequency, measuring points, 
conclusions to be drawn etc.) and where necessary 
establishing a scale of comparison of the various 
methods employed in coal and other mines. 
3. Establishment of airborne dust thresholds. Definition 
of categories of permissible dustiness. Steps to be 
taken when faced with various categories of dustiness, 
especially in coal mines. 
4. Among the medical problems in the control of ambient 
health hazards to workers in mines and other extractive 
industries priority must be given to the study of the 
following factors : climate, noise, vibration, 
visibility and gas, in particular radon and H?S. 118 
N - RESCUE ARRANGEMENTS, 
FIRES AND UNDERGROUND COMBUSTION 
Chairman : Mr COENDERS 
A. General terms of reference 
(Art. 7 of the Terms of Reference of the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission) 
Exchange of experience between the Community countries 
on : 
1. Rescue operations and action against spontaneous 
combustion, heatings and fires on the occasion of 
accidents or other events underground requiring the 
assistance of rescue teams, from which useful lessons 
have been learned ; 
2. Organization of rescue operations underground and 
the presentation of reports every two years ; 
3. The prevention of spontaneous combustion, heatings 
and fire outbreaks underground, the fighting and con-
trol of spontaneous combustion, heatings and fires, 
and reopening sealed-off workings. 
B. Special terms of reference 
1. Comparison of practical arrangements of rescue opera-
tions existing in the Community countries and possibly 
the drafting of a standard plan of procedure for the 
Community as a whole. 
2. Exchange of experience and practical knowledge in the 
following fields : 
a) methods and apparatus for the early detection of com-
bustion, heatings and pit fires, 
b) CO self-rescuers employing filters oxygen and more 119 
N generally methods to protect personnel in noxious 
atmospheres (gas, fumes, oxygen deficiency etc.) 
c) Oxygen deficiency warning devices, 
d) Fires in long plant, 
e) Sealing off abandoned workings, 
f) Specifications and testing conditions for fire-
resistant fluids for mechanical power transmission. 
3. Condensed comparative survey of new regulations and 
guidelines promulgated by the mining authorities of 
member countries on rescue arrangements, first aid 
and fire lighting and prevention. 
C. Analysis of results (partial or overall) of research 
projects at present in progress so as to : 
1. Improve borehole rescue techniques, 
2. Define the standards to which flameproof clothing 
should conform. 
D. Studies to be completed on the following subjects : 
1. Effects of a fire in shafts, 
2. Resources to be applied to combat the danger of ex-
plosion during firefighting : nitrogen and others. 120 
0 - COMMON ACCIDENT STATISTICS 
Chairman : Mr KOCH 
Terms of reference 
1. To extend the tables of accident statistics under 
ground, prepared for coal mines to all the extractive 
industries. 
The working party shall determine the conditions for 
this extension and examine how the condensed statis-
tics on socioeconomic items might be presented for 
all the extractive industries. 
2. In order to enable the Mines Safety and Health Com-
mission to draw conclusions on accident prevention, 
the frequency of underground accidents in the Commu-
nity coal mines should be examined, with the fol-
lowing objectives : 
2.1. To decide on suitable mathematical statistical 
systems, 
2.2. To evaluate, with their aid, chronological differences 
in frequency together with differences from country to 
country or coalfield to coalfield. 121 
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Rheinland-Pfalz 
Am Staden 17 
6600 SAARBRUECKEN 
A-B 
Dipl-Ing. Werner SLONINA  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft mbH 
Tremoniastrasse 13 
4600 DORTMUND 
D1-D2 
Ernst STEBEL  Leiter des Sachgebietes Arbeitsschutz 
IG BERGBAU UND ENERGIE 
Alte Hattingerstr. 19 
Postfach 1229 
C - M - N4 
4630 BOCHUM 
G. STRAKERJAHN  Bergdirektor - Landesoberbergamt Nordrhein-West. 
Goebenstr. 25 - 27 
4600 DORTMUND 
0-N4 
Günther THIELEN  Bergdirektor 
Wilhelmsklamm 18 
6604 GUEDINGEN/Saar 
Dr. Chem. Hans Willi THOENES Technischer Ueberwachungsverein e.V. 
Steubenstr. 53 
4360 ESSEN 
N 
Klaus TRäGER  Bergdirektor - Landesoberbergamt Nordrhein-West. 
Goebenstrasse 25 - 27 
4600 DORTMUND 
I-N2 155 
BELGIQUE - BELGIUM - BELGIEN - BELGIO - BELGIË - BELGIEN 
Joseph BRACKE  Hoofdingenieur -
Directeur der Mijnen 
Institut National des Industries Extractives (INIEX) 
60, rue Grande 
Β 7260 PATURAGES 
F - L - M - N2 - N3 
Prof. BRYCH  Faculté Polytechnique de Mons 
9, rue Houdain 
B 7000 MONS 
K-Kl 
P. CAJOT  Ingénieur en Chef 
Directeur des Mines 
Ministère des Affaires Economiques 
30, rue Demot 
B 1040 BRUXELLES 
H-K 
J.B. CAZ 1ER  Ingénieur Principal des Mines 
Administration des Mines 
Centre Albert 
Place Albert 1er 
B 6000 CHARLEROI 
M 
L. COLINET  Rue de Monceau-Fontaine, 33 
B 6031 MONCEAU-SUR-SAMBRE 
C-Gl 
Prof. DAENENS  Laboratorium voor Toxicologie KUL 
Van Evenstraat 4 
Β 3000 LEUVEN 
N2 
J. DE BACKER  Ing .-Principal des Mines 
Administration des Mines 
30, rue Demot 
B 1040 BRUXELLES 
O 
F. DECKERS  Divisiedirecteur der Mijnen 
Thon issen laan 18 
Β 3500 HASSELT 
Ι-
Ε. DE GROOT  e.a.Mijningenieur 
Adininstr. van het Mijnwezen 
Afdeling Kempen 
Thonissenlaan 18 
Β 3500 HASSELT 
M. DEGUELDRE  Conseiller à l'Institut d'Hygiène des Mines 
Hovennarkt 22 
B 3500 HASSELT 
A-M 
A.DENTENEER  Hoofdingenieur-Directeur der Mijnen 
Langveldstraat 44 
Β 3500 HASSELT 
E-156 
BELGIQUE - BELGIUM - BELGIEN - BELGIO - BELGIË - BELGIEN 
Philippe DOM  Directeur 
S.A. FORAKY 
15, place des Barricades 
Β 1000 BRUXELLES 
Κ 
Charles FRENAY  Directeur Divisionnaire des Mines 
Division du Hainaut 
Centre Albert 
Place Albert 1er 
B 6300 CHARLEROI 
N2. 
André GHISLAIN  Ingénieur 
Ateliers de Constructions 
Electriques de Charleroi 
Avenue E. Rousseau 
B 6001 MARCINELLE 
P. GOFF ART  Ingénieur-en-Chef, 
Directeur des Mines 
Administration des Mines 
Ministère des Affaires Economiques 
30, rue Demot 
B 1040 BRUXELLES 
H. GREGOIRE  Inspecteur Général der Mijnen 
Administratie van het Mijnwezen 
30, rue Demot 
Β 1040 BRUXELLES 
C-C1-N4 
E. JACQUES  Département de Thermodynamique 
Place du Levant 2 
B 3000 LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE 
NI-
J.Ch. JANSEN  Administrateur Principal 
D.G. Marché Intérieur et Affaires Industrielles 
Commission des Communautés Européennes 
200, rue de la Loi 
B 1049 BRUXELLES 
F-
M. JANSEN  Ingénieur 
N.V. KEMPENSE STEINKOLENMIJNEN 
Zettel Zolder 
Β 3540 ZOLDER 
G-
Georges LECLERCQ  Directeur des Travaux 
S.A. des Charbonnages de Roton-Farciennes 
et Oignies-Aiseau 
20, rue Destrée 
Β 6258 LAMBUSART 157 
BELGIQUE - BELGIUM - BELGIEN - BELGIO - BELGŒ - BELGIEN 
Joseph LEYS  Ingénieur van de N.V. Kempense Steinkolenmijnen 
Koolenmijnlaan 48 B 
B 3540 ZOLDER 
M.MAUFORT  Koolmijnlaan 194 
B 3560 BERINGEN 
M. MAYNE  Directeur du Centre de Coordination de Sauvetage 
du Bassin de Campine 
Kempische Steenweg 555 
B 3500 KIEWITT-HASSELT 
L-N-N3 
Jean MEDAETS  Directeur Generaal van het Mijnwezen 
Ministerie van Economische Zaken en Energie 
30, rue Demot 
B 1040 BRUSSEL 
A-B-I 
G. MIGNION  Ingénieur en Chef, Directeur Administration 
des Mines, Direction Générale des Mines 
30, rue Demot 
B 1040 BRUXELLES 
D-D2 
Jan OLYSLAEGERS  Président National de la Centrale Syndicale 
des Travailleurs des Mines de Belgique 
Statiestraat 78 A - 3530 HOUTHALEN 
«n 8, rue Joseph Stevens B.P. 4 
B 1000 BRUXELLES (Siège) 
A-I 
J.PATIGNY  Université de Louvain 
Bâtiment Stevin 
2, place du Levant 
B 1348 LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE 
Y. PUT  Ingénieur en Chef - Directeur 
Administration des Mines 
13, nie de Spa 
B 4000 LIEGE 
A. RENDERS  Voorzitter van de Centrale der Vrije Mijnwerkers 
Ouddergemselaati 26-32 
B 1040 BRUXELLES 
L.RUY  Ingénieur en Chef - Directeur des Mines 
Ministère des Affaires Economiques 
30. rue Demot 
B 1040 BRUXELLES 58 
BELGIQUE - BELGIUM - BELGIEN - BELGIO - BELGIË - BELGIEN 
J.STASSEN  Inspecteur Général des Mines 
Administration des Mines 
49 rue des Augustins 
B 4040 LIEGE 
A-B-F-N 
Robert STENUIT  Avenue de la Libération, 66 
B 1640 RHODE ST GENESE 
NI 
Pierre TAMO  Ingénieur Principal 
Ateliers de constructions électriques de Charleroi 
Avenue E. Rousseau 
B 6001 MARCINELLE 
H. TRONNIER  Secrétaire Général du CENELEC 
2, rue Brederode 
B 1000 BRUXELLES 
E. VANDENDRIESSCHE  Secrétaire Général de la Centrale des 
Francs-Mineurs 
113, rue de Trazegnies 
B 6180 COURCELLES 
A - C - G - N4 
G. VAN GUCHT  e.a. Mijningenieur 
Administratie van het Mijnwezen 
Thonissenlaan 18 
B 3500 HASSELT 
M. VERWILST  Association des Industriels de Belgique (A.I.B.) 
Avenue A. Drouart 29 
B 1160 BRUXELLES 
D 159 
DANEMARK - DENMARK - DAENEMARK - DANIMARCA 
DENEMARKEN - DANMARK 
Anders KJAER  Maitre en Sciences Sociales 
Secrétaire Direktorater for Arbejdstilsynet 
Rosen vaengets Allé 16-18 
DK 2100 KOEBENHAVN OE 
0-
E. SPRUNK-JANSEN  Direktor 
GREENEX A/S 
Landemaerket 10 
DK 1119 KOEBENHAVN K 
A-K-
Johan BLOU  Fabrikinspektoer 
Direktoratet for Arbejdstilsynet 
Rosenvaengets Allé 16 
DK 2100 KOEBENHAVN OE 
K-
Afdelingsingenioer DAN BUCH  Ministeriet for Groenland 
Hausergade 3 
DK 1128 KOEBENHAVN K 
A - B - K 
Svend FONSSKOV  Forbundsformant 
Dansk-Maskinbesaetningsforbund 
St.Strandstraede8 
DK 1255 KOEBENHAVN K 
K-
Peter Helmer STEEN  Danish Energy Agency 
Strandgade 29 
DK 1401 COPENHAGEN K 
Kl-
Boris SVENDSEN  Arbejdstilsynets Groenlands Kreds 
Directoratet for Arbejdstilsynet 
Rosenvaengets Allé 16-18 
DK 2100 KOEBENHAVN OE 
A-B-K1-N4 161 
FRANKREICH - FRANCE - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
Dr C. AMOUDRU  Médecin-chef 
des Charbonnages de France 
9, Avenue Percier 
N2 
75 PARIS 8e 
M. BELIN  CERCHAR 
B.P.n.2 
F 60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
Rémi-François BERNARD  Ingénieur des Mines 
Service de l'Industrie et des Mines 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
941, rue Charles Bourseul 
B.P. 838 
F -59508 DOUAI CEDEX 
M. BIEAU  Service Technique des 
Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
F 75008 PARIS 
Guy BLANPAIN  Ingénieur, 
Laboratoire au Centre d'Etudes et de 
Recherches des Charbonnages de France 
VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE (oise) 
B.P. 2 
F 60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
N2 
Marcel BOULICAULT  Ingénieur en chef des Mines 
Service de l'Industrie et des Mines de Lorraine 
6, place du Roi Georges 
F 57000 METZ 
D 1 
Norbert BOUTIER  5, rue du Maréchal Juin 
F 62800 LIEVIN 
N3 
M. BOUTONNAT  CERCHAR 
B.P.n.2 
F60550VERNEUIL-
C 1 
EN-HALATTE 
M. BURGUN  Directeur-Adjoint-Principal 
Association des Industriels de France 
10, rue de Calais 
F 75 009 PARIS 
Dl 
Jean CEREDE  Ingénieur en Chef de l'exploitation 
10, rue Espariat 
F 13100 AIX-EN-PROVENCE 
N 162 
FRANKREICH - FRANCE - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
M. CHAMPAGNAC  93, rue F aiguière 
F 75015 PARIS 
NI 
M. CHEVILLARD  Chef du Service Sécurité Générale 
des Houillères du Bassin de Lorraine 
Poste central de secours Belle Roche 
F 57802 FREYMING-MERLEBACH 
N 
Jean CRETIN  Ingénieur principal 
Poste central de secours 
BELLE-ROCHE 
F 57802 FREYMING-MERLEBACH 
N-Nl -
M. DELCLAUX  Laboratoires du Cerchar 
B.P. n. 2 
F 60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
N3 
G. DERAM AUX  Fédération des Mineurs C.F.T.C. 
43, rue des Cyclamens 
Cité 12 bis 
F 62300 LENS 
Henri DESVIGNE  Chef du Service central Sécurité 
Houillère du Bassin du 
Nord et du Pas-de-Calais 
20, rue des Minimes 
F 59 DOUAI 
Michel DOLIGEZ  Ingénieur principal 
Chef du siège 19 
Houillères du Bassin 
du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais 
12, rue Emile Combes 
F 62500 LENS 
C-L 
J. FOUBET  86, avenue E. Zola 
F 75015 PARIS 
A-
M. GILTAIRE  Ingénieur au Cerchar 
B.P.n.2 
F 60550 VERNEUIL-
L-
EN-HALATTE 
M. GOUILLOUX  Charbonnages de France 
Direction des Services Techniques 
B.P. 396-08 
9, avenue Percier 
F 75360 PARIS CEDEX 08 
E-163 
FRANKREICH - FRANCE - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
Marcel GRAGEZ  Ingénieur en Chef des mines 
Service de l'Industrie et des Mines 
de Rhône Alpes 
11, rue Curie 
F 69456 LYON CEDEX 3 
R. GRISARD  Ingénieur Principal 
Cher du Service Sécurité des mines 
des Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
F 75008 PARIS 
M-N-O-
Roger ISNER  Ingénieur Principal 
Houillères du Bassin du Nord et 
du Pas-de-Calais 
20, rue des Minimes 
F 59508 DOUAI 
C. JAGUSINSKI  1, rue de la Forêt 
RUELISHEIM 
F 68270 WITTENHEIM 
M 
Louis KOCH  Ingénieur en Chef des mines 
Direction de la Qualité et de la Sécurité 
Industrielles - See des Techniques du Sous-sol 
99, rue de Grenelle 
F 75700 PARIS 
A - B - L - O 
René KOWALIK  Ingénieur T.P.E. 
Service de l'Industrie et des Mines de Bretagne 
2, quai Richemont 
F 35100 RENNES 
N-
M. LAMATY  Ingénieur au Service P.E.M. 
Préparation mécanique des charbons et 
entretiens électromécaniques - gros en-
tretien câbles - Etudes générales 
Houillères du Bassin de Lorraine 
F 57802 FREYMING-MERLEBACH CEDEX 
D-D2-
M. LANDIER  Ingénieur principal 
aux Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
F 75008 PARIS 
O 
J.P. .LARREUR  Ingénieur Divisionnaire 
Service Technique 
Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
F 75008 PARIS 
G. 164 
FRANKREICH - FRANCE - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
M. LE BOUFFANT  Chef du Département Physique-Biologie 
Lab. du Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches 
des Charbonnages de France 
B.P. n. 2 
F 60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
N2 
R. LELEUX  Ingénieur Divisionnaire des T.P.E. 
Chef du groupe de Subdivisions de Béthune 
297, rue Michelet 
F 62400 BETHUNE 
Francis MACART  Ingénieur des T.P.E. 
Direction des carburants 
Ministère de l'Industrie 
5, rue Barbet de Jouy 
F 75700 PARIS 
Dr. J.C.MARTIN  Dept. Physique-Biologie 
Lab. du centre d'études et de recherches 
des Charbonnages de France 
B.P. n.2 
F-60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
N2-
M.MATHEUS  Ingénieur 
Arrondissement minéralogique de 
Bordeaux 
26, Cours Xavier Arnozan 
33076 BORDEAUX 
Kl-
A. MONOMAKHOFF  Ingénieur 
Chef du Groupe Agrément-Sécurité 
Centre de recherches 
Charbonnages de France 
B.P.n.2 
F 60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
F-
M. MONTAGNE  Président Directeur Général 
de la Société Alsacienne 
d'Installations techniques 
B.P. n. 24 
F 67000 SAVERNE 
Stanislas NOWAK  Secrétaire du Syndicat des Mineurs 
Force Ouvrière 
4, rue Charcot 
F 62300 LENS 
A - L - N4 165 
FRANKREICH - FRANCE - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
Pierre ODIER  Chef du Service Central 
Sécurité et Environnement d'ELF R.E. 
Tour Aquitaine 
F 92080 PARIS LA DEFENSE, CEDEX 4 
K 
R. PLOUCHARD  Ingénieur des Mines 
Chef du Laboratoire Lubrifiant 
F 59-SIN-LE-NOBLE DOUAI 
N2-
Henri POCHELSKI  Ingénieur des P.T.E. (Mines) 
Service de l'Industrie et des Mines des 
Pays de la Loire - Groupe de subdivision 
du Maine et Loire 
Cité Administrative 
Rue Dupetit-Thouars 
F 49043 ANGERS, CEDEX 
Michel POI LEVE  Directeur du Poste central de secours 
des Houillères du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais 
Rue Notre-Dame de Lorette 
62300 LENS 
D-D2-N 
L. POIRIER  Ingénieur à la Direction 
des Services Techniques 
des Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
B.P. 39608 
F 75360 PARIS - CEDEX 08 
D-1 -N2 
André PUYO  Division Opérations 
Département Exploitation SNEA(P) 
26, Avenue des Lilas 
F 64000 PAU 
Kl 
J.P. RAFFOUX  Dr.-Ing. 
Laboratoire mécanique des Terrains 
du CERCHAR 
Ecole des Mines 
Parc du Saurupt 
F 54 NANCY 
R. RIVIERE  Chef de la Division des Statistiques 
Bureau de documentation minière 
4, rue Las Cases 
F 75007 PARIS 
O-166 
FRANKREICH - FRANCE - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
Camille ROGEZ  Ingénieur des T.P.E. (Mines) 
Service de l'Industrie et des mines du 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
941, rue Charles Bourseul 
B.P. 838 
59508 DOUAI CEDEX 
N 
Bernard SCHNELL  Ingénieur général des mines 
Conseil général des mines 
Ministère de l'Industrie 
5, rue Barbet de Jouy 
75700 PARIS 
M. SCHWEITZER  Directeur du Service technique 
des Charbonnages de France 
9, Avenue Percier 
75008 PARIS 
E. SIMODE  Ingénieur en Chef 
à la Direction de l'Economie et de 
l'Informatique 
Houillères du Bassin de Lorraine 
5, rue Ambroise Thomas 
57 FREYMING 
C-Nl 
Czeslaw STAIN  Ingénieur divisionnaire des T.P.E. (mines) I 
Ministère de l'Industrie 
Direction de la Qualité et de la Sécurité Industrielles 
Service des Techniques du Sous-Sol 
99, rue de Grenelle 
F 75700 PARIS 
M. TCHOULAKIAN  Chef du Service Matériel et Approvision. 
des Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
75008 PARIS 
N3 
Raymond THOMAS  Service de Formation et Gestion 
des cadres supérieurs, 
Charbonnages de France, 
9, avenue Percier 
75008 PARIS 
Louis TOURRAND  20, rue Roger Cadel 
F 75600 FORBACH 
El 167 
FRANKREICH - FRANCE - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
M. TRETIAKOW  Ingénieur en Chef 
Service Exploitation des 
Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
75008 PARIS 
F-N4. 
André TRICOIRE  Ingénieur des mines 
Service de l'Industrie et 
Mines de Lorraine 
6, place du Roi Georges 
57000 METZ 
G-
Lucien VIELLEDENT  Ingénieur général des Mines 
Ministère de l'Industrie et de la recherche 
Conseil Général des Mines 
35, rue St-Dominique 
F 75700 PARIS 
N 
François WANECQ  Ingénieur des mines 
Service de l'Industrie et des Mines 
d'Aquitaine - Poitou - Charentes 
26, Cours Xavier Arnozan 
33076 BORDEAUX CEDEX 
K 169 
ITALIE - ITALY - ITALIEN - ITALIA - ITALIE 
Sig. Francesco BIAGIOLI 
Ing. Rolando BONAZZA 
Ing. A. BRIGNONE 
Ing. Giovanni BULGARELLI 
Prof. Mario CARTA 
Ing. COPPOLA 
Prof. Dr. Ing. R. COTZA 
Dott. Giorgio CRAVIOTTO 
Aw. Umberto CUTTICA 
Ing. Aldo GALATI 
Segreteria Federestrattive 
Via Isonzo, 42/A 
I 00100 ROMA 
Ispettore Generale del 
Corpo delle Miniere 
Via Brenta 9 
158100 GROSSETO 
ENEL 
Miniera di Seruci 
C.P. 117 
I 09013 CARBONIA (Sard.) 
Capo del Distretto 
Minerario di Padova 
Via Genova 22 
135100 PADOVA 
Istituto Arte Mineraria 
della Facoltà d'Ingegneria 
Piazza d'Armi 
I 09100 CAGLIARI (Sardegna) 
ENEL 
Direzione della Produzione e Trasmissione 
C.P. 386 
I 00100 ROMA 
Istituto di Arte Mineraria dell'Università 
I 09100 CAGLIARI (Sardegna) 
E.T.S.I.-C. I.S. L. 
Via Po 22 
I 00198 ROMA 
Dirigente della Società 
Nazionale Cogne 
Via S. Quintino 
I 10100 TORINO 
Ministero dell'Industria e del Comercio 
Direz. Gen. delle Miniere 
Serv. Sicurezza Mineraria 
Via Veneto 33 
I 00100 ROMA 
M 
C-M 
N 
A-C 
A-N4-
G-
A-B 
Ing. Mario GA 170 
ITALIE - ITALY - ITALIEN - ITALIA - ITALIE 
Ing. Mario GASPARINI 
Ing. Carmelo LATINO 
Dott. Carlo MICHELAZZI 
Prof. 
Carlo MORT ARINO 
Ing. G.B. NARBONE 
Dott. Ing. E. ORU 
Prof. Nicolas DE PAMPHILLIS 
Ing. Massimo PERSOD 
Prof. Ing. Paolo PIGA 
Dott. N. RICCIARDI-TENORE 
c/o AGIP Mineraria S.pA. K - Kl -
I 20097 SAN DONATO MILANESE 
Capo del Distretto E -
Minerario di Grosseto 
Via Trieste 1 
158100 GROSSETO 
Ispettore Generale del Ministero del Lavoro A - G 
e delle Previdenza Sociale 
Via Andrea Fulvio 10 
I 00162 ROMA 
Dott. 
Istituto di Meccanica applicata D 
del Politecnico di Torino 
24, Corso Duca degli Abruzzi 
I 10129 TORINO 
Ing. 
Ministero dell'Industria del Commercio 
e dell'Artigianato 
Direzione Generale delle Miniere 
Serv. Sicurezza Mineraria 
Via Veneto 33 
I 00100 ROMA 
Direttore della Miniera di Seruci 
C.P. 117 
I 09013 CARBONI A (Cagliari) 
C.I.S.L. 
Via Isonza 42 
I 00100 ROMA 
Ingegnere Capo delle Miniere 
Distretto Minerario 
Via Gramsci 
109016 IGLESIAS-Ca 
I-O 
N-
G-
O-
Titolare della Cattedra di Arte Mineraria N -
della Facoltà di Ingegneria di Roma 
Via Eusossiana 
I 00100 ROMA 
Ispettore Generale Medico 
Capo dell'Ispettorato -
Medico Centrale del Lavoro A -
Minist, del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale 
Via XX Settembre 97 c 
100187 ROMA 171 
ITALIE - ITALY - ITALIEN - ITALIA - ITALIE 
Dott. Ing. Onofrio SAMMARCO  Distretto minerario 
Via Trieste 1 
158100 GROSSETO 
Nl-
Ing. F. SCIUTO  Direzione Generale 
Direttore della Divisione V 
dell'Ufficio Naz. Minerario per gli Idrocarburi 
Via Molise 2 
100187 ROMA 
A-B-K 
M. TARABOCCHLA  Federestrattive C. I. S. L. 
Miniera di Niccioleta G.R.) 
Via Isonzo 42 
100918 ROMA 
Dr. Ing. Ugo VIVIANI  Montecatini Edison SpA 
Foro Buonaparte 31 
I 20121 MILANO 
GÌ-173 
IRLANDE - IRELAND - IRLAND - IRLANDA - IERLAND 
J.LEYDEN  Arigna Collieries 
IRL - ARIGNA, Co. Leitrim 
A-
Noël O'RIORDAN  Dipl. I.E., C. Eng. 
Industrial Inspector 
Grade 11 - Depart, of Labour 
Mespil Road 
DUBLIN 4 
Gerald B. O'SULLIVAN  Principal Officer 
Department of Labour 
Mespil Road 
IRL - DUBLIN 4 
A-B 
J.SINCLAIR  Grade 1 Industrial 
Inspector 
Department of Labour 
Anley House 
Mespil Road 
DUBLIN 4 
A-B 
S.TRACEY  Natural Resources Limit 
Irish Transport and General Workers Union 
Liberty Hall 
IRL-DUBLIN 
Secretary of Department of Labour David House 
Mespil Road 
IRL- DUBLIN 
K 
J. CHESTER  Department of Labour 
Davitt House 
Mespil Road 
DUBLIN 4 - Ireland 175 
LUXEMBOURG - LUXEMBURG - LUSSEMBURGO 
J. BIRDEN  Directeur-Adjoint 
Inspection du Travail et des Mines 
2, rue des Girondins 
L -LUXEMBOURG 
A-
Edouard MULLER  Ingénieur 
Chef de Service Adjoint 
ARBED-MINES 
B.P. 143 
ESCH S/ALZETTE 
Luxembourg 
M 
Adolphe RAUCHS  Chef de Service 
ARBED 
ESCH-BELVAL 
Luxembourg 
A-G 
Arthur SCHUSTER  Directeur de l'Inspection 
du Travail et des Mines 
2, rue des Girondins 
B.P. 27 
-L - LUXEMBOURG 
A - B - E - G 177 
PAYS - BAS - NETHERLANDS - NIEDERLANDE - PAESI-BASI 
NEDERLAND - NEDERLANDENE 
W. EYKHOUT  Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen 
Jan Willem Frisolaan 3 
NL 2517 JS s'-GRAVENHAGE 
KI 
L.F. HEEZEN  Amoco Netherlands Petroleum Co 
Postbus 9550 
NL 2502 AN s'GRAVENHAGE 
K 
E.A.R. HOEFNAGELS  Inspecteur der Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen 
9, Apollóla an 
6411 BA HEERLEN 
Nederland 
F-I 
F. HOLZAPFEL  Placid Int. Oil Co. 
Konigin Juliana Plein 15 
2595 AA s'-GRAVENHAGE 
Nederland 
Kl 
Th. M. JANSEN  Inspecteur der Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen 
Apollolaan 9 
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Maintenance of the safety standard and improvement of the safety of 
highly-worked friction winding ropes of stranded construction 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Definition of the problem 
Shaft winding is of key importance in the transport systems of mines 
with main and staple shafts. With the constant increases in daily output 
capacity brought about by rationalization, the demands made on shaft 
winding installations, and especially central winding installations, are 
becoming more and more stringent. 
To meet these demands shaft winding capacity is stepped up primarily by 
increasing the payload of the system and only to a limited extent by 
increasing the winding speeds. 
But with larger payloads, the loading and unloading times are considerably 
longer, with a consequent increase in the length of the winding cycle. 
The shortest decking times for skip winding installations are in the region 
of 15 seconds with a payload of 25 t, and they increase to approx. 32 seconds 
with 42 t payload. 
Figure 1 shows the present situation as regards the ratio of payload to 
maximum rope tension in the payload compartment (S.. ) as a function of 
depth, for major single, two, four and six-rope winding installations 
in North Rhine-Westphalia. The diagram clearly shows how the percentage 
of payload in total compartment weight goes down as the mining depth increases, 194 
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Figure 1 Ratio of payload to rope tension in the payload compartment vs. depth, 
in major single, two, four and six-rope winding installations in 
North Rhine-Westphalia. 
Figure 2 shows, for the same installations, the marked increase in rope weight as 
a percentage of total compartment weight (S,), again as a function of depth. 
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Figure 2 Ratio of rope weight to rope tension in the payload compartment vs. depth, 
in major single, two, four and six-rope winding installations in 
North Rhine-Westphalia. 195 
It is clear from both these diagrams that increasing mining depth is the greatest 
obstacle to raising the capacity of shaft winding installations. The greater depths 
not only increase the length of the winding cycle, but also, more particularly, the 
dynamic stresses exerted on the moving load-bearing parts of the shaft winding 
installation. 
With increasing dynamic stresses, that is, in this case, with an increase in 
undulating loading, the service life of the material decreases. This is . 
particularly significant in the case of winding ropes which are so worked that 
they will attain the endurance limit. This relationship can be illustrated by 
means of fatigue strength diagrams. 
Figure 3 shows how, in the case of a high-strength material with a certain 
surface structure, the fatigue resistance drops as dynamic loading increases. 
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The values under static loading are shown on the right-hand ordinate, and the 
dynamic (cyclic) load increases as one moves towards the left. The left-hand 
ordinate represents straightforward push-pull loading (alternating tension/ 
compression) of the same value and the middle ordinate represents undulating 
loads. The arrows pointing left show the area of the increase in undulating 
loads in the moving parts of a shaft winding installation. It is clear from 
the fall in the fatigue strength, curve that it is necessary either to reduce 
the stress applied to the material by increasing the load-bearing cross-sections, 
thus remaining within the material's fatigue limits, or to accept reduced service 
life of the part if the stress is further increased. 
Because the daily number of winds in single-purpose central shaft winding 
installations is 2-3 times that in normally-worked installations (on average), 
there is a further complicating factor, from the point of view of safety, in 
highly-worked installations. This is as follows: the period available for 
determining the time of discard of load-bearing parts - especially winding 
ropes - is drastically reduced. 
In the past it took 3-5 years of winding for a winding installation to reach 
a rope work figure of 600 tkm/kg rope, but nowadays a central winding instal­
lation reaches ψΟΟ-600 tkm/kg rope in the course of a single year. Because of 
the higher rope work per year and the increase in dynamic stresses, the inter­
vals between the emergence of detectable rope impairment and the discard time 
have become ever shorter. A distinction is therefore made in the Federal 
Republic of Germany between normally-worked and highly-worked winding ropes. 
Figure 4 provides an illustration of this problem in the case of shaft winding 
ropes. The breaking strength is shown on the vertical axis and the number of 
winds on the horizontal axis. The left-hand curve represents the general limit, 
in normal situations, for highly-worked winding ropes and the right-hand curve 
that for normally-worked ropes. 197 
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Figure 4 Breaking strength drop curves for highly-worked and normally—worked 
winding ropes, with Periods available for determining the time of 
discard 
The time scale below the horizontal axis referring to the number of winds 
shows the periods of time available for determining the time of discard. It 
is clear that in the case of highly-worked ropes, the time available is 
extremely short. In extreme cases it can be as low as l/9 of the usual 
observation time available. For this reason, new and/or supplementary 
inspection measures are necessary in order to maintain the safety standard. 198 
1.2 Criteria for highly-worked winding ropes 
To obtain an outline for the whole of the Community of the reasons for failure 
of highly-worked winding ropes, the first step was to decide on the criteria 
for the definition of highly-worked winding installations. The criteria were 
based on conditions obtaining in the Community and were divided into two 
groups : 
Group I: Here the winding frequency alone is sufficient for the installation to 
be classified as a highly-worked· winding installation. 
Group II: For installations with winding frequencies below that in Group I, there 
are also additional criteria, any one of which is sufficient, in combination with 
a certain winding frequency, for the installation to be classified as a highly-
worked winding installation. 
The criteria are shown in Figure 5· 
I. Winding frequency 
alone 
Winding frequency: 
ï5ï 500 winding cycles/ 
working day 
II. Winding frequency and additional criteria 
1. Winding frequency*) 
^ 4OO - <C500 winding cycles/working day 
2. Additional criteria: 
\ ->w ^ / 2 **) 
a; Quasistatic undulating load β 160 H/mm 
V WW \ 
b) Diameter ratio D/d <T 100 ' 
(driving sheave diameter/rope diameter) 
c) Fleet angle (between the rope and the plane of 
the driving sheave) >· 1°30· 
d) Acceleration a, ^ 1.2 m/sec 
or 
Retardation a ^ 1.2 m/sec  ν ' 
e) Oscillation behaviour if the additional dynamic 
forces are greater than 2$% of the static stresses 
f) Tread pressure between rope and driving sheave, 
head sheave or deflecting sheave ^ 200 N/cm 
Figure 5 
*) A winding cycle is one complete journey in a shaft until the direction of 
wind is changed, excluding decking operations at the terminal point. 
Manriding is not normally included. 
) 1 N/mm βώ=·10 kgF/cm (formerly 10 kg/cm )  ** 
***) In the UK, the D/d limit is set at <C 95 owing to the measuring system 
employed. 199 
2. Factors affecting rope safety and rope life incorporated in the criteria. 
The factors affecting rope life are broken down into three groups, namely 
rope-related, 
installation-related, and 
operation-related 
variables. (See Figure 6). 
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2.1 Quasistatic undulating load during a winding cycle (Figure 5, 2a) 
As a result of greater winding depths, payloads, rope weights, acceleration 
and retardation forces the variation in the stress to which a rope is subjected 
in the course of a wind is increasing, which means that the stresses imposed on 
the rope wires above the capping fluctuate within wider limits. Determination 
of the quasistatic undulating load (in the rope cross sections immediately 
above the cappings) is shown in Figure 7· 
— . payload + balance rope weight 
vmdulatiTJh 
metal cross-section of rope 
.undulating load 
(quasistatic) 
increase due to 
greater depth 
increase due to 
larger payload 
Figure 7 Quasistatic undulating load 
with balance ropes 
in shaft winding installations 201 
2.2 Influence of the D/d ratio (Figure 5, 2b) 
The effect on rope life of the D/d ratio - driving sheave (or head sheave or 
deflecting sheave ) diameter D to rope diameter d - is all the more pronounced 
if the tread pressure between rope and rope groove is high. The number of 
. stress reversals to which a rope is subjected during a winding cycle also 
affects the life of the rope. For example, the life of a winding rope on a 
tower winder with deflecting sheaves and a D/d ratio of 100 would be the same 
as that of a winding rope on a tower winder without deflecting sheaves and 
with a D/d ratio of 8o to 90 (if all other parameters for the two install-
ations were comparable). 
2.3 Influence of the fleet angle (Figure 5, 2c) 
Since the fleet angle «. (Figure 8), has an influence on rope life which 
becomes more significant as the angle increases, it has been taken as an 
additional criterion for highly-worked installations. It is considered 
significant if it is over 1°30'. 
head sheaves driving sheave 
Figure 8 Fleet angle <x with side-by-side head sheaves 
(ground-mounted winding engine) 202 
2.4 Effect of poceleration and retardation (Figure 5, 2d) 
In installations subject to high acceleration and retardation forces, drive 
transmission from the friction tread to the winding rope, especially in the 
oase of thick ropes, causes increased internal wear and damage to the rope 
construction by displacement of wires, strands and layers. This danger is 
proportionate to the degree of utilization of the coefficient of static friction 
between tne iriction «read and .the lubricated rope, i.e. depends on how close to 
the rope slip limit the installation is operated. 
As rope diameter increases it becomes more difficult to produce strong, non-
spinning ropes which conform to the operating requirements. Figure 9 shows the 
torsional moments of various rope constructions as a function of the rope's 
tractive force. In multi-strand ropes relative displacement of the strand 
layers may occur'. The same applies to wire core ropes and locked-coil ropes, 
in which the wire layers may move in relation to each other. 
All the torque curves shown in Figure 4 were determined for ropes with the 
outer strand layer in rignt hand lay. The torque measured was that applying 
in the non-rotating gripping device. 
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2.5 Detrimental vibrations in the winding system (Figure 5, 2e) 
The greater the winding depths, the poorer the condition of the shaft guides 
and the more irregular the running of driving and non-driven sheaves, the 
higher will be the level of vibration in the winding system. Vibrations 
which reduce the rope life are also induced by harsh braking and by abrupt 
transitions between the acceleration, full-speed and retardation phases. 
There are various methods for measuring such vibrations. Efforts are being 
made to develop a uniform measurement procedure. 
2.6 Detrimental tread pressure (Figure 5, 2f) 
The tread pressure between the rope and the driving sheave, head sheave or 
deflecting sheave has a detrimental effect on rope life from 200 fl/mm 
upwards, or in some cases even earlier (Figure 10). 
rope 
"groove 
projected surface 
sheave diameter-
Figure 10 Determination of tread pressure 2U^ 
3. Other varianles and their effects on the safety and service life of 
highly-worked winding ropes of stranded construction 
Various cases of damage to the ropes of highly-worked friction winding 
installations showed some years ago that such ropes often reach their discard 
limits very rapidly after the first damage has occurred. These field obser­
vations were then reproduced on test rigs and in mines. 
3.1 Difficulties in the determination of discard limits 
It is a basic fact that the determination of the discard limits during service 
life for winding ropes in highly-worked installations, which may carry out 
over 9OO winding cycles a day, involving high pay-loads and depths of 1000 m 
and more, is far more difficult than in the case of winding ropes under normal 
stresses, if only because of the short time the breaking strength of the rope 
takes to drop to an unacceptable level. 
Figure 11 shows the breaking strength drop curves for loads of 10$ and 20$ 
of the breaking strength of the rope. The additional dynamic forces are 
already included. The breaking strength drop curves for highly-worked winding 
ropes of stranded construction lie within the closely hatched section of . 
Figure 11. 
The horizontal stippled band across Figure 11 indicates the limits of discard. 
The two vertical panels running through the diagrams (Figure 11) show the 
significant difference between the numbers of winding operations which correspond 
to the discard limits for highly-worked as against normally-worked ropes. Within 
the area of these two vertical columns one can also observe the different shape 
of certain characteristic curves indicating the condition of the rope, namely 
those for rope torsional moment Mi (Figure 11), rope elongation (Δ. L in Figure ll) 
and wire breakage (Figure 11). A further difficulty is that at the beginning of 
the discard period, ropes appear to be in better condition than is actually 
the case. 205 
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3.2 Some causes of wire fatigue 
Movement within the rope assembly may lead to severe loosening, and thus to 
overloads on wires, and pressure and wear points which cannot readily be 
detected. High undulating loads and major differences in the strength of 
the wires also lead - particularly in highly-worked installations - to 
premature wire fatigue. 
3·3 Effect of lubrication on rope life in friction winder installations 
The effective use of lubricants to reduce internal wear is restricted in 
Germany by the need to achieve maximum friction between the friction tread 
and the rope at temperatures of up to 35°C When the D/d ratio (driving 
sheave diameter D to rope diameter d) is low, improvement of this ratio has 
a more positive effect on rope life than a larger increase in the amount 
of lubricant. 
3.4 Differences in the tension of individual ropes in multi-rope winding 
installations 
Multi-rope winding installations are the only convenient method of winding 
large payloads from great depths (Figure 12). 
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* Corresponds to the minimum factors of safety commonly applied in the PRG. 
With the factors of safety applied in other Community countries, the values 
would vary accordingly. However the trend is the same. 207 
There is a danger of overloading individual ropes by failure to equalize 
the rope groove diameters at the proper time or by delays in balancing the 
surplus rope lengths, i.e. by neglecting to even out the rope tensions. It is 
a current requirement in the FRG for rope tensions to be equalized when the 
tension in a given rope deviates by more than 10$ from the average of all ropes. 
3.5 Defects in the wire material and on the wire surface 
If the rope construction is free of defects the fatigue strength of the wires 
is reflected to a large extent in the endurance limit of the strands and rope. 
Figure 13 shows the fatigue and endurance values achieved, together with the 
target values. 
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3.6 Corrosion hazard 
The thinner the wires, the greater the notch effect and the reduction of 
the cross-sectional area of the wire (Figure I4)· 
Corrosion can be very dangerous owing to the irregularity of its occurrence 
on a winding rope. Often only very short lengths (50 to 200 cm) 
are severely corroded for various reasons, e.g. exposure of parts of the 
rope to corrosive air or water. 
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3.7 Erroneous assessment of rope life as a result of the method of calculating 
rope work 
Rope work is normally calculated by means of a formula which makes no allowance 
for the working stresses inherent in the installation and the method of operation. 
If these factors, which greatly affect rope life, were taken into account in 
calculating the rope work the values obtained would be 1.1 to 1.6 times higher 
than those derived from the basic formula for approximately 60$ of highly-worked 
friction winding installations in Germany (excluding exceptional cases). 
A standard rope-work formula is to be devised separately. 209 
4· Recommended measures to improve the assessment of discard limits for, 
highlv-worked winding ropes of stranded construction 
The rope surveillance measures laid down in the mines inspectorate regulations 
for the FRG were insufficient in these cases to permit adequate observation of 
the rapid deterioration of these ropes and precise determination of the appro-
priate time of discard. For this reason, the following measures are 
recommended to improve standards of surveillance with respect to such ropes. 
RECOMMENDED SURVEILLANCE MEASURES TO IMPROVE ROPE SAFETY 
Nature of surveillance 
I. Measurement of 
rope length 
II. Examination of 
rotational 
■ characteristics 
-once 
b) rope marking 
+r>r-+ _ 
-frequency as 
required 
III. Magnetic induction 
. t · 
Testing ........ 
1 month after 
installation: 
further tests 
depend on result 
of first 
IV. Measurement of 
length of lay 
and rope diameter 
— frequency as 
required 
V. Testing after 
After damage or 
incident the whole 
length of the rope 
must be checked. 
Examination: 
competent 
person 
ν γ 
if exceptional 
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Inspection: 
mine official 
·». γ 
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·*, τ 
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4.1 Daily measurement of the lengths of winding ropes 
Exceptional elongation, e.g. elongation exceeding 15-20 cm over a length 
of 1000 m, occurring within a short period of time ( <1 day) may be a sign of 
internal damage. As such changes in length are smaller than the range of 
variation of the floating platform, they are not always detected.as early 
they should be. Daily measurement of rope lengths is a simple method for 
early detection of rope damage. 
Rope length measurements are-carried out as follows: 
Two cm scales H and F, reading in opposite directions, are fixed at the pit 
bank and at the bottom shaft landing; 
Two markings are made on the two conveyances; 
Set conveyance I with its marking against scale H, and conveyance II will 
then be beside scale F. Both conveyances must be empty; 
Read off the figures on H and F, and record the difference (P-H). 
the 
The change in/difference (P-H) from one measurement to the next equals 
the rope elongation which has occurred in the interval. 
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4.2 Testing of rope rotational characteristics on a test piece and in normal 
operation (Figure 15,Il) 
a) In order to assess the tendency of a rope to spin under operational 
conditions a sample at least I4 m long must be tested under progressive 
loading on a testing machine incorporating a torquemeter. 
b) Variations in rope spin in operation are determined by the "rope marking 
test" (see Figure I7). 
'. -
DD  ΰ 
ìt= 
a. Mark the rope above a descending conveyance with chalk or paint 
over the whole rope—length until the conveyance reaches the bottom; 
rate of descent 1 to 2 m/s. 
\ 
b. Count the rotations of the rope during the upward wind at 6 - 10 m/s 
c. Discontinuity in the spin characteristics indicates internal damage. 
Follow-up tests: at the same location with the same load. 
Figure 17? The rope-marking test. 212 
Notes on the rope-marking test 
If a friction winder installation makes use of winding ropes which are not 
completely non-rotating, the ropes spin during the wind. The greater the 
winding depth, the more pronounced is the spin, which can be detected by 
means of the rope-marking test. In the shaft, the mark on the rope adopts . 
the form of a spiral. However, the winding rope rotates only in the compart-
ment above a descending conveyance, and during the subsequent ascent the 
spiral thus created retains the same form. 
Because the rotation of the winding rope reduces the rope torsion in the 
upper portion of the shaft, but increases it above the conveyance, the 
spiral reverses direction half way down the shaft. With an undamaged rope 
the slope of the spiral alters continuously over the entire length of the 
rope, and the reversal of direction is also continuous. Irregularities in 
the change of the slope of the spiral indicate abrupt changes in torque, 
and this in turn points to damage inside the rope. 
The number of rotations of the spiral around the rope can therefore be 
counted during the ascent, and anomalies can be detected. 
The greater the rope torque in, for example, a three-layer flattened-strand 
rope, the greater the danger that the outer layer of strands will cause 
constant corkscrewing and loosening of the second and third layers. The same 
applies to ropes with a wire core, and to a lesser extent to ropes with a hemp 
or plastic core. In addition to daily measurements of length, therefore, rope 213 
marking tests should be conducted each month initially, and then with increasing 
frequency to determine the number of clockwise and anticlockwise rotations of 
the rope during a winding cycle, and the results should be compared with the 
number of rotations counted previously under the same conditions. 
4.3 Magnetic induction testing of highly-worked winding ropes of stranded construction 
(Figure 15,111) 
. Testing of this kind is specified for all highly-worked ropes; it is 
otherwise obligatory for multi-strand ropes only. 
4.3.1 Hand-held testing instrument for mine officials 
A battery-operated, intrinsically safe testing device of convenient size 
with auditory and visual defect indication was developed for the use of 
mine officials in rope testing. This hand-held instrument operates on the principle 
of magnetic induction . and converts the signals to visual or acoustic 
output. The visual output comprises a chain of light emitting diodes in 
which one point lights up at a time corresponding to the amplitude of the 
signal. Short—term storage of the signals improves ease of recognition. 
A warning light can also be illuminated. The acoustic output takes the 
form of earphones, loudspeakers or claxons. For testing by experts, the 
device is fitted with a defect counter and a connection for a chart 
recorder. 
4.3.2 Improved error detection 
Powerful detectors fitted with permanent magnets permitting a considerable 
increase in the distance between search coil and rope make it possible to 
increase the error detection signals while reducing the level of interference 
(Figure 18). ■^"■r^
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4.4 Measurement of length of lay and rope diameter (Figure 15,IV) 
When internal damage is detected by magnetic methods it is recommended 
that the length of lay and the rope diameter should be measured in the area 
affected. Fracture of the wire core or failure of the inner strand layers 
in multi-strand ropes can increase the length of lay by as much as 60 fo according 
to the extent of the damage, and in exceptional cases the increase may be even 
greater. Wear of fibre or synthetic cores normally causes less marked increases 
in the length of lay and corkscrew deformation of the rope, which can easily 
lead to dangerous fractures at points of contact between strands. 
4.5 Observation of the vibrational characteristics of the winding installation 
Information on the amount of jolting of conveyances against shaft guides and 
on the vibration characteristics of the system of moving parts must be obtained 
with maximum speed and precision to permit assessment of the safety of the instal­
lation. Telemetrie systems transmit the vibration data obtained from the conveyances 
to the surface. The angular acceleration of the driving and rope sheaves is then 
synchronously recorded along with the data obtained from the conveyances by a UV 
recorder (Figure I9). 
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Figure 19 Measurements of.vibrations 
in a shaft winding installation 216 
Analysis of the charts is carried out by an automatic reading device which 
employs a laser beam and converts the chart values to digital form. These 
data are then further processed in a programmed classing device. The output 
from this system enables the expert to arrive at an opinion on the safety 
of the winding installation in respect of vibration. 
4·6 Assessment of breakage and loosening of wires 
In highly—worked ropes and especially ropes of larger diameter, internal 
wear leads to loosening of wires and hence overloading of those wires which 
are still fully tensioned and which are then usually subjected to stresses 
beyond the elastic limit. This causes premature fatigue of the wires and 
deterioration of the rope construction e.g. by kinking. The guidelines for 
the determination of discard limits for highly-worked ropes ' drawn up by 
the Rope Testing Centre of the Westfälische Berggewerkschaftskasse, Bochum, 
state that the loss of strength'of a rope as a result of wear and consequent 
loosening is to be taken as twice that caused by wire breakage. The concen-
tration of wire fractures, including internal fractures detected by electro-
magnetic methods, within a length equal to 50 times the rope diameter must 
therefore not exceed one-third of the 15$ loss of strength which is permitted. 
If fractures at points of contact between strands are observed, more severe 
discard standards are applied as such fractures are difficult to detect by 
visual inspection or magnetic induction. 
1) Ulrich, E. and Grupe, Η.: Die Überwachung hochbeanspruchter Schachtforder— 
seile, Glückauf, Issue III (1975), pages 870/874. 217 
4.7 New method of determining wire fatigue 
The scanning electron microscope is used to detect wire fatigue in highly-worked 
winding ropes which usually appear superficially to be in better condition than 
is in fact the case. Figure 20 compares the surface of a wire from the test 
piece with a wire taken from a rope due for discard. This technique is parti-
cularly suitable if the number of broken wires is small but fatigue is 
suspected. 
Figure 20: 200-fold magnification of wire surface, using scanning electron 
microscope: top — as-new condition; bottom — at discard limit. 219 
ANNEX V 
IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF THE SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
AS AT 1.1.1978 221 
The assessment of the implementation of the principles and reports prepared by the Safety 
and Health Commission since the beginning of its activities and distributed to the Govern-
ments and other interested bodies for further action or for information, is published every 
other year in its annual report. 
The recommendations have been classified by subject and listed in their order of approval 
by the M.S.H.C. 
The situation with regard to implementation of the above-mentioned recommendations and 
proposals is indicated, with explanatory notes, in the following tables. 
The following symbols are used in the tables : 
C : national regulations which are already in accordance with the recommen-
dations. 
C' recommendations which have not been embodied in regulations, but which 
have been implemented de facto. 
NRC recommendations for which new regulations implementing them have been 
issued. 
NRP recommendations for which new regulations implementing them are being 
drawn up. 
E the preparation of new regulations is being studied. 
? there is uncertainty regarding the steps to be taken. 
A the national authorities have decided not to bring their regulations into line 
with the recommendations. 
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I - Reconmendation regarding the consulting of 
foreign experts in the case of rescue operations 
connected with major mining accidents 
In certain serious mining accidents advice 
requested by the leaders of the rescue operation 
from qualified foreign experts in mine-rescue matters. 
The heads of Mine Rescue Stations are provided 
for this purpose with a plan containing the 
most important addresses and information needed. 
This plan should be constantly kept up-tp-date. 
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1) The main First-Aid Stations are in touch with the main Rescue Stations in the Community countries. 224 
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I - Recommendations regarding equipment for shafts 
in connection with the prevention of fires 
(First Report of the Safety Commission, p. 11 
(German text) 
1. Steps to prevent any accumulation of grease 
and coaldust (First Report of the Minee 
Safety Commission, p. IS (German text) and 
Report of the Conference, p. 54, No. 2, 
para. C.) 
- Skip-winding installations should as far 
as possible be sited only in upcast shafts; 
- Equipment in new shafts should be of 
aerodynamic form; 
- all suitable steps should be taken to 
avoid in every case any accumulation of dust 
to ensure that any such accumulation is 
removed 
2. Preferred siting of methane-drainage lines 
in upcast shafts (First Report of the Mines 
Safety Commission, p. 16 (German text) and 
Report of the Conference, p. 54, No. 3, Par. d) 
- This recommendation of the Conference 
applies particularly to pressure lines 
3. Siting electric cables, compressed-air 
mains and gas-drainage pipes (First Report 
of the Mines Safety Commission, p. 16 
(German text) and Report of the Conference, 
p. 54, No. 3, par. e) 
- electric cables and leads, compressed-air 
drains and gas-drainage pipes should not 
be sited in the haulage compartment : 
- electric cables should not all be sited 
in the same shaft 
II -Guiding principles for fighting mine fires by 
sending down water (Second Report of the Mines 
Safety Commission, p. 26) supplemented 5.2.1973 
(10th Report of the MSCH, annex VI) 
1. Installation 
a) At the top of every shaft reaching to the 
surface there must be a device which can send down 
at least 50 litres of water per minute and per 
square metre of shaft cross-section 
b) This device must be installed in such a way that 
the supply of water can at no time be seriously 
affected by drawing-off or flowing-away of water 
at other points 
c) The water pipes and the spray jets must be set in 
such a way that they are protected from frost 
d) The damming device or devices must be set outside the 
shaft-top building in such a way that they can be 
operated at any time. They must be marked by means 
of an instruction plate. 
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1) All skip-winding equipment still in use is installed in downcast shafts; 
2) No methane-drainage lines in service; 
3) Recommendation does not apply; there is no multiple compartment shaft; 
4) There are doubts as to the practicability of the recommendation; minimum water quantities are laid down 225 
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e) At each filling station of every main shaft 
a fire point should be provided such as 
spraying ramps, hoses, or equivalent apparatus 
f) This apparatus should be operated either from 
the filling station or the shaft outlet 
g) A device should be installed at each level to 
restrict the air flow in the galleries coming 
from the air intake shaft, if it should be 
necessary, when the air flow is reversed 
accidentally or on purpose 
(This device should not necessarily be installed 
close to the shaft; the most important poinC 
is that it should be up-wind of the first 
bifurcation from the filling station. Nevertheless, 
since each mine is different, the effects of 
using this device should be evaluated beforehand by the 
use of a simulator or some equivalent method). 
2. Fires in down-cast shafts 
a) Immediate measures 
- it is essential to indicate in the fire-
fighting plan the maximum amount of water 
which can be sent down each of the downcast 
shafts, without creating additional dangers 
for the workers by its effects on the 
ventilation. 
- the damming device which can be operated at 
this stage must not release more than this 
prescribed quantity of water. 
- until the leader of the rescue operations 
has issued his instructions and as long as 
there has been no reversal of ventilation, 
water may be sent down only by opening the 
damming device prescribed for this purpose. 
b) Measures to be taken on the instructions of 
the leader of rescue operations 
- the leader of the rescue operations must 
therefore decide 
- taking into account all the circumstances 
- either to send down an increased quantity 
of water - or must he give orders that reversal 
of the ventilation be brought about or encouraged. 
- to facilitate the reversal of the ventilation 
in the burning downcast shaft, once this has been 
opened and the main fan stopped, water can be sent 
down the upcast shaft. 
- if reversal of the ventilation has already 
occurred - either as a result of the 
upward current produced by the heat of the 
fire or deliberately - downcast shafts should 
be treated as though they were upcast shafts. 
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Fireproof doors to restrict the airflow are required in all mines in the intakes close to the shaft. 
There are doubts as to the practicability of the Recommendation; minimum water quantities are laid down. 
Not suitable for inclusion in regulations. 
There are doubts as to the practicability of the Recommendation. 
Not suitable for inclusion in regulations; must be decided separately in each case. 
: In principle, the regulations require fire doors at the pit-bottoms stations of these shafts. 226 
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- if the calculated water quant i y appears 
to be too small to extinguish the fire 
immediately, or to hinder its spread, 
additional precautions must be worked out 
and laid down in the fire-fighting plan: 
- simultaneous supply of water down all 
downcast shafts, 
- partial shutting-off of the burning shaft 
at surface level, 
- shut underground fire-doors, etc.. 
3. Fires in upcast shafts 
- in upcast shafts, water may be sent down 
only on the instructions of the leader of 
the rescue operation 
- as long as there are still any workers 
in the pit, only so much water may be 
sent down as will alow the fumes of the 
fire to continue to be extracted whilst 
the water is falling 
Note. A commentary and examples (with diagrams), regarding 
the calculation of the effect of falling water 
on the ventilation are given in the Second Report of 
the Mines Safety Commission pp. 29-50 
III - Recommendations for the sealing-off by dams 
of mine fires and underground combustion 
(Second Report of the Mines Safety Commission, 
p. 53) 
Introductory remark 
The following Recommendations are not binding. 
They are not intended to give Inspectorates 
"ready-made" regulations; on the contrary, it 
remains for the competent authorities to 
decide how these Recommendations are to be 
applied as regulations, circulars or service 
instructions. 
These Recommendations refer only to the 
actual fighting of the fire or combustion; 
they do not refer to the measures to be taken 
as a matter of priority to rescue men following the 
outbreak. 
A - When a mine fire has broken out or underground 
combustion developed, it is indispensable to 
take the necessary preparatory steps for any later 
sealing-off by dams which may be necessary while the 
direct firefighting operations are still 
going on 
- In the event of sealing-off by dam becoming 
necessary, as a general rule the first stoppings 
to be erected must be advance dams. 
These advance dams are in fact the real subject of 
the present Recommendations. 
Β - Structure and erection of the advance dams 
1. If there is no risk of explosion 3) : 
a) to make the advance dams themselves 
as air-tight as possible and to 
create the closest possible seal 
between the dam and the surrounding walls; 
b) there is nothing against shutting off first 
of all the intake air. 
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1) Not suitable for inclusion in regulations. 
2) There are doubts as to the practicability of the Recommendation. 
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Note 
IV -
2. If there is a risk of explosion: 
a) to have at all times the most precise 
information possible regarding the 
degree of explosion risks in the fire 
zone; 
it may be necessary to provide the 
men constructing the advance dams with 
fireproof clothing; 
b) to ensure that the advance dams are 
as air-tight as possible; to ensure 
that they are strong enough to resist 
an explosion: 
c) to ensure that for the entire period 
during which the stopping is being 
erected, there is sufficient ventilation 
of the fire zone to counter as far as 
absolutely possible the formation of an 
explosive gas mixture; 
d) to ensure that all suitable measures 
are taken to reduce as far as possible 
the effects of any explosion which may 
occur; (dust barriers, stone-dusting 
or water through barriers); 
e) to the greatest possible extent, the 
dams on the intake and return sides 
should be sealed simultaneously; 
only the number of workers and members 
of the staff strictly necessary for 
this work should stay behind; 
as soon as the dams have been sealed, 
the danger area must be completely 
evacuated. 
C - The final dams must be durable, built of 
brick or concrete under the protection 
offered by the advance dams. 
Additional details to the foregoing 
Recommendations are given in a Commentary 
(Second Report of the Mines Safety Commission, 
pp. 53/58) 
General guidelines for the opening-up of sealed-off 
fire areas (Doc 1304/3/64) 
1. GENERAL 
Special reasons for opening-up a district 
sealed-off after a fire: 
- recovery of bodies 
- salvage of material 
- recovery of roadways and workings 
- reduction of the sealed-off area 
- inspection of the district, and, if necessary, 
- direct fire-fighting 
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1) Not necessary. 
2) The opening-up of fire areas is carried out on the responsibility of the manager, who prepares a 
reopening plan - taking into account the scale and type of fire and the ventilation situation in 
the fire area - in collaboration with the Main Rescue Station. The action plans of the Main 
Rescue Stations very largely embody the guidelines laid down in Doc. 1304/3/64. 228 
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The following hazards can arise from reopening 
a sealed-off district: 
- release of CO, foul air and hot damp air, 
- explosion of firedamp or fire gas, where 
the fire is not yet extinguished, 
- recrudescence of the fire, which need not 
necessarily occur immediately, but even 
after some time has elapsed. 
Recrudescense of the fire can occur only when 
fresh air reaches the seat of the fire, so 
that with all operations involved in reopening 
a fire area it is of prima importance to inspect 
the individual air currents constantly. 
All places suspected of having been seats of 
fire or heatings must be ascertained with 
the utmost speed. 
2. BASIC RULES 
2.1 Sealed-off districts may be reopened only 
after the competent authorities have been 
notified or have given their permission. 
2.2 Before opening commences, gas samples must 
be taken from the fire area, at each stopping 
and from all sampling pipes. 
2.3 The gas samples are analysed and the results 
assessed from the point of view of explosion 
risk in the sealed-off area and the state of 
the seat of the fire. 
2.4 The cooling-off time of the seat of the fire 
must be taken into account. 
2.5 If possible, the sealed-off district should 
be inspected before any air is circulated or 
any operations are started. 
2.6 Before opening commences, a plan should be 
drawn up jointly with the Main Rescue Centre. 
2.7 This plan must cover the following points: 
- the method. 
- nature, scope and order of operations, 
- direction and supervision, 
- checking of the ventilation system and of 
the composition of the air, 
- communications, 
- preparation of material, 
- evacuation, prohibition of access to and 
remanning of endangered workings, 
- deployment of the Rescue Team, 
- connection and disconnection of electrical 
equipment and cutting-off the supply of 
electricity in both equipment and part of 
network concerned, 
- opening and closing of the compressed air. 
water and methan-drainage pipeline valves. 
- re-sealing of the fire area in emergency. 
2.8 The method to be adopted for eopening 
sealed-off districts depends on the presence 
or otherwise of 
- non explosive gaseous mixtures which remain 
non-explosive on dilution with air, 
- non-explosive gaseous mixtures which may 
become explosive on dilution with air, or 
- explosive gaseous mixtures. 
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Fire areas may be opened at one point or at 
several points. In the latter case, a 
continuous direct circulation of air is 
automatically established and the fire area 
is permeated with fresh air. An examination 
should be made of the effects of the opening 
of the area on the ventilation system of the 
pit as a whole and within the fire area. 
2.9 A sealed-off district may be reopned by 
- breaching one or more stoppings (with or 
without the use of an air-lock), or 
- cutting a new entry into the fire-area. 
Before opening a sealed.off area, provision 
should be made for immediate reclosure if 
necessary. 
2.10 Stoppings may be opened only on the instructions of 
the manager underground and under the constant 
supervision of personnel appointed by him. 
2.11 Workings, into which the opening of a stopping 
may release toxic gases or foul air, 
or where there is a risk of explosion, must 
be evacuated and put out of bounds to personnel 
before opening. 
2.12 Since conditions in the district, the state 
of the seat of the fire and the risk of gas 
explosion may change during the opening 
operation the composition of the fire gases 
or fumes must be checked at regular intervals. 
2.13 The kind and number of samples and the points 
at which they are to be taken should be fixed 
in advance. 
2.14 In doing so, the possibility of gas accumulations 
forming should be allowed for. (In general, 
the formation of gas layers is fostered by 
low air velocities and differences in 
temperature). 
2.15 Where a stopping is opened in the knowledge 
that a fire is not yet extinguished, or where 
the fire is revived as a result, the area in 
question must be resealed at once, if.the 
composition of the fire gases or fumes 
changes in such a way that an explosion 
hazard might arise. 
2.16 With non-explosive ?,as mixtures in the fire 
area, this Ís necessary only if extinguishing 
operations seem unlikely to succeed. 
2.17 It is the responsibility of the Rescue Team 
to open and inspect fire areas, even after 
they have been ventilated, 
2.18 On the intake side, breaching of stoppings 
need not be carried out by the Rescue Team 
provided that no gas hazard is to be reckoned with. 
2.19 When deploying the Rescue Team, allowance 
should be made for the adverse climatic conditions 
which are likely to obtain at any point where 
they may be employed. 
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1) Reopening of an area where a known fire exists ia not normally considered. 
2) Opening of sealed off areas is prohibited while there is known to be an explosive mixture behind. 230 
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- OPENING-UP SEALED-OFF DISTRICTS CONTAINING 
NON-EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURES 
1. Opening-up one side only 
Asealed-off district containing non-explosive 
gas mixtures may be opened on one side even if 
the fire is not yet extinguished. 
It must first be extablishe whether the 
remaining stoppings and seals are sufficiently 
air-tight and that there is no risk of releasing 
fire gases, in particular carbon monoxide in 
other parts of the working, which may be connected 
with the fire area. 
If the stopping to be opened is on the return 
side, special attention should be paid to 
the release of CO or of other toxic or 
dangerous gases or foul air. 
The decision as to whether to carry out 
operations in the fire area without ventilation 
air or with auxiliary ventilation depends 
on the purpose of the reopening of the area, 
the expected duration of the Rescue Team's operations 
and the possible hazards involved. Auxiliary 
ventilation is especially desirable for extended 
operations within the fire area. 
a) Working without ventilation air, 
especially behind an airlock, has the 
advantage of eliminating the risk of 
reviving the fire. When carrying out 
extinguishing operations without ventilation 
air and under unfavourable air conditions, 
it is advisable first to set up water sprinklers 
or nozzles and to put these into operation 
only after the Rescue Team has left the fire area, 
b) If auxiliary ventilation is used, it should 
preferably be by suction. 
It is advisable to isolate the fire area 
ventilated by an auxiliary fan from the 
non-ventilated section by means of an 
auxiliary stopping if the seat of the fire is 
situated in the non-ventilated section. 
2. Opening on two sides to establish a circulation 
of air round the sealed-off area 
Asealed-off area containing non-explosive gas 
mixtures may be ventilated only if it is likely 
that the fire is extinct. 
While ventilation is being extablished, a 
Rescue Team wearing breathing apparatus may enter 
the fire area to examine conditions within it 
and to extinguish any fires. 
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1) It is forbidden to start opening sealed off areas, either from one point or from two places, 
while there is known to be an explosive mixture behind the stoppings. 
2) Experience hitherto has shown that blowing auxiliary ventilation is preferable, to ensure that no 
explosive gases are sucked in by the auxiliary fan. 
3) The use of blowing auxiliary ventilation is preferred. 
4) Not suitable for inclusion in regulations; the use of forcing or auxiliary fans would depend on 
individual circumstances. 231 
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VI - REOPENING OF SEALED-OFF DISTRICTS CONTAINING 
GAS MIXTURES WHICH MAY BECOME EXPLOSIVE ON 
DILUTION WITH AIR 
1. Opening on one side only 
1.1 A sealed-off area containing gas mixtures 
which may become explosive on dilution with 
air may be opened on one side only, even if 
the fire is not yet extinguished; 
1.2 It must first be checked whether the remaining 
stoppings and seals are sufficiently air-tight 
and that there is no risk of releasing 
fire gases, in particular carbon monoxide, 
into other parts of the workings which may 
be connected with the fire area. 
1.3 If the stopping to be opened is on the return 
side, particular attention must be paid to 
the possibility of releasing CO.CH, or foul 
air 
1.4 All operations must be carried out without 
ventilation air. 
1.5 There must be continuous sampling and 
evaluation of the results of analysis to 
check whether the gas mixture remains non-
explosive . 
1.6 For extinguishing operations, see section III.I. 
If the size of the sealed-off area is to be 
reduced, a new explosion-proof stopping must 
be erected. In order to be able to erect 
this stopping under tolerable climatic 
conditions and possibly without wearing 
breathing apparatus, auxiliary ventilation 
may have to be provided. 
1.7 For this purpose, an auxiliary stopping 
must first be erecred and sealed in an 
unventilated atmosphere. (Before constructing 
the main stopping, it should be considered 
whether to erect several successive auxiliary 
stoppings, according to the possible hazards). 
1.8 The section of roadway thus recovered must 
then be ventilated by an auxiliary fan so as 
to create suitable air conditions for the 
erection of the main stopping. 
1.9 When starting up the auxiliary ventilation, 
it must be remembered that the gas mixture 
becomes explosive on dilution with air. It 
is therefore essential to ensure that there 
is no source of ignition in the workings to 
be ventilated. 
1.10 In addition, it is essential to make certain 
that the fan used cannot cause any risk of 
ignition. 
1.11 Before starting up the auxiliary ventilation, 
all workings likely to be exposed to the hazards 
of fire gases or explosions must first be evacuated 
and access thereto prohibited. 
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1.12 Electrical equipment must be cut off 
from the power supply 
1.13 In addition, the ventilation must, as far 
as possible, be regulated so that no 
explosive gas mixtures can be released over 
long distances. 
1.14 For this purpose, the quantity of air 
circulated should, if necessary, be increased. 
2. Opening on two sides to extablish a 
circulation of air through the fire area. 
2.1 This method of opening automatically 
results in the formation of a through 
air-current in the open district, but 
not necessarily in other parts of the 
district. The method can be used only 
if there are no remaining signs of fire in the 
district. 
2.2 In addition," a period long enough for 
the seat of the fire to cool off must 
have elapsed since the estimated time 
of extinction. 
2.3 If possible, the Rescue Team should carry 
out an inspection in an unventilated 
atmosphere. 
2.4 Failing this, the results of the snuffle 
pipe tests should be used to determine the 
condition of the seat of the fire. 
2.5 Furthermore, it should be considered in 
such cases whether the method described in 
section IV,1 might not be preferable. 
2.6 In each case, it is essential to check 
the likelihood of a recrudescence of 
the fire during ventilation, by means of 
fire gas samples. 
2.7 This applied particularly in the case of 
a much-branched district. 
2.8 Before ventilating the fire area, all 
working exposed to the hazards of fire 
gises or explosions of fire gases or fire-damp 
when the stopping is opened must be evacuated. 
2.9 All electrical installations in these 
workings must be cut off from the power 
supply. 
2.10 On safety grounds, it is advisable to open 
the return stopping first. 
2.11 After the Rescue Team has withdrawn to 
less dangerous zones, the intake stopping should 
be opened. 
2.12 When ventilating the fire area, the quantity of 
air and the content of inflammable gases in 
the air-current circulation through the fire 
areas, and in the current into which it subseq­
uently flows, should be checked. 
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Α.  RESCUE ARRANGEMENTS, FIRES AND UNDERGROUND COMBUSTION 
Proposals from the Kines Safety Commission 
for the improvement of safety and 
health conditions in coalmines 
2.13 The two air-currents should be mutually 
adjusted ín such a manner as to ensure 
that no explosive mixture of gases is present 
over long distances after their junction. 
2.14 Access to the fire area is prohibited until 
it has been ventilated. 
VII- OPENING OF FIRE AREAS CONTAINING EXPLOSIVE GAS 
MIXTURES 
Sealed-off districts may not be reopended, either 
on one side or on two sides, if the presence of 
explosive gas mixtures behind the stoppings is 
established. 
VIII- OPENING OF FLOODED FIRE AREAS 
The composition of the air in fire areas flooded 
to extinguish the fire must be checked after 
draining. 
In workings with solid coal, allowance must be 
made for the increased hazard of spontaneous ignition 
after drainage. 
Where fire areas have been isolated by local 
flooding instead of by stoppings, the rules 
mentioned in section I to V should be observed, 
insofar as applicable, when opening a district. 
IX- REMANNING OF FIRE AREAS 
After ventilating a fire area, workings may not 
be manned until a Rescue Team has established 
that all workings are free of noxious gases. 
If the fire area is merely being reduced in size, 
workings free of noxious gases may be manned 
only when the remainder of the fire area has 
been sealed-off by permanent stoppings. 
X- GUIDELINES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ADVANCE FIRE 
STOPPINGS FROM PLASTER (doc. 4928/63/2) . 
In all cases where it is possible and advantageous, 
the erection of plaster stoppings to seal off fÍTes 
and heatings is recommended. 
Is this process applied in practice as laid down 
in the guidelines contained in the report? 
Is the application of this process prescribed 
by regulations? 
Is this process applied in practice in a manner 
differing from the principles laid down? 
Is the application of this modified process 
prescrived by regulations? 
Oermany 
Ï.R./Wph 
C 
C 
C 
c 
c 
c 
c 
NRP
 
X
)
 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
Saar 
C 
c 
C 
C' 
c' 
c 
c 
c 
c 
yes 
yes 
Belgium 
C* 
C* 
C' 
C' 
c' 
c' 
c 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
Frano« 
C' 
C* 
c' 
c' 
c' 
c* 
c' 
2)  yes 
no 
no 
no 
Italy 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C* 
C' 
C' 
C' 
E 
no 
no 
no 
United 
Kingdom 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
c 
c 
c' 
no 
no 
no 
1) The construction of advance stoppings against will be the subject of new regulations when the 
fire-fighting directives are revised. 
2) The choice of means is, however, left to the mine-manager. 234 
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XI- USE FOR FOAMED URETHANE 
Opinion on the use underground of foamed 
urethane in coal mines (7th Report of the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission, annex VI) 
The Mines Safety and Health Commission considers 
it desirable that the producers of the foamed 
urethane plastic should further develop the 
compound at present available in such a way that, 
while retaining unchanged the positive properties 
which it now has, it satisfies the requirement set 
out in the Commission's opinion. 
Are there any regulations governing the use 
underground of foamed urethane? 
XII- PLASTER STOPPINGS 
Opinion on the construction of plaster stoppings 
using the hydroraechanical process (doc.3481/3/69); 
instructions for construction (8th Report of the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission, annex V) 
Is this recently developed process in use? 
Is its use governed by any regulation? 
XIII- FOURTH REPORT ON SPECIFICATIONS AND TESTING 
CONDITIONS RELATING TO FIRE-RESISTANT FLUIDS 
USED FOR POWER TRANSMISSION 
Part II - Specifications and test conditions 
(pp. 19 onwards) 
1. Fire-resistant fluids for hydraulic power 
transmission and hydraulic control, before 
being used in mine workings must be given 
a certificate of approval. 
This certificate must indicate that the 
product has been subjected to the following 
tests: 
a) Laboratory tests (articles 3 -7) 
aa) to determine criteria of flammability 
(article 3, p.22) 
bb) to determine health criteria (article 4, 
p.23) 
cc) to determine technical criteria 
(article 5, p.23 
b) Long-term tests during normal operations 
(article 8, p.27) 
2. These tests are carried out under an authorised 
body. 
3. Authorisation for use underground should be 
dependent on presentation of the certificate 
mentioned in 1. above. 
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1) The use underground of liquid plastic products requires the approval of the Obergamt. Approval 
has so far only been granted for its use in rock consolidation. Its use for coating surfaces is not permitted. 
2) Directives for the construction of stoppings of 21.4.71 - 18.13.1 II - 1. 235 
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XIV- FIRST REPORT ON TESTS AND CRITERIA OF FLAMMABILITY FOR 
TEXTILE CARCASS CONVEYOR BELTS USED IN COAL MINES 
(12th Report of the Mines Saftey and Health Commission, 
annex VI) 
Is account taken of the tests and criteria of 
flammability for textile carcass conveyor belts 
defined in this report, i.e. 
- drum friction test? 
- flame test? 
Article 9 - Withdrawal of approval 
At the request of the authorised body, the 
permitting authority may withdraw the approval for 
the fluid to be used in mine workings. 
xv- FIRST REPORT ON FILTER SELF-RESCUERS FOR 
USE IN COALMINES - Part 1 : Minimum requirements 
and testing procedures. 
(13th Report MSHC, Annex X) 
In those countries where filter self-rescueis are used : 
does the manufacturer take into account the require-
ments set out in Section 2 of the report ? yes/no 
- are they tested in accordance with the procedures laid 
down in Section 3 ? yes/no 
- do they undergo a quality control test ? yes/no 
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(2) fi' : type self rescuers are not used in Frencli coal mines 236 
C. ELECTRIFICATION 
Proposaln froa thu Kina· Bafety Comission 
for tha iuprovement of safety and 
health conditions In coalmines 
I- RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ELIMINATION OF OIL 
FROM UNDERGROUND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT (1st 
REPORT OF MINES SAFETY COMMISSION, p.7 -
German text) 
1. a) Resistances installed underground should not 
contain any combustible oil. (Exceptions are 
allowed for the starting-up resistances of 
large motors driving water pumps). 
h) Condensers and transformers installed 
underground must not contain either combustible 
oil or didectric substances which can give 
off noxious gases. 
- Otherwise effective measures should be 
taken against the dangers to workers 
caused by the use of these devices. 
c) Switches and relays, used underground and 
operation on voltages below 1,100 v, must 
not contain any flammable oils. 
2. Recommendation to begin detailed investigation 
into the degree of increased safety which can 
be achieved, when prescribing an explosion-proof 
housing for normally spark-producing components 
only, and a design of the "increased safety" type 
for all other equipment. 
3. Is the policy followed of reducing the use 
of oil in cut-off devices by reason of the 
potential dangers of explosion and fire? 
4. Are new purchases restricted to apparatus 
using no oil or, if this is not possible, only -
small quantities of oil? 
II- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SHOTFIRING LEADS 
(2nd Report of Mines Safety Commission, p.10) 
1. Recommendations for all shotfiring leads 
- Every conductor must be provided with at 
least one good-quality insulation. 
- All connections must be properly insulated. 
- Every shotfiring leed must have the 
appropriate degree of flexibility 
- The conductors must be of such cross-
sectional area that thy do not occasion 
an excessive voltage drop. 
- The shotfiring leads must be made up and 
laid so that the risk of any fault current, 
resulting from contact with metal objects, 
is reduced. 
- Before any shotfiring operation in particular 
workings and before the simultaneous firing 
of a fairly large number of shots, the ohmic 
resistance of the circuit must be measured. 
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1) In hazardous zones only. 
2) Cannot be laid down in inspectorate regulations. 
3) Not applicable. 
4) Approval regulations have been issued for equipment in the "increased safety" category, but the 
type of protection is left to the individual firms. 
5) A British Standard for "increased safety" apparatus has been published. 237 
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a) Temporary shotfiring, leads 
- Careful inspection before each firing. 
- Regular and thorough testing by an expert 
either at the surface or in an underground 
workshop. 
A thorough checking must consist of at least: 
- a careful inspection of the lead over its 
whole length, 
- measurement of the insulation between the 
two conductors, if the lead consists of a 
cable or rubber-covered lead. 
- measurement of the ohmic resistance of 
the lead. 
b) Permanent shotfiring leads 
- Regular and thorough checks by an expert. 
- Written record of every thorough check, 
with the date. 
2. Further recommendations for permanent and 
temporary shotfiring leads used in gassy 
mines 
The shotfiring leads must fulfil conditions 
which ensure sufficient safety with 
regard to: 
a) mechanical strength and in particular 
tensile, bending and abrasion strength. 
b) electrical insulation. 
c) impermeability (to moisture) of the 
insulation and the sheathing. 
Recommendation that checking standards 
which correspond to the conditions be laid 
down. 
3. Supplementary recommendations for permanent 
shotfiring leads used in gassy pits' 
- Permanent leads shojld be so arranged 
that, as far as possible, damage during 
firing of the shots or from other causes 
is avoided. 
- If the shotfiring lead consists of two 
separate conductors, these should be 
arranged sufficiently far apart 
and in such a way that inspection is possible, 
- In shafts and dipping roads, the leads must 
have an adequate mechanical strength. 
C' 
C' 
3) 
C' 
1) Safety is ensured py proper insulation; leads must not be used if there is any visual evidence of 
damage to the insulation. 
2) Not applicable. 
3) Seems unnecessary and would increase administrative work. 238 
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III- RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDIN6 THE PROTECTION OF 
UNDERGROUND DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS AGAINST THE 
DANGER OF CAUSING ELECTRIC SHOCKS (2nd Report 
of the Mines Safety Commission,~p.13) 
I. The following recommendations refer only to 
the MT networks defined below; Medium Tension (MT) 
the normal voltage range for working equipment used 
underground with three-phase A.C. (between 380 and 
1.100 V). These networks should fulfil all the re­
commendations set out below. 
These recommendations refer neither to the 
HT networks, nor to voltages which are lower 
than the medium-tension range and are used 
for particular purposes (lighting, drilling 
apparatus, telephone installations, etc..) 
for which some easing of the restrictions 
may be allowed. Overhead wire networks 
with bare trolley wires are also excluded. 
II. Protection against the risk of electric shocks 
A - First order precautions 
(Protection against direct contact with 
a live phase) 
1. Every chance contact with a live phase 
should be avoided as far as possible 
by laying the conductor out of the 
workmen's reach, by interposing 
effective barriers, by sheathing the 
phase or by insulating it. 
2. The cables and leads used in medium-tension 
underground networks should be mechanically 
protected either by means of a metal armouring 
connected to the pilot lead, or by a flexible 
envelope of the best possible design. 
- Leads without metal armouring must 
be electrically protected by separate 
or common protective screens, which trip 
safety devices in the event of a fault. 
3. Only trained men should be allowed to 
open the housings of accessible live 
parts (medium-tension voltage range) 
and this only under conditions which 
have been clearly laid down in advance. 
A. The repair and maintenance of the 
electrical equipment should be 
entrusted only to trained personnel. 
Β - Second order precautions 
(Equipotential connection between 
conductive parts of the installation) 
1. All underground networks must be 
provided with an equipotential 
connection between the conductive 
(not live in normal operation) 
components of the installation and 
the other metal elements connected 
thereto, such that its conductance 
is sufficient to prevent the occurrence, between 
any two points accessible to a workman 
simultaneously, ofa voltage higher than the 
weak voltage. 
2. This equipotential connection (protective lead) 
must ensure electric connection between the 
conductive elements of the installation over 
the whole length of the network. It must be 239 
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maintained in satisfactory condition and must 
be inspected as often as is necessary to 
ensure this. 
3. The above-mentioned equipotential 
connection (protective lead) must be 
earthed to at least one point of the 
network via an earth connection of the 
lowest possible resistance. 
4. This earth connection must be combined with 
the star-point earth connection, if a star-point 
is employed. 
C -Third order precautions 
(Reduction of fault duration) 
1. Any fault current must be considered 
dangerous in underground medium-tension 
networks if, when the fault current flows 
through the protective lead and connected 
conductive component of the installation 
of earth, there is produced between any 
two points accessible to a workman simultaneously 
a voltage exceeding the level of a weak voltage, 
regardless of whether it occurs between parts of 
the installation or between such parts and earth.  C' 
If the star-point of a network is earthed 
via a weak impedance or without any 
impedance, so that the presumed fault 
current is not restricted to a low value, 
then the network must be provided with 
safety devices which can at any time automatically 
isolate the damaged section of the networkfrom 
the current source (or render it completely 
dead) before the fault flowing through the protective 
components of the installation or earth reach a 
dangerous value  E C 
- Since the complete or partial cuttingToff 
of a line voltage can have serious 
effects on the current supply to important 
equipment, appropriate preventive measures 
should be taken. 
- Only when the line has been repaired or 
the fault eliminated, or at the direction 
of a specialist who has taken all necessary 
precautions, may that section of the network 
be brought under voltage again. 
3. If the star-point of a network is insulated 
or earthed via some impedance, which 
restricts fault currents to a low value, 
the network must be fitted with supervising 
devices which are always in a state of 
readiness and which are capable: 
a)- either of checking the insulation of the 
various parts of the network and of 
indicating any damage they may have suffered 
of automatically cutting off the 
damaged section of the network from 
its source of current (or rendering the entire 
network dead)■ 
If no automatic cut-off device is installed, 
the responsibility for cutting-off should 
be entrusted to an expert who can intervene 
as soon as the warning signal of the 
supervisory system is tripped or if the fault 
assumes major dimensions. 
1) Not applicable, as only isolated ciruits are used, 
2) Was carried out in workings where there is a risk of firedamp. 240 
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- If cutting-off has been necessitated by 
one of the two cases cited above, the 
restoration of current may be accepted 
only after repair of the line or 
elimination of the fault, or only at the 
direction of an expert official, who 
has tken all necessary precautions. 
- If no automatic cut-off device is 
installed, the rubber-covered leads of 
mobile machines should be fitted with 
an automatic device which renders them 
dead as soon as there occurs s fault 
current which is caused by damage to 
the insulation of an individual phase. 
b) - or of automatically cutting off the 
the damaged section of the network from 
its source of current (or rendering the 
entire network dead) as soon as a 
double fault occurs leading to a dangerous 
fault current in the protective lead 
and connected parts of the installation. 
In this instance, the current may be 
switched on again only after the line 
has been repaired or the fault eliminated. 
N.B. The comments on this Recommendation are 
given in the Second Report of the Mines 
Safety Commission, pp. 15/22. 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF 
UNDERGROUND ELECTRICAL NETWORKS AGAINST FIRE 
AND FIREDAMP-EXPLOSION RISKS (Doc. 1156/61/4) 
1. Recommendations regarding the protection of 
underground electrical networks against 
fire risk 
A - First order precautions - avoidance of 
fire risk 
C' 
D 
2)  2)  1) 
1) Avoidance of excessive heating of 
cables in normal use by providing 
adequate conductivity. Avoidance of 
unforeseen local heatings by the use 
of suitable designs and by proper 
supervision. 
2) Reduce the possibility of faults and 
short-circuits occurring between 
conductors, or between conductors and 
earth, by adequate insulation or 
proper spacing of the conductors. 
Second-order precautions - protection 
against the effects of a heating or a 
fault 
1) Use of heat- stable insulations. 
2) Use of protective sheathing for equipment 
and for cables, made of flsme-resistent and 
non-propagating material. 
- Use of oil as a non-conductor only 
if no fire risk for the workers is 
involved. 
3) Accumulations of flammable or combustible 
materials and pipelines for combustible 
gases should be sited well away from 
electrical equipment. 
C' 
C' 
C'  c' 
1) Not applicable 
2) Not suitable for inclusion in regulations. 241 
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C - Third-order precautions - measures 
regarding the network 
1) Automatic protection of networks 
against abnormal overloads. 
2) Automatic protection of networks 
against short-circuit; these protective 
devices must be capable of 
handling the maximum short-circuit 
current at their point of installation. 
Selecting and regulating of these 
devices in relation to the minimum 
short-circuit current which can occur 
at the end of the section they protect 
3) Steps to give effective protection 
against low-current faults, which 
might get past the above-named protective 
devices and cause dangerous heating. 
2. Recommendations for the protection of underground 
electrical networks against firedamp-explosion 
risks 
A. First-order precautions - prevention of 
accumulations of firedamp 
1) The firedamp content at the site of 
the electrical apparatus must be kept 
whithin the limits prescribed by the 
Inspectorate. 
2) The ventilation situation must be 
checked before any new installation or 
extension of electrical equipment. 
3) There must be a thorough investigation 
of the possible consequences of any 
alterations in working method, of 
ventilation or gas omission, which 
might cause problems in the vicinity 
of electrical equipment. 
B. Second-order precautions - protection 
against ignition 
1) In gassy workings: use of electrical 
equipment which is permitted by the 
Inspectorate only under its own 
specified conditions. 
2) The electrical equipment must be 
installed, used, supervised and maintained 
in such a way as to keep it flameproof. 
All cables must be of adequate 
mechanical strength. 
All cables must be installed and 
maintained without damage. 
C. Third-order precautions - cutting off the 
circuit 
1) Networks must be designed and installed 
in such a way that any fault current 
which may arise between phase and earth 
is reduced to a low value or quickly 
cut off. 
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1) Was carried out in workings where there is a risk of firedamp. 
2) In such mines where CH is a hazard, all apparatus must be designed to prevent open sparking and must be 
so certified. 242 
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2) A protective relay, preferable automatic, 
must be provided against betveen-phase 
faults and earth faults. 
3) Precautions must be taken to avoid 
accidents when faults are being Bought 
or dealt with. 
A) Protection must be given to leads without 
metallic sheathing, and to those which 
supply movable machines, by means of 
individual or collective screens which 
bring a protective device into operation 
if a fault occurs. 
5) If the firedamp content rises above the 
prescribed limit, all the sections of 
the network involved must be cut off. 
Issuing instructions to maintain in 
operation certain machines which 
provide ventilation. 
Restarting only when the firedamp 
content has fallen below the permissible 
value, and only on the orders of a 
trained person. 
Supplementary precautions for pits liable to 
sudden outbursts of gas 
1. Risk of damage by particles projected by 
an outburst of i;as 
- The threatened zones in which projection 
can occur should not be electrified. 
- The electrical equipment and cables 
should be protected against heavy blows. 
- The electrical equipment ehould be 
designed to give adequate robustness. 
2. The risk of firedamp concentrations 
- Increased ventilation 
- Use of remote-indicating methano-meters 
or ventilation-fault detectors which can 
cut off the threatened section of the 
ne two rk. 
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3) 
The use of electricity is forbidden in pits liable to sudden outbursts of gas, excepting for lighting 
and shot-firing. Exceptions can, however, be approved by the senior mining engineers: when using 
armoured cables, telephone installations and methanometers in intake airways-provided that no damage 
is likely to occur as a result of a gas outburst - and also in main return airways. 
No pits liable to sudden outbursts of gas. However, in pits or parts of mines which are considered 
to be liable to sudden outbursts of gas, the use of electricity, excepting for lighting purposes 
and portable lamps, must be authorized by a senior mining engineer, subject to the observance of all 
other measures, precautions or restrictions which might be included in the authorization such as for 
example the above-mentioned recommendations. 
Introduced recently in some individual mines which are not necessarily subject to outbursts, but 
have high quantities of firedamp. 243 
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- Relaxation shot-firing only after all 
equipment has been switched off. 
3. - Supplementary electrical precautions 
a) Preferable use of a starpoint earthed 
via a strong impedance, e.g. by means of 
an insulation detector. 
b) Quickest passible automatic protection 
of the network against all insulation 
faults, even if formed by resistances 
between phase and earth. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE USE 
OF EXPLOSION-PROOF ELECTRICAL APPARATUS FOR NOMINAL 
VOLTAGE ABOVE 1100 VOLTS (10th Report MSHC, 
annex VIII, June 1973) 
In respect of the circuit-breakers, it will be 
observed that the conclusions contained in the 
Report of 1964 (see third report of The Mines 
Safety and Health Commission, annex VIII, pages 
391-404) are now out-of-date, since considerable 
efforts have been made in all the Member States 
to eliminate or reduce the quantities of oil used. 
Different types of oil-less apparatus can be 
found (using sulphur hexafluoride, air or water) 
and all have given satisfaction and their utilization 
has made considerable advances. 
During the reporting period, the design of circuit 
breakers of the "increased safety" category with 
additional protection of the contacts has been 
accepted in different Member States, and the new 
purchases of circuit-breakers containing a large 
quantity of oil have been either restricted or 
forbidden. 
In the contactors without oil, considerable 
progress has been achieved, particularly as a 
result of the introduction of vacuum-break 
contactors. 
In these circumstances, the Mines Safety and Health 
Commission considers it necessary to recommend 
to the Member States to continue their policy 
of reducing the use of oil in cut-off devices 
by reason of the potential dangers of explosion 
and fire resulting from the presence of an appreciable 
quantity of oil in such devices. 
Consequently, the Mines Safety and Health Commission 
recommends that new purchases be restricted to 
apparatus using no oil or, if this Ì3 not possible, 
only small quantities of oil. 
1) Is the policy followed of reducing the use of 
oil in cut-off devices by reason of the 
potential dangers of explosion and fire? 
2) Are new purchases restricted to apparatus 
using no oil or, if this is not possible, 
only small quantities of oil? 
yes 
no+ 
ye;; 
1) No pits liable to sudden outbursts of ga3. However, in pits or parts of mines which are considered to be 
liable to sudden outbursts of gas, the use of electricity, excepting for lighting purposes and portable lamps, 
must be authorized by a senior mining engineer, subject to the observance of all other measures, precautions 
or restrictions which might be included in the authorization such as for example the above-mentioned 
recommendations. 244 
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VI - CABLES SUPPLYING MOBILE MACHINES AND THEIR 
ELECTRICAL PROTECTION 
Recommendations arising out of the "Report 
adopted by the Mines Safety and Health Commission 
on 20th June 1969 on the characteristics and electrical 
protection of cables supplying mobile machines (coal 
cutters, loading machines, etc.) used underground in 
coal mines in the various Community countries" 1) 
(8th Report of the Mines Safety and Health Commission, 
Annex IX) 
The Mines Safety and Health Commission recommends 
that electrical equipment supplying current to 
mobile machines should meet the following minimum 
requirements: 
A. Power should automatically be cut off from cables 
supplying mobile machines in the following 
cases: 
a) phase to phase faults 
b) faults between phase and earth 
c) faults between phase and polarised screen 
d) faults between conductor or polarised 
screen and earth 
e) breaking of the monitoring circuit 
B. The electrical installations defined above 
should be designed in such a way that any 
fault arising in the cable cannot result in 
unintentional starting of machines connected 
to the supply. 
C. CI or CB insulation monitors and BS safety 
blocks not automatically monitored should 
incorporate a device which monitors their 
operation and integrity. They should also 
have a fault-indicating device. 
D. The BS safety block should be arranged so 
that the supply cable cannot become live again 
after power has been cut off due to a fault. 
E. The monitoring circuit should not give rise 
to any risk of igniting firedamp. 
F. The earth conductors should be symmetrically 
arranged. 
G. Finally, the Mines Safety and Health Commission 
recommends that: 
1. The power to a cable supplying a mobile 
machine should be cut off when the first 
fault between phase and screen (polarised 
screen or earth conductor) appears and. 
C' 
C' 
C*+E 
C'  C' 
r,, 3) 
c* 
4) 
C + 
NRP  C' 
1) See 7th Report of the Mines Safety and Health Commission, Annex V. 
2) There is no polarised screen. 
3) There are precautions additional to BS. 
4) Yes, but on condition that this measure is extended to the whole network which is practically impossible. 245 
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2. In view of the present state of the art it 
suggests the use of cables provided with 
screens (polarised screens or earth 
conductors) of one of the types described 
in annex V, page 13 of the 7th Report of 
the Mines Safety and Health Commission 
except types A , Β , D . 
3. These cables should be used in conjunction 
with the following devices: 
- protection by means of current intensity 
appropriate to the length and cross-section 
of the cables, 
- a permanent insulation monitor (CI or 
CB), 
- a safety block incorporated in the gate-end 
box. 
VII - THE USE OF LIGHT ALLOYS FOR THE CONSTRUC­
TION OF ELECTRICAL APPARATUS FOR USE IN 
GASSY MINES. 
(13th Report of the MSHC, Annex IX) 
At its meeting on 11 July 1975, the MSHC decided to reply 
as follows to the question posed by CENELEC (European 
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization) concern­
ing the light alloy enclosures for Group I (gassy mines) co­
vered by draft standard EN SO 014 - General Requirements 
concerning electrical apparatus for potentially explosive 
atmospheres (&7.1.) : 
The alloys used in the construction of enclosures of electri­
cal apparatus for use in gassy mines should contain, by 
weight : 
a) no more than 15 o/o in total of aluminium, titanium 
and magnesium and 
b) no more than 6 o/o in total of magnesium and titanium 
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for the improvement of safety and health conditions 
in coal mines 
I- REPORT ON THE ELECTRO MAGNETIC EXAMI-
NATION OF WINDING ROPE (doc. 8470/64/2) 
Steps taken to develop electro-magnetic testing methods 
II- REPORT ON THE USE OF ACCELEROMETERS 
TO TEST WINDING INSTALLATIONS. 
doc. 3725/1/61 
Tests with accelerometers should be continued on a large 
Use of accelerometers should be extended 
Ill - MINIMUM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR WINDING 
AND BALANCE ROPE SUSPENSION GEAR, FOR SHAFT 
WINDING AND SINKING INSTALLATIONS. 
(13th report MSHC - Annex VII) 
1. Field of application 
1.1. These requirements apply to winding and balance rope sus-
1.1.1. Shaft winding installations designed for manriding 
1.1.2. Shaft winding installations not designed for manrid-
ing (mineral winding) in compartments adjacent to 
1.1.3. Mineral winding installations not accommodated in 
the same shaft as the man winding installations 
1.2. The provisions of items 3.1. to 3.8. and 3.15 and 
3.16 shall apply to winding and balance rope suspension 
■ gear in other installations not included in item 1.1. 
1.3. The following shall not be considered as winding 
rope suspension gear (1) or balance rope suspension 
1.3.1. The ends of the winding or balance rope attached to 
1.3.2. The main load-bearing elements of the conveyance (3), 
the attachment points on the conveyance for the bridle 
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(1) Llcctro-magnciic examination is required for multi- strand ropes of flattened strand construction and other 
highly-worked ropes. 
(2) Tests are being carried out with a view to improving the electro-magnetic method of examination 
(3) Electromagnetic examination of ropes is not obligatory. 
(4) Annual examination of rigid guides in installations where the winding speed exceeds 4 m/s and more than 
300 winds are carried out per working day by geometric measurement and acceleration or force measure-
ments (& 2Q Abs. 2, Nr 4. B VOS). 247 
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chains and winding rope suspension gear and the suspen-
sion beams and attachment points for the balance rope 
(1) See item 2.4. 
(2) See item 2.5. 
(3) See item 2.4. 
2. Definitions 
2.1. Examination (German : "Ueberpriifung" - French "con-
trôle") 
Examiniations are to be carried out by a competent per-
son nominated by the Manager of the Mine. They are 
made to determine externally visible damage or defects. 
2.2. Inspection is to be carried out by a competent person 
who has received appropriate engineering training (e.g. 
overman mechanic). Inspections are made to determine 
damage or defects requiring detailed examination, if ne-
cessary after the cleaning of individual components. 
2.3. Testing (German : "Untersuchung" - French "examen") 
Testing shall be carried out by an independant expert 
authorized by the Mining Authorities to perform such 
duties. 
Testing comprises : 
2.3.1. detailed examination of components, after they have been 
dismantled and cleaned, to determine damage or defects, 
2.3.2. where necessary, application of special testing or measuring 
methods permitting detection of damage to the load-hear-
2.4. Suspension gear 
Suspension gear (see fig. 1-9) is taken to mean the con-
necting elements between winding rope and winding cage, 
skip or counter-weight (herein after referred to as "con-
2.5. Balance rope suspension gear 
Balance rope suspension gear (see fig. 10-13) is taken to 
mean the connecting elements between the balance rope 
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3. Standard safety regulations for winding and balance rope 
suspension gear. 
3.1. Mathematical safety factor for suspension gear - at least 
3.3. Mathematical safety factor for the king post in the area 
3.4. Edges of the clamps rounded off. yes 
3.5. Marking of the load-bearing components of the suspen­
sion gear (see item 4.6.) . . yes 
3.6. Weld seams only on non load-bearing components other 
than chains (compression and shear loads permissible). 
yes 
3.7. Wedge-type capeis and wedge clamps for conveyance with 
arresting devices - with the exception of straight friction 
wedge-type rope capping (type reliance) - not acceptable. 
3.8. Items 3.1., 3.4., 3.5. and 3.6. apply to balance rope sus-
3.9. In situ examination of suspension gear (for derogation see 
3.10. In situ examination of balance rope suspension gear - at 
3.11. Dismantling and inspection of suspension gear (for dero-
3.12. Dismantling and inspection of balance rope suspension 
3.13. Testing of suspension in the dismantled condition (for 
derogation see item 4.9.) 12 months 
3.14. Testing of balance rope suspension gear in the dismantled 
condition (for derogation see item 4.9.) . . 12 months 
3.15. Service life of winding and balance rope suspension gear 
(for derogation see item 4.10) 10 years 
3.16. Overall life of winding and balance rope suspension eear 
in-calendar years (for derogation see item 4.10) 
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(5) In North Rhine- Westfalia 3 χ nominal load or absence of cracks established by non destructive testing. 
(6) Only in man-winding installations (7) Except. 3.5. (8) 24 months 
(9) After 10years,special examination for further serviceability, after 15 years the item is discarded and sent for scrap 
(10) After 20 years, spe^i examination as in (9), after 30 years the item is sent for scrap. >49 
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4. General 
Supplementary provisions applicable to the standard safety 
requirements for winding and balance rope suspension 
gear. 
4.1. Winding and balance rope suspension gear must be manu-
factured from non-aging materials (i.e., materials resistant 
to strain age embrittlement) or from materials which are 
specifically permitted under national regulations 
Tests must be conducted to determine the mechanical 
properties of the materials of which suspension gear is ma-
de - apart from capel wedges or thimbles and clamps. 
The tests must be carried out on surplus lengths having 
the same cross-section and having undergone the same 
heat treatment as the individual ropes in question or on 
test places from the same batch, the shape and dimensions 
to be agreed with the user. These test places must have 
undergone the same heat treatment as the individual com-
ponents 
4.2. The requisite mathematical safety factor for winding rope 
suspension gear (item 3.1.) and balance rope suspension 
gear (item 3.8) is based on the ex-works condition and on 
subsequent replacement of bushes. It shall be determined 
by simple static load calculations based iulely on the load 
the strength of the material and dimensions, taking into 
~" account the limits ol' permitted wear (code of practice). 
(The safety factors have been selected so that there is an 
adequate safety margin even if complicated theoretical 
strength calculations are used). The lowest tensile strength 
guaranteed for the material selected shall be used for the 
calculation 
4.3.' In the calculation of safety factors for all suspension gear 
components the load shall be taken as the net weight of 
the conveyance, the weights of the mine cars, the pay-
load and the balance rope suspension gear as well as that 
of the balance rope from the topmost operting condition 
of the conveyance down to the loop of the balance rope 
and shall cover at least the proportionale weights of the 
winding rope suspension gear. The payload to be includ-
ed in the calculation is that most frequently encountered 
in material winding under normal conditions. The man-
winding weight should be used if this is greater than the 
material winding weight. 
4.4. In calculating the safety factors for the balance rope sus-
pension gear, the load shall be taken as the weight of the 
balance rope suspension gear and of the balance rope 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
C' 
C' 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
C 
C 
NRC 
(11) 
NRC 
NRC 
(12) 
NRP 
(11) The calculation are based on nominal load of the item ; this shall be at least equal to the loads given at 4.3. 
and 4.4., respectively. 
(12) 3 χ the nominal load. 250 
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from the topmost operating position of the conveyance j ¡ 
down to the loop of the balance rope | NKL \ L 
j 4.5. Test loading of the suspension gear shall be carried out 
ι 
at 2.5 times the design load. 
Test loading of ordinary thimbles and clamps is not 
necessary. 
4.6.  The load-bearing suspension gear components must be 
marked - e.g. by stainless steel plaques attached with 
adhesive - so that the surface of the material is not da-
maged, unless national standards permit this at certain 
points on the components 
(12) 
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4.7. 
4.8. 
Examination of suspension gear (item 3.9.) need only 
be carried out weekly if manriding and material winding 
take place only occasionally and involve not more than 
thirty winding operations per working day ; NRC 
Dismantling of the winding rope suspension gear com-
ponents (item 3.11) and of the balance rope suspension 
gear components (item 3.12) need only be carried out at 
intervals of 12 months (maximum) if winding and ba-
lance rope suspension gear is inspected in situ at inter-
vals of not more than two months  NRC 
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C* 
4.9.  Except in the case of winding installations subjected to 
heavy usage, e.g. over 500 winding operations per work-
ing day, testing (items 3.13 and 3.14) need only be car-
ried out at intervals of up to two years if winding and ba-
lance rope suspension gear components subjected to ten-
sile and bending stresses are tested for incipient cracks by 
means of suitable non-destructive methods 
4.10.' The service life of winding and balance rope suspension 
gear (see item 3.15) may be set at a maximum of 15 years 
and the overall ufe (see item 3.16) at a maximum of 30 
years provided the Mining Authorities grant exceptional 
authorization 
4.11. In the case of material winding installations not contain-
ed in the same shaft as manriding systems, other time 
intervals may be laid down by national authorities for 
the examination and inspection of winding and balance 
rope suspension gear covered by items 3.9., 3.10, 3.11 
and 3.12 
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(14) Highly worked installations are not excluded 
(15) No exemption required. 
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Propoaala from the Kinee Safety Commisoion 
for the improvement of eafety and 
health conditions in coalmines 
I - PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
THEORY OF STABILISATION OF VENTILATION (sixth 
report of the Mines Safety and Health Commission -
Annex IIÏ) 
1. Supervision of ventilation 
The supervision of ventilation in a mining 
system requires an overall view, and should 
therefore be entrusted to a single man specially 
appointed, having at his disposal all the necessary 
means for carrying out his task. 
2. Fundamental factors in ventilation 
Apart from a regular inspection and anlysis of 
ventilation conditions in mines, ventilation 
officials require to have data on: 
- the actual characteristics of the main and 
auxiliary ventilation fans, 
- the order of magnitude of the aerodynamic effect 
of natural ventilation in summer and winter, 
- the potentials of the intersections (at least 
the main ones). 
3. Additional representations of ventilation 
sys terns 
In order to obtain a precise picture of the 
overall structure of ventilation systems and to 
reveal possible instabilities, it would be 
advisable when necessary to have, in addition 
to the regulation diagrams, representations of 
other types, such as, for example: 
a) a representation of the whole of the mine 
workings in perspective (isometric or any 
other equivalent system). 
b) a diagram without any topographical information. 
k. Characteristics of ventilation 
The representations mentioned in conclusion 
No. 3 should make available all the data 
necessary for the understanding of analysis of 
ventilation, particularly: 
Ξ) at the measuring points 
- the air quantities 
- the direction of the airflow 
- the methane content 
- the temperatures 
- the pressures (at least at the principal 
intersections) 
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1) In every colliery with over 500 workers the engineer responsible is also assisted by a supervisor who ensures 
application of the ventilation measures. In each coalfield an engineer has been specially entrusted with 
studying the application of the ventilation stabilisation theory adopted by the Mines Safety and Health Commission. 
2) It is a statutory duty of the undermanager or, in some cases, the manager of a mine to verigy the sufficiency of 
the ventilation. 
3) Applies to recent ventilators, but not to old ones. 
4) These are being carried out. 
5) Applicable to some coalfields, but not all. 
6) Carried out by means of network plans in ventilation calculations made by electronic computers. 
7) Not systematically recorded. 252 
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b) in addition 
- the lengths and average cross-sections of 
the roadway 
- the calculated resistances 
- the angles of inclination, particularly at 
the ends of the inclined and vertical section 
- the positions of the air doors and control 
doors, and of the barriers 
5. Inspection of ventilation conditions 
In each mine, there should be a systematic analysis 
of the ventilation system, at least once a year 
and after any major modification of the system, 
in order to detect any probable cases of 
instability under the normal operating conditions 
In addition, cases of instability which may be 
caused by the introduction of additional aeromotive 
sources, or the changing or elimination of the 
existing aeromotive sources, should also be 
examined 
6. Informing the personnel 
Taking into account the importance of ventilation 
for the whole of the underground workings, each 
responsible person should be informed of ventilation 
conditions within his own field. 
Furthermore it is essential that separate meetings 
should be held once a year at least, as well as 
after any major modification in the ventilation 
system, at which the colliery ventilation engineer 
will explain the ventilation conditions obtaining 
at the pit, together with any modifications which 
have recently been made, in the presence of: 
a) the management officials, the technical 
departments, the chief of the rescue team and 
the officials responsible for ventilation; 
b) the local officials, each in respect of his 
own speciality. 
On these occasions, attention should be drawn to 
districts where instabilities are already likely in 
normal conditions and, in particular cases of 
instability which make the occurrence of a fire 
likely. 
7. Exercises on plans 
Once a year at least, the management or the 
competent mining authority should organise an 
exercise on plans covering measures to be taken 
in the event of an underground fire. This should 
be attended by the mine owner or his representative, 
the ventilation engineer and the competent officials 
responsible for the organisation of fire fighting 
and rescue operations. 
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2) Headlines for the evaluation of pressure measurements are now being drafted. 
3) This instruction is not usually given at separate meetings. 
4) Will be regulated by the fire-fightinf plan. 
5) These will be organised after implementation of the Budryk plan, but the ventilation officials and 
the rescue centres already contact each other from time to time. 253 
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8. Position of regulation doors 
When doors are necessary for regulating ventilation 
they should be placed as near as possible to 
roadway junctions, taking into account other 
requirements, in order to facilitate access in 
smoky conditions. 
9. Measures and equipment for slowing-down 
ventilation 
In all collieries, devices for rapidly slowing-
down ventilation in order to stabilise it shall be 
installed in all intake airways, subject to 
exceptions to be previously determined, after each 
roadway junction or branch, and as near as possible 
to it. 
10. Instructions to officials in the event of 
underground fire 
Apart from the usual provisions regarding the 
obligation to attack any seat of a fire in order 
to extinguish it as soon as possible, and to 
inform the officials and managementwithout delay, 
there should be instructions to officials laying 
down the other measures to be taken in the event 
of a mine fire in order to slow down ventilation 
so as to avoid an increase in the air supply to 
the seat of the fire. 
11. Instructions to management officials in the event 
of underground fire 
No decision to modify the ventilation is to be 
taken by the management staff without a study being 
made of the consequences, by means of application 
of the theory of the stabilisation of ventilation, 
and without the help of plans and ventilation 
schemes which have previously been prepared in 
respect of all the possible causes result from 
the fire or from the structure of the mine 
(ventilation by multiple fans etc.). 
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1) Owing to the different local conditions a uniform regulation would be unsuitable. 
2) The decision is to be taken by the head of the fire-fighting unit. 
3) As soon as possible, but not automatically. 
4) Experience has shown that it is more convenient to have a central store of materials for constructing 
regulation doors. 
5) Now being studied by the users. 
6) The ventilation must not be modified except on the express order of the officials in charge. 
7) The decision is to be taken by the leader of the fire-fighting unit. 
8) Not supervisors level but thechiefs of rescue teams and the rescue centres. 
9) To be specified after implementation of the Budryk plan. 254 
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II - CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH EXEMPTION MIGHT BE GRANTED TO 
RAISE MAXIMUM PERMITTED CH^ LIMITS (12th Report of the 
Mines Safety and Health Commi s s i on, Annex V) 
1. 
2. 
2.1. 
2.1.1. 
2.1.2. 
2.1.3. 
2,1,4. 
Prerequisites for granting exemptions to maximum 
permitted CK limits 
2.1. A reasoned application from the producer 
2.2. Documents to be enclosed: 
a) a forecast on the emission of firedamp (2.2.1) 
b) a ventilation forecast (2.2.2) 
c) firedamp capture (2.2.3) 
d) other methods of reducing firedamp emission 
(2.2.4) 
General conditions for raising maximum permissible 
CH, levels 
4 
The conditions under which an exemption is granted 
are to be specified by the Mines Inspectorate. The 
regulations laid down by the Inspectorate, as they 
apply in normal cases, remain in force unless 
otherwise expressly stated in the exemption. 
In particular, it should be pointed out that CH, 
monitoring with hand-held instruments prescribed 
by national regulations is not to be discontinued 
where automatic CH, monitoring is used and will 
have to be carried out in accordance with the 
provisions in force. 
. Automatic monitoring of CH, content in the 
airflow, alarms. 
Monitoring of CH, content in the airflow is 
obligatory if an exemption is to be granted. 
Monitoring must be carried out: 
- automatically and 
- continuously and with sufficient frequency by 
means of reliable and accurate equipment. 
. Depending on local requirements, readings 
should be monitored either centrally or 
locally. It should be specified whether all 
readings or only some are to be recorded, 
e.g. whether recording is required in the 
case of readings from a measuring head or 
installation located at a point where the 
full amount of firedamp emitted from the 
working area is mixed with the air current 
(in principle at the end of the return airway). 
. The way in which firedamp content is to be 
monitored (mean content in the airflow or local 
content) must be clearly specified. 
The following points should also be specified: 
The location of the points at which CH, content 
is to be monitored, as these points may vary 
according to the type of working areas and to 
the wording of the exemption. 
A CH, recorder may, in particular, be required 
at the return end of the face, at right angles 
to the electricity supply devices in the return 
airway if such devices exist and at the far end 
of the return airway as indicated in p.ρ 3.1.2. 
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2.3.2. 
2.4. 
2.4.1. 
2.4.2. 
2.5. 
2.6. 
2.7. 
2.8. 
The frequency of the checks and calibration 
of the measuring heads of the automatic 
monitoring equipment. 
In the case of failure of the automatic 
monitoring equipment the exemption should be 
lapsed. However, if such failure affects only 
one measuring head and lasts less than 24 hours, 
the exemption may be maintained under special 
conditions, including in particular intensified 
monitoring and measurements taken with hand-
held instruments. 
A visual and/or a acoustic alarm must be 
triggered off at a continuously manned location, 
if the permissible CH, limits are exceeded. 
Additional monitoring of CH, content using 
hand-held instruments. Additional monitoring 
(supplementing the routine monitoring prescribed 
in the regulations) using hand-held instruments 
may be required in places where an increase in 
NRC  2)  D 
BSÍRC 
NRC 
2) 
NRC  2) 
Switching on and off of electrical equipment. 
When the maximum permitted CH, levels are 
exceeded, the electrical installations in the 
area in question should, if not intrinsically 
safe, cut out immediately and preferably 
automatically. Multi-powered (by electricity 
or compressed air) auxiliary fans might be re-
commended. 
Resumption of power should be by manual 
operation only, by a specially appointed person 
or another person answerable to him and carrying 
out his instructions. 
Ventilation measures. 
Care must be taken to ensure that the quantity 
of air and the minimum air speed are such that 
the mixture of firedamp with air prevents the 
formation of CH, roof layers. 
air speed oiust be subject to continuous auto-, 
matic monitoring accompanied by warning lights 
and/or acoustic signals at a continuously manned 
control point. 
. Shotfiring operations. 
Shotfiring operations will remain subject to 
the regulations in force in the various 
countries. 
. Use of light alloys. 
No light alloys may be used where the use of 
such components would present an ignition hazard 
. Use of diesel engines. 
In areas for which exemption is granted in 
respect of admissible CH, content, diesel engi-
nes may be used only if suitable precautions 
are taken to ensure that such use does not 
create additional hazards or increase existing 
ones. 
Evacuation of workings. 
Should the maximum CH, content in the general 
body of the air or localized areas be exceeded 
by a specific amount the working areas must be 
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evacuated. An evacuation procedure must be 
drawn up in advance, and the procedure for alert­
ing personnel laid down. The importance of a 
suitable, intrinsically safe communications 
network, or of other warning devices should be 
stressed. 
*·-'* Informing and instructing personnel. 
A procedure should be laid down whereby personne 
and possibly their representatives working in 
areas subject to an increase in CH, limits are 
informed. Specific instructions should be 
given to supervisory officials and officials 
authorized to take action where maximum 
permissible limits are exceeded or where 
evacuation is required. 
2.10 . Control by the Inspectorate. 
3. 
Ill -
1. 
1.1. 
2. 
2.1. 
2.2. 
The various information documents concerning 
working operations in areas for which an 
increase in maximum CH, levels has been 
authorized must at all times be available to 
the officials of the local Inspectorate. 
Measures relating to the granting of exemptions 
to increase maximum permissible CH, levels in 
special cases. 
In special cases, measures must be laid down in 
addition to those mentioned in Chapter 3. 
FIRST REPORT ON IGNITIONS OF FIREDAMP 
BY POWER LOADERS AND HEADING MACHINES 
(14th Report MSHC - Annex X) 
Development and use of mobile automatic CH. monitoring 
instruments which contain equipment designed to cut off 
the power supply or to raise an alarm. 
The MSHC believes that the development and use of such 
instruments should be encouraged. 
Has any progress been made in this field ?. . . yes/no 
Further research work to clarify the mechanism of ignition 
caused by cutter picks seems to be appropriate 
Special attention should be paid to the long-term recom­
mendation of the National Coal Board (see end of An­
nex I) : 
There should be further examination of a hydraulically-
operated ventilator or other means of ventilating the 
space between the face and the body of the machine. 
Work should continue on the development of suitable 
equipment for automatically monitoring the efficiency 
of auxiliary ventilation devices. 
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2.3. More attention should be given to making available bet-
ter facilities for horizon control. 
Has progress been made ?  yes/no 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 
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Saar 
Belgium 
— 
France  Italy 
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Kingdon 
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(1) 
(2) 
See previous page 
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I - RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING LOCOMOTIVE EQUIPMENT 
(First Report of the Safety Commission, p.20 -
German Text - April 1959) 
1. New locomotives must be equipped with fixed, 
rigid cabins which at all times give the driver 
a clear view along the roadway, ahead and 
behind, without any need for him to put his 
head out of the cabin. (Fixed cabins are 
understood to cover those forming a part of 
the structure or which can be removed only 
laboriously with special tools). 
2. The locomotives in service must be modified 
to meet this requirement, 
- locomotives which cannot be modified should 
gradually be withdrawn from service, within 
a period to be fixed by the responsible 
inspectorate, or 
- only be used in roadways which are wide 
and high enough to eliminate accident risk 
3. For particular types of locomotive, or in 
certain circumstances, the responsible Inspectorate 
can grant exceptions from the above regulations, 
provided that safety regulations of equal stringency 
are laid down. 
II - RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE NEUTRALISATION OF 
DIESEL-ENGINE EXHAUST FUMES (First Report of the 
Safety Commission, p. 23 - German text - April 
1959) 
- General use of better starters 
- Intensified research into improving combustion 
by the use of catalysts 
- Draw attention to the existence of this process 
- Continuation of the research into an automatic 
transmission system, which would make it possible 
to give Diesel engines a constant rpm. 
. Subsequent resumption of trials with the 
Houdry carbon monoxide purification process. 
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1) In the case of main-road locomotives, with the exception of "a clear view behind", which is 
difficult technically. 
2) No application made to gateroad locomotives, because the risk of accident is increased. 
3) For trolley locomotives. 
4) For other than trolley locomotives. 
5) Not applicable. 
6) The problem of the low CO content of Diesel engine exhaust fumes is solved by blocking the 
injection pump at a pumping capacity at which the CO content shows a marked rise. 
7) Not suitable for inclusion in regulations. 259 
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DUST CONTROL 
RECOMMENDATION EMBODYING DIRECTIVES OF SUPPRESSING 
DUST CONCENTRATIONS IN UNDERGROUND WORKINGS (8th Report 
of the Mines Safety and Health Commission, Annex VI) 
With due regard to the basic principles set out 
and, in particular, to the need for the different 
dust control processes to be combined to suit locally 
prevailing conditions, the dust control methods should 
be applied in accordance with the directives of the 
recommendation, namely: 
A. FACES 
1) Coal winning 
1.1. - Seam injection 
- Is any attention paid to the degree 
of efficiency of the different processes 
suggested? 
1.2. - Spraying 
2) Stewing 
a) In general: 
2.1. Prior sprinkling of the soil 
2.2. Prior sprinkling of the site to be stowed 
b) When hydraulic stowing is employed: 
2.3. Specific consumption of ventilated 
air maintained at the lowest possible level 
2.4. Use of soil of fine mechanical composition 
and sufficiently humid to prevent subsequent 
fissuring during transport and forced ventila-
tion 
2.5. Prevention of air stagnation in the stowage 
zone when tipping the goaf 
3) Caving 
3.1. Seam injection 
3.2. Spraying 
B. SHAFTS AND ROADWAYS 
4) Drilling of mine chambers 
(shot holes) 
4.1. Wet drilling, dry dust extraction 
5) Shotfiring 
5.1. Use of wet tamps or gelatine pastes, 
supplemented by previous sprinkling 
of the floor and sides of the roadways 
and the dirt resulting from previous 
shots. 
5.2. Use of water screen where wet tamps 
cannot be used 
6) Loading of excavated material 
6.1. Abundant and systematic sprinkling of 
excavated material 
C' 
C'+C 
1) Only wet tamps are used. 260 
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7) Machine drivers 
7.1. Suitable distribution of the dust 
extraction and ventilation flow rates 
so as to keep the dust against the 
drivage front at the maximum distance 
away from the machine operators 
7.2. Purification of the dusty air before 
it is diluted in the general ventilation 
system 
8) Various rock working operations 
8.1. Use of wet mechanical picks 
9) Various material handling operations 
9.1. Arrangements for withdrawal, transfer, 
tipping and loading (e.g. determining 
the minimum height of fall, ensuring 
that meteríais are completely tipped 
out at loading and unloading points) 
9.2. Use of additional products ensuring or 
maintaining surface wetting 
II - ORGANISATION OF SERVICES 
RECOMMENDATION ON THE ORGANISATION OF SPECIAL 
SERVICES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSPECTION OF DUST 
CONDITIONS IN UNDERGROUND WORKINGS (8th Report 
of the Mines Safety and Health Commission, Annex VII) 
The Commission recommends the following methods 
of operating: 
1. The managementof each pit shall appoint from 
among its staff a person who shall be responsible 
for dust control and is not directly concerned 
with production and output. 
2. The said person, and any assistants, shall be 
responsible for dust control operations, any 
improvements required, and dust sampling. 
3. Dust is to be sampled in all working places. 
The frequency and location of sampling or 
measurements are to be recorded in accordance 
with the standards laid down in the various 
countries and made available to the appropriate 
administrations and the mine's medical department. 
4. A department belonging to the company or 
coalfield shall assemble the results of 
measurements, be responsible for training 
persons in charge of dust control operations 
in each mine, and work out and co-ordinate 
instructions for use by the latter. 
5. The special services belonging to the 
company or coalfield shall keep in touch with 
the relevant technical and medical departments 
so as to take any precautions needed for reducing 
inadmissible dust concentrations or moving staff 
following the results obtained during the periodical 
medical examinations. 
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III - RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FIXING OF CLIMATIC 
LIMITS (The unabridged text is reproduced in 
doc. 3034/4/62) 
1.1. The basis is the American effective temperature 
(° eff basic scale). 
Air velocities above 3 metres/sec should be 
considered as only 3 metres/sec in determining 
the American effective temperature. 
1.2. The temperature data must be given so as 
to make possible a comparison on the 
basis indicated under 1.1. 
1.3. The climatic limits determined shall be 
maximum values. 
More favourable climatic values for the workers 
shall remain unchanged. 
1.4. There will be further investigation into the 
effectiveness and accuracy of the various 
climatic indices. 
2. Determination of a maximum climatic value 
2.2. Work on location is forbidden in working 
places where the temperature exceeds 32° eff A 
(basic scale), excepting the cases named in 2.3. 
and 2.4. 
2.3. An exception can be made to the ban on 
working on location in temperatures 
above 32° eff A (basic scale) if the competent 
authority has given permission and the workers 
in question have been medically examined. 
In this case the following conditions must also be 
fulfilled: 
2.3.1. The responsible authority can only issue 
permission for a fixed period and for given 
working operations. 
2.3.2. The work must be carried out under medical 
supervision. 
Guidelines must be worked out, in collaboration 
with medical experts, covering the medical 
examination envisaged under 2.3. 
2.3.3. Work must not continue uninterrupted 
for more than one hour. A suitable break 
must then be arranged in a better 'climate'. 
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1) Climatic values only have to be determined in certain very exceptional cases. 
2) 3,5 metres/sec. 
3) Working points where the temperature reaches 28°C are considered as particularly hot (without this 
being an absolute maximum value). 
4) For mine rescue personnel. 
5) Medical supervision obligatory. 262 
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The duration of uninterrupted working time, as 
well as the duration and frequency of the 
breaks and the climatic range in which this 
break is spent, as also all other necessary 
provisions are to be laid down in writing by 
the competent authority together with the 
responsible doctor before the work begins. 
2.3.4. Acclimatised persons must be chosen. Persons 
over 40 years of age should not be put to 
this work. 
Persons under 21 and over 45 years of age 
must not be put to this work. 
2.4. An exception can also be made to the ban on 
working on location in temperatures above 
32° eff A (basic scale) if danger threatens 
or in special circumstances calling for 
immediate action. 
In such case, however: 
2.4.1. The competent authority and the responsible 
doctor must be immediately informed. 
2.4.2. This work must be performed as soon as possible 
under the conditions listed in 2.3.1. to 2.3.4. 
3. Climatic range between 32° eff A and 28° eff A 
(basic scale) 
3.1.1. Only persons shown by medical examination to 
be suitable can be employed in this climatic 
range. 
The medical examination must pay particular 
attention to the heart and to blood circulation. 
Persons continually employed in this climatic 
range must be examined medically at least once 
a year. 
In addition, the following provisions apply: 
3.1.2. As soon as a working-point reaches a temperature 
above 28° eff A (basic scale) the competent 
authority must be informed in writing. 
3.1.3. The length of stay in the climatic range between 
30° and 32° eff A (basic scale) is restricted to 
5 hours, and in the range between 28° and 30° 
eff A (basic scale) to 6 hours. 
3.1.4. For work in a climatic range between 28° and 32° 
eff A (basic scale) a method of payment 
corresonding to these conditions must be applied 
to eliminate any overloading. 
3.1.5. The provisions quoted in 3.1.3 and 2.1.4 apply 
to all persons who, during one shift, have to 
work more than half the time of that shift in 
one of the climatic ranges mentioned above. 
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Laid down generally in the mine rescue plans. 
Only required for rescue work. 
No provision made for excluding persons below 21 years of age from exceptional hot work. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MEDICAL EXAMINATION 
(Second Report of the Mines Safety Commission, p. 79) 
1. Pre-Entry Medical Examinations 
- ALL appLicants for employment at collieries 
should undergo a pre-entry medical examination. 
- This must establish that the appLicant 
shows no symptoms rendering him unfit for 
such empioyment. 
The pre-entry medical examination must inciude: 
- a generaL examination 
- such special examination as may be deemed necessary 
for the purpose. 
- The examinations effected must inciude, as 
regards the chest, a radiograph or radiophotograph 
of format not smaiLer than 70 χ 70 mm. 
- The Latter to be supplemented if need be by a 
standard-format (L : L) radiophotograph. 
- The nature of these examinations and 
- the practical details, together with 
- the criteria on which the doctor should base 
his findings, 
- should be defined by medical experts. 
- In the case of recruitment for work, whether 
below or above ground, where the worker will 
be exposed to a dust hazard, the examination 
must show a normal pulmonary image. 
- The concept of normal pulmonary image must 
be defined by medical experts. 
- These are to be regarded as minimum medical 
recommendations. 
- The points concerning the number and type of 
examinations to be carried out, 
- the effecting of radiological examinations 
- the definition of the normal pulmonary image 
- are subject to review in each country 
- whenever this is felt to be appropriate in 
the light of progress in medical and radiological 
knowledge 
- working conditions, and 
- preventive measures. 
2. Special Examinations 
a) The object of special medical examinations 
should be to establish - taking into account, 
according to circumstances, the opinions of: 
- the training 
- vocational-guidance and applied psychology 
- and other services concerned a worker's fitness 
for certain specific occupations 
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3. 
b) Such examinations are essential in the case of 
jobs : 
- Which, either in themselves or owing 
to the conditions under which they are performed, 
involve a special hazard to the worker himself 
or to others as regards health and/or safety. 
- which involve special health or safety require­
ments, 
- or which demand particular physical aptitutes 
or characterological qualities. 
c) No attempt has been made here to list in full 
the cases in which special examinations are necessary 
this being left to the competent authorities in 
each country. 
Examples include: 
- winding enginemen, 
- staple pit enginemen, 
- motormen (drivers of locomotives, mobile 
haulers and surface vehicles) , 
- workers assigned to hot workings, 
- all those employed on cage handling. 
Routine examinations during employment 
a) Periodic health checks 
- The object here is to establish whether the 
subject is still fit for duty, 
- to detect any symptoms of occupational disease 
at the earliest possible stage, 
- where appropriate to help supervise the subject's 
health generally. 
- All personnel should undergo such check-ups at 
intervals. 
- The interval is fixed at two years. 
- The interval is reduced for workers under 21. 
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1) The interval is one year; 
2) Article 648 of Inspectorate Regulations provides for an interval of one year. 
3) For workers under 18 years. 
4) Compulsory for persons under 18 years of age at annual intervals; other miners can consult their 
local doctors or an industrial medical officer. 
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- The interval should be considered as a maximum 
figure. 
This interval can also be reduced: 
- if the state of health of a worker indicates 
that such a reduction is desirable; 
- in relations to the type of work performed; 
- because of the nature of the place at which the 
work is being done. 
b) Medical examinations on specific occasions 
1. In the case of reassignment 
- Workers whom it is proposed to assign 
to jobs involving hazards not previously 
taken into account for the man concerned 
should be re-examined. 
2. Medical examination following absence from work 
- Where a man's return to work after an illness 
or accident involves risk to the safety of 
himself or others, he may be subjected to a 
special examination, 
- Che type and extent of which should be fixed 
in each case according to the circumstances. 
V - GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE DESIGN AND USE OF COAL-GETTING 
AND HEADING MACHINES RELATING TO THE REDUCTION OF AIRBORNE 
DUST (11th Report of the Mines Safety and Health 
Commission, annex XI) 
Coal-getting machines (8) 
- General observations on the quality of air entering 
working areas, water infusion where possible; 
maintenance of cutting horizons. 
Directives for coal producers on the use of drum power-
loaders (9) 
- water spraying on power loaders (9.1) 
- location of sprays (9.2) 
a) internal 
b) external 
- avoidance of jet blockage by adequate pressure and 
outflow of water (9.3) 
- minimizing coal fragmentation by adequate travel speed 
of power loaders, by suitable drum speed and by 
maintaining picks in good condition (9.ή) 
Directives for constructors on the construction of drum 
power loaders (10) 
To ensure minimal breakage of coal: 
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1. picks should be as few as possible; their shape 
and distribution on the drum should be such that 
the coal is not broken unnecessarily; 
2. the body of the drum ehould be designed to transfer 
the cut coal continuously to the conveyor to avoid 
build-up, the need for clearing up and consequent 
secondary breakage of the product, as well as 
projection into the air stream; 
3. the drum should be capable of removing more coal 
than it cuts; 
4. the speed of travel of the power loader should be 
variable while in motion; 
5. the drum speed should be variable; a maximum pick 
speed of 4 m/sec is suggested; 
6. provision should be made for adjusting the height 
if the drum to avoid cutting in the roof and floor; 
it is an advantage to provide facilities for 
automatic control by suitable sensing devices 
wherever these can be used. 
To ensure effective spraying, machines should be provided 
with (11): 
1. a water filtering arrangement; 
2. piping to take the water to the inside of the drum; 
the junction between the body of the machine and 
the drum should be made by a gland designed for 
pressure well above the working pressure; 
3. distribution channels in the drum to take the water 
to the picks; 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
pipes with a sufficiently large internal diameter 
to allow an adequate supply of water without excessiv» 
loss of pressure; account must be taken of the fact 
that already or in the near future production 
methods may call for water supplies of, for 
example, 200 1/min at a pressure of 15 atm; 
5. one or more systems to feed the external sprays; 
the position of the jets (for example on the body 
of the machine and/or on the cowl), the direction 
of projection, the diameter and operating angle 
of the jets should all be adaptable to operating 
conditions. 
To complete the dust suppression arrangements, particularly 
in view of the-use of more and more powerful machines, 
it is advisable (12): 
a) to provide an automatic water control system to 
ensure that water is flowing before the drum 
can rotate; an "override" system should be 
provided for use by fitting staff only; 
b) to design the machine to permit the fitting of 
a cowl. 
The possibility of fitting a dust extractor to the machine 
should be allowed for in case the systems already 
described prove inadequate. 
Coal ploughs (13) 
a) it is essential that seams be infused correctly 
on ploughed faces 
b) where infusion is impossible or insufficient, 
plough runs should be sprayed either continuously 
or during the passage of the plough only; 
alternatively, sprays ehould be fitted on the 
plough itself. 
C' 
c' 
C' 
c' 
c' 
C 
c* 
1) The mines inspectorate cannot (legally) prescribe conditions to the constructors of machiniery. 
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c) the methods outlined for external spraying on the 
drum power loaders apply equally to ploughs. 
d) in addition, spraying must be adequate on the 
plough runs and at the discharge points between 
faces and transport roads. 
- Directives on road heading machines 
General observations on working conditions 
a) in the seam (14); 
b) the importance of duat: the need for de-dusters (15); 
c) the need for cooperation between coal producers and 
the makers of machines and of de-dusting equipment 
(16). 
- Technical measures relating to ventilation and the filtra­
tion of dust 
a) in general, the forcing of ventilation through 
ducts (17a); 
b) the particular case of auxiliary extraction 
ventilation (17b) ; 
c) air filtration (18). 
Recommendations on the construction of heading machines 
19. The number of cutting picks on a heading machine 
should be reduced to the minimum; they should be 
of such shape and so arranged on their mountings as 
to reduce fragmentation as far as possible. 
20. A water supply should be provided on the machine to 
give sufficient output and pressure for each cutting 
tool; the arrangements are similar to those for 
power loaders. 
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I - RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL 
FACTORS AFFECTING SAFETY (3rd report of the Mines and 
Safety Commission, p. 425) 
1. Measures which will make it possible for 
workmen to recognise dangers and to carry 
out their work in such a way that these 
dangers are avoided. 
1.1. Recognising dangers 
1.1.1. Before starting work in a district, a 
section of a working or a workingpoint and 
before any planned major change in the 
manpower deployment or in working conditions 
it is important to check all the safety precautions 
tomeet any dangers to be encountered. 
1.1.2. During the work, regular reports on the 
following points must be prepared on the 
basis of the safety conditions which have 
to be observed under continuous supervision: 
a) changes in operating conditions 
b) accidents or incidents 
c) dangerous situation encountered during work 
The data brought together in these reports 
should be systematically assessed with a 
view to improving or adapting the safety 
precautions in force. 
1.1.3. After the work has been finished, the data 
assembled on the basis of daily experience 
should be used to prepare a report of 
experience which should at least include 
information 
regarding the winning methods used, 
the dangers which have arisen and the 
precautions taken to deal with them, 
together with any accidents, incidents and 
dangerous situations which have occurred 
during the working operations 
1.2. Making known the dangers to all concerned 
1.2.1. Before starting work in a district, a 
section of a working or a workingpoint or 
in the event of a major change in the 
operating conditions, it is advisable to 
arrange a discussion between representatives 
of the management, supervisory staff and 
members of the safety sévices as well as 
the workers concerned or their representatives, 
in order: 
- to inform each individual with regard to 
the work envisaged 
- to study in detail the work to be carried 
out. 
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1) No report is drawn up, verbal or written instructions given to the personnel concerned. 
2) As regards the pattern of work and not actual operations as mentioned in the text. 
3) Such situations are discussed at management or supervisor level, no report is drawn up. 
4) No report is drawn up although account is taken of experience gained. 
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- to settle upon the method of work 
1.2.2. The workers concerned should be informed by 
the most appropriate means of the method of 
work chosen. 
1.2.3. During the execution of the work, the management 
and the supervisory staff should refer to the 
regulations and instructions to be observed 
as often as necessary to counteract the effects 
of habit. 
1.2.4. If it is considered necessary to issue new 
safety instructions, these should be brought 
regularly to the notice of every worker 
concerned. 
1.2.5. Reports made by each of the workmen regarding 
dangerous situations which arise during the 
work should be brought co the notice of the 
management staff. 
1.3. Instruction in the manner in which the work 
is to be carried out without danger 
1.3.1. Every worker assigned to underground work 
must be able to show that he has: 
- a general training as an underground worker; 
- a special training for the work to which he is 
to be assigned; 
- the necessary additional training to cuver 
the special working conditions at the 
point where he will work. 
1.3.2. Should there be a change in the work or in 
the working conditions, the necessary additional 
training must be provided. 
1.3.3. Instruction in safety precautions is to be 
considered as an integral part of vocational 
training 
1.4. Supervision to check that safety regulations 
are observed during work 
1.4.1. During the work, the safety conditions must 
be subject to continual supervision. 
1.4.2. The duty to see that safety regulations are 
observed, and the responsibilities resulting 
from this duty, fall upon the management 
and supervisory staff. 
1.4.3. The supervision, which must be exercised 
with authority, should in its ever-day 
action seek to improve the training and 
education of the workmen on the basis of 
daily experience, and should give rise to 
fines or penalties only in very serious or 
repeated cases of infringement. 
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1) This takes place at engineer or supervisor level, or even at Safety Committee level, but not at meetings 
where all the people mentioned are present, 
2) Workers' safety representatives may give their opinion and submit their observations in the form provided 
for in the labour legislation. 
3) By means of service instructions issued by the management of the mine, or of service notes issued by 
departmental heads and supervisors. 
4) Convention of the Joint National Minea Commission. 
5) Systematic training courses are provided up to 1963. After 1963, no new staff were engaged and therefore 
apprenticeship and training are only provided where new machinery and equipment is introduced. 
6) Laid down by the responsible authorities for particular cases, otherwise generally included in the 
enterprises manual. 
7) Concerns the last part of the sentence: '... and should give rise ...'. 270 
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2. Training the management and supervisory staff 
in the matter of safety 
2.1. General 
2.1.1. Steps must be taken to ensure that the supervisory 
staff does not change posts frequently 
2.1.2. The vocational training should be adapted to 
the particular features of the staff member's 
task and his responsibilities, and in particular 
to the requirements of his place in the hierarchy 
of management or supervisory staff. 
2.1.3. The transition from one grade to another 
should be possible for a given person ly 
after he has actually proved to have the required 
knowledge and skill. 
2.2. Guidelines for the vocational training of the 
management or supervisory staff 
2.2.1. The management and supervisory staff must 
have an adequate knowledge of: 
- the safety regulations; 
- the safety precautions to be taken; 
- the available safety equipment and its use; 
- the instructions in force for the different 
vocational groups whose work they are 
called upon to supervise, and the instructions 
for the exercise of activities at the working 
points for which they are responsible. 
2.2.2. The management and supervisory staff must be able: 
- to point out in a suitable way to the 
workers under their orders the dangers 
associated with their work; 
- to instruct these workers as to how best 
to carry out the work in order to avoid 
these dangers. 
2.2.3. The management and supervisory staff should 
be trained in how to issue instructions. 
2.2.4. Special attention must be apid to the 
continual further training of all management 
and supervisory staff. 
2.2.5. The management and supervisory staff must both: 
- account for and report on the execution of 
their work, and 
- account for and report on all accidents 
and other notable incidents which have 
occurred during the working period at the 
points for which they are responsible. 
2.2.6. The management and supervisory staff must be able: 
- to draw up accident reports correctly; 
- to assess and use the data in these report; 
- to study and establish the causes of accidents; 
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1) For the shotfirer. 
2) By limited competition in the E.N.E.L. (Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica). 
3) For the management staff. No systematic training in management for other grades. 
4) This is not considered as a subject for training. Preference is given to constant supervision of the staff. 
5) For the management staff. For supervision staff in certain cases only. 271 
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- to work out means to aboid accidents; 
- to receive the training necessary to this end. 
2.3. Staff responsible for training 
2.3.1. The staff responsible for the training 
activities set out in paragraphs 1.3 and 2 
must be numerous enough and must have available 
the necessary means and time to carry out their 
task properly. 
2.4. Drawing up of an accident report; training 
of staff responsible for filling in such reports 
2.4.1. The accident report must, taking into account 
all the appropriate human and technical 
factors, give all necessary information and 
in particular: 
- the circumstances, the consequences of the 
accident, the causes, 
- the precautions proposed to avoid similar 
accidents. 
2.4.2. Each of these items of information referred 
to in point 2.4.1 must be capable of formulation 
as an answer to a clear and precise question. 
2.4.3. The breakdown and layout of the form used 
for accident reports must clearly show which 
questions have to be answered by each of the 
members of the staff contributing to the 
preparation of the reports. 
2.4.4. There must be suffcient room on the form for 
supplementary remarks or sketches which may 
be provided by the person or persons concerned. 
2.4.5. Each of the persons contributing to the 
preparation of the report must be informed 
with regard to: 
- the importance of each question, 
- the way to provide correct answers to the 
questions. 
2.4.6. Practical instruction should be provided to 
draw the attention of the employees concerned 
to the consequences of omissions, neglectful 
or unclear answers to the questions. 
2.4.7. Systematic attention should be paid to 
ensure that the answers are complete, aacurate 
and precise. 
2.4.8. The accidents reports referred to in this 
cahpter are to be drawn up for the sole 
purpose of accident prevention. 
2.5. Appointment and promotion of management or 
supervisory staff 
2.5.1. Care should be taken to ensure that there is 
available an adequate number of management 
or supervisory staff possessed of the 
requisite skills both in the technical and 
safety fields. 
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2.5.2. The election of this staff is the responsibility 
of the employer, who must at least inform 
the competent authority of the persons entrusted 
with supervision of working operations, together ■ 
with the necessary data justifying the selection. 
2.5.3. To ensure a selection which promisee 
success, there should be laid down the 
minimum requirements for appointment to a 
post in one of these categories, either by 
direct appointment or by promotion, 
together with the certificates and other 
documents which are the necessary requisite 
for such an appointment. 
2.5.4. The competent authority should be in a position 
to check the knowledge and skills of the manage-
ment or supervisory staff - both 
from the human and technical points of view -
should this authority consider it necessary, 
at least in the case of a major failure or of 
repeated failures in the performance of duties. 
3. Usefulness of psycho-technical examinations 
3.1. On assignment 
3.1.1. It is recommended that the application of a 
relatively simple psycho-technical examination 
upon assignment should be developed as far as 
possible, in order to: 
- determine the general intellectual level 
of the candidate; 
- to exclude those candidates whose intellectual 
level lies below a pre-determined minimum. 
3.2. Before the exercises of specific duties 
3.2.1. In every instance, the workmen who are to be 
amde responsible for the execution of particular 
working operations 
- with which there is associated a particular 
responsibility in respect of collective safety 
or 
- which call for particular intellectual or 
personality characteristics 
should be subjected to a special psycho-technical 
examination to determine whether they have the 
capacities required for this activity. 
3.2.2. The competent authority must, in co-operation 
with the representatives of the employers 
and employees, keep up to date the list 
of work for which those special examinations 
are to be prescribed and, to this end, should 
list the duties which have been shown by experience 
to call for such tests and for which such tests 
can inpractice be carried out. 
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1) The managing director of the mine informs his chief engineer of the name of the departmental head in 
charge of technical matters. 
2) As regards the reasons for the choice. 
3) Does not exist in practice. 
4) The law lays down a provision concerning the academic qualifications of directors and departmental heads. 
5) Psycho-technical examinations are required for certain duties only (winding-enginemen, locomotive drivers). 
6) This ceased when recruitment was discontinued. 
7) Cf. 2) on previous page. 
8) For winding-enginemen and locomotive drivers. 
9) Ceased when recruitment was discontinued. 273 
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3.3. Before any promotion of a worker to a 
supervisory post 
3.3.1. Before the promotion of any workman to a 
supervisory post, a suitable psycho-technical 
examination must be carried out. 
3.4. Principles underlying the various psycho-
technical examinations 
3.4.1. The psycho-technical examinations listed 
under 3.2 and 3.3 should, as far as possible, 
aid the vocational specialisation of the worker 
in question. 
3.4.2. The management must lay down the criteria 
which have to be met by the candidate on 
assignment, or later, when directed to special 
tasks, 
and must seek the advice of psychologists when 
so doing. 
3.4.3. The psychologist's assessment will be valid 
only for a restricted period and must be 
compared with the assessments of the 
vocational behaviour of the person in question. 
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1) Eligibility for promotion within the supervisor grade is determined during the vocational training laid-down by 
the responsible authorities. 
2) Where there was in fact a psychological department. 
3) Psycho-technical examinations are required for certain duties only (winding-enginemen, locomotive drivers). Other 
enterprises have these types of examination for other duties. 274 
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II - RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED 
IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF PAYMENT AT 
PIECE RATES ON SAFETY IN COALMINES (4th report of the 
Mines Safety and Health Commission, Annex IV). 
1. Piecework arrangements 
1.1. Minimum age; medical examinations 
1.1.1. To be assigned to piecework, a miner must 
- be not less than 18 years of age 
- have underground a medical examination to 
establish his fitness for such work. 
1.1.2. Similar examinations must follow at regular 
intervals. 
1.2. Make-up of piece rates 
1.2.1. Written particulars of the operations to 
be performed must be given to the men 
concerned, including such information as 
is needed to calculate the amount payable 
therefor. 
1.2.2. In the interests of safety, the piecework 
arrangement employed must either 
- provide that operations of importance to 
safety shall be paid on a separate basis, 
or 
- contain equivalent financial safeguards 
for the proper execution of such operations. 
1.3. Fixing of norms and of rates payable therefor 
1.3.1. The men must have the right to discuss the 
fixing of piecework norms and rates with the 
employer. 
1.3.2. If agreement is not reached, the men or 
their representatives must have the right 
to start conciliation proceedings under 
4 below. 
1.4. Form of piecework 
1.4.1. One-man piecework should preferably be permitted 
only where the operations concerned are not 
of a nutre to allow any other form of piecework. 
1.5. Determination of the norm 
1.5.1. The norm must be determined in accordance with: 
- the amount of time actually available during 
a normal shift; 
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1) Recommendations not applicable; miners are not paid on piece rates. 
2) Questions relating to pay cannot be dealt with by the responsible authorities. Such questions are 
settled by means of collective agreements. 
3) Pursuant to the Mining Regulation and to the provisions relating to young workers. 
4) Periodic X-ray examinations (every 15 months at most). Periodic clinical examination only where signs 
of pneumoconiosis are detected or on medical advice. 
5) Settled by collective agreement. 
6) For certain operations, one-man piecework is considered by both sides to the agreement as the most 
appropriate type of remuneration. 
7) The collective agreement does not provide for conciliation procedures, although such procedure exists 
and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security acts as an arbitrator (whose decisions are not binding). 275 
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the amount of work the men can fairly be 
expected to perform during this time, 
having regard to the working conditions; 
the amount of time required to perform the 
operations properly. 
1.6. Calculation of the end wage 
1.6.1. The basis and mode of calculation must be 
sufficiently simple for any worker to be 
able to work out for himself the sum due to 
him for a given period. 
1.7. Performance in piecework 
1.7.1. Regulations should be laid down requiring 
that periodic checks be carried out on the 
amounts of workperformed for the purpose 
of determining the wages payable therefor. 
and that the findings be duly notified to 
the men concerned 
1.7.2. Particular's must be supplied to the men of 
all additions and deductions affecting the 
amount of the end wage, together with 
details as to how these were calculated. 
2. Changes in conditions at the workplace 
2.1. A piecework arrangement my be terminated 
or amended if the employer and the men are 
agreed that genuine difficulties warranting 
this course have been objectively found 
to exist. 
Failing such agreement, the men must have 
the right to ask nevertheless that the 
arrangement be terminated or amended forthwith. 
2.1.1. If the men cannot be paid at piece rates 
for so long as the difficulties persist, 
they must be paid a proper wage appropriate to 
their grade. 
3. Managerial and supervisory staff 
3.1. In the interests of safety, extra supervision 
must be provided in workings where men are 
employed on piecework. 
3.1.1. Since failure to carry out safety operations 
in good time can result in particular hazards, 
the supervisory personnel must give the men 
strict and relevant instructions to this effect, 
and check regularly to see that these are carried 
out 
3.2. Payment of managerial and supervisory staff 
3.2.1. Since managerial and supervisory staff are 
responsible not only for the organisation 
and smooth running of operations, but 
also for the safety of the men engaged 
in them, they should as a rule be paid out 
Germany 
H.R./Wph 
c'
 x
) 
c· " 
C
 l) 
C' » 
c- » 
C
 1
} 
C' » 
c
 L> 
c
 x
) 
c 
c' 
Saar 
c' 
C' 
c' 
C' 
c' 
c' 
c' 
C' 
c' 
c 
c' 
Belgium 
c' 
C' 
C' 
c' 
c' 
C' 
c' 
c 
c' 
? 
c 
Frano· 
C 
C 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
Italy 
E 
C 
C' 
C' 
c' 
C' 
C' 
c' 
c
2> 
c 
c' 
United 
Kingdom 
1) Settled by collective agreement. 
2) The collective agreement guarantees minimum pay and ancillary allowances. 
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on a basis independent of the ups and down 
of production. 
They may be granted production or output 
bonuses provided they have at the same 
time a sufficient financial incentive to 
devote the necessary attention to safety. 
4. Settlement of disputes 
4.1.. There should be a conciliation system for 
dealing with any disputes arising between 
management's and men's representatives 
with regard to piecework arrangements or their 
implementation. 
4.1.1. The conciliation system should operate by 
means of a board on which employers and 
workers are equally represented, and which 
should approach disputes in the light of 
the present recommendations. 
4.1.2. The fact that proceedings of this kind are 
pending must not affect the terms of 
employment of the men concerned, 
who must continue to be entitled to a fair 
wage appropriate to their grade. 
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Memorandum on information necessary for the examination 
of coal-dust explosions on ignitions of firedamp in 
mines (adopted by the Mines Safety and Health Commission, 
6.2.73, 10th Report, Annex VII) 
In this memorandum used by the mines inspectors when 
investigating accidents? 
2. - Information on the procedure for binding dust by means 
of hygroscopic salts, another effective technique for 
neutralizing inflammable dust (11th report of the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission, annex VI) 
Is any further information available? 
3. - Information report on water barriers for containing dust 
explosions underground (11th report ofthe Mines Safety 
and Health Commission, annex VII) 
Is any further information available? 
4. Triggered barriers and recommendation for their use 
underground (11th report of the Mines Safety and Health 
Commission, annex VIII) 
At the present stage of research the Mines Safety and 
Health Commission feels that triggered barriers may be 
more effective than conventional methods of suppressing 
explosions at certain points in the mine such as headings, 
gallery and face junctions, gateroads, the boundaries 
of ventilation districts and at particular danger points. 
The Mines Safety and Health Commission has recommended 
that barriers already available should be installed so 
that their behaviour under working conditions may be 
tested. 
Has this recommendation been implemented? 
5. APPLICATION OF DUST BINDING BY HYGROS-
COPIC SALTS AS Λ M HANS OF COMBATING COAL 
DUST EXPLOSIONS. 
14th Report MSHC - Annex V 
The MSHC recommends the proper application of hygros-
copic salts as a protection against dust explosions, parti-
cularly in places where coal dust makes are likely to be 
high. 
Is this recommendation being complied with alone ? 
yes/no 
In conjunction with the following alternatives : 
1) the MSHC considers that stone dusting, whether ap-
plied over the whole periphery of roadways or in com-
bination with dust binding on the floor, is a suitable 
alternative, provided it is regularly applied 
2) The recommendation does not apply to those workings 
or sections of roadway which are kept constantly wet 
either naturally or as a result of winning operations. . . 
3) It does not, however, preclude water spraying at cer-
tain points in the mine as a means of protection against 
dust explosions 
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GENERAL REMARKS ON STEPS TAKEN IN ITALY 
The Italian coal mines, of course, comprise only the Sulcis coalfield in Sardinia and are 
currently not being worked. 
The Italian Government only recently decided to consider reopening this coalfield and is 
carrying out an extensive survey to determine its potential. 279 
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THE CHECK TESTING OF CONVEYOR BELTS 
WITH TEXTILE CARCAS 
FOR USE UNDERGROUND IN COAL MINES 
Resistance to flame 
The check testing of conveyor belts with textile carcas for use underground 
1. General 
1.1. On 15th. november 1974, the Mines Safety and Health Commission 
adopted the First Report on Tests and criteria for flammability of conveyor 
belts with textile carcass used in mines of coal in the European Community 
countries. The report was published as Annex VI to the 12th Report of the 
MSHC. It prescribes two testing procedures which constitute the minimum 
requirements which conveyor belts with textile carcass must satisfy prior to 
approval for use in underground coal-mines. 
The two tests are : 
- the drum friction test and 
- the propane burner test. 
1.2. Since 1974, new types of belt in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the United Kingdom have been approved for use in coal mines only 
if they can satisfy the requirements described in the above-mentioned report. In 
some countries additional tests are prescribed. 
1.3. The Working Party on Rescue Arrangements, Mines Fires and Under-
ground Combustions has given the Committee of Experts on Fire Resistant 
Conveyor Belts, the task of finding a routine quality control test for conveyor 
belt delivered for use in coal mines to determine whether the fire resistant pro-
perties of these belts are substantially the same as the values established at the 
time of the type approval tests. 
These quality control tests are intended to allow belt users and manufac-
turers to monitor product quality. 
1.4. The type approval tests involve the use of expensive equipment which is 
generally not available to manufacturers and users. It is therefore necessary to 
seek a rapid, simple and cheap method for check testing of conveyor belts. How-
ever, in Belgium the type approval tests had been used for this purpose. 28 2 
1.5. A series of comparative tests has been carried out at the following research 
institutes : 
- CERCHAR Verneuil-en-Halatte 
- INIEX Pâturages 
- NCB Bretby/Harrow 
- Versuchsgruben-
gesellschaft Dortmund. 
The findings indicate that both the Barthel burner test and determination 
of the limiting oxygen index could be suitable for check testing of belt material 
on delivery. 
It is possible to define the two tests in terms of the apparatus used and 
procedure adopted with a sufficient degree of precision to ensure reproducibi-
lity of results. A final assessment of their suitability will not be possible until 
results are available for a sufficiently large number of test pieces. 
1.6. The Committee of Experts also notes that : 
1.6.1. The National Coal Board in the United Kingdom has used the Barthel Bur-
ner test as part of its type approval testing scheme for 20 years. It also requires 
that the manufacturers carry out one complete "test" on at least every 400 me-
tres of conveyor belt prior to despatch. 
In addition the NCB itself tests at least one sample for every 800 metres of 
belt received. The NCB however, use predominantly belt with textile carcas and 
PVC covering. The U.K. experience indicates that the Barthel Burner Test can be 
successfully used for quality control purposes for this type of belt. 
1.6.2. Recently, the limiting oxygen index for conveyor belts has been determ-
ined in Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United King-
dom. These tests, which are still in progress would seem to indicate that this 
procedure may also be suitable as a quality control test for conveyor belts with 
textile carcass. 
2. Proposals. 
The member states are invited to see that either the Barthel Burner or the 
Limiting Oxygen Index test or preferably both, be introduced on an experimental 
basis for quality control purposes. This shall supplement and not replace any ar-
rangements which already exist. Experience of the two methods of quality con-
trol is to be evaluated in the three years following the approval of this document. 
2.1. Tests instructions. 
The tests should be carried out in accordance with the attached instruc-
tions, Annexe I and Annex II of this document. 283 
2.2. Reference values. 
When the sample of a new type of conveyor belt is submitted to a testing 
station for type approval testing, the conveyor belt should also be submitted to 
the Barthel Burner Test and/or the Limiting Oxygen Index Test. The results may 
be taken as the reference value for the check testing purposes for this type of con-
veyor belt. 
2.3. Check testing procedures. 
2.3.1. Prior to the use of a belt underground, users should ensure that as far as 
possible a check test (in accordance with Annexe I and/or II) should be comple-
ted on at least one sample per delivery or production batch. 
2.3.2. The results of the quality control tests should be recorded by the parties 
conducting the test and should be forwarded to the testing stations responsible 
for type testing. The latter will submit summaries of the data to the Committee 
of Experts at regular intervals. 
2.4. Assessment. 
The fire resistant properties of a conveyor belt ready for shipment to the 
mine may be considered similar to those of the specimens submitted for the type 
approval test when the results of the quality control tests are not generally differ-
ent from the reference value. What variations from the reference value are accep-
table can only be determined after a statistical evaluation of the results of these 
tests. 
Until then, it is left to the discretion of the testing institutes to determine 
the siye of the permissable variances from the reference values in the light of the 
spread of individual results. 
Objectives. 
If the results of the trials are positive, a decision will be taken on the me-
thods and values to be proposed for check testing the fire resistance of conveyor 
belts. 
4. This report was adopted by the Working Party on "Rescue Arrangements 
Mine Fires, and Underground Combustions" on 31st January 1978 after consult-
ing with representatives of the manufacturers of conveyor belts in the various 
member states. 
The Working Party sends this report to the Mines Safety and Health Com-
mission suggesting that it accepts the proposals set out in Item 2 above. 
Note : Texts of check testing can be obtained at the Secretariat under doc. 1479/8/77 efdindk. 285 
ANNEX VII 
PROPOSAL TO GOVERNMENTS 
concerning 
THE HARMONISATION AND APPLICATION OF SAFETY SIGNS AT WORK 
IN COAL MINES 
(Adopted by 
the SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION FOR THE MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
on theïst of december 1978 
in accordance with Article 1 of its terms of reference 
and follow up in accordance with art. 4 of those terms). 
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PROPOSAL TO GOVERNMENTS 
concerning 
THE HARMONISATION AND APPLICATION OF SAFETY SIGNS AT WORK 
IN COAL MINES 
(Adopted by 
the SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION FOR THE MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
on theïst of december 1978 
in accordance with Article 1 of its terms of reference 
and follow up in accordance with art. 4 of those terms). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The Commission proposed to the Council of Ministers of the European Community 
and it adopted a Directive on the approximation of the laws regulations and adminis-
trative provisions of member states relating to Safety Signs at places of work. 
1.2. Following requests from various organisations and certain delegations of the coal 
industries, the Consultative Committee of the European Coal and Steel Commission 
asked that the advice of the Safety and Health Commission for the Mining and 
Extractive Industries be sought concerning the question of the draft directive. 
1.3. In response to these requests, and believing that this directive could not be applied in 
total to the mines and other extractive industries coming within its terms of referen-
ce, the Safety and Health Commission for the Mining and Extractive Industries asked 
the Commission of the European Communities to exclude the coal mines and other 
extractive industries within its competance from the provisions of the directive ; 
at the same time, it promised to try to propose to governments, in accordance with 
Articles 1 and 4 of its Terms of reference, an appropriate harmonised document for 
signs in these industries as soon as possible and not more than 18 months later. 
1.4. On 25th July 1977, the Council of Ministers of the European Communities adopted 
the Directive and excluded coal mines from its application. 
(See paragraph 2 c of Art. 1 of 77¡57 6/EEC). 
1.5. In accordance with its promise, the Safety and Health Commission for the Mining 
and Extractive Industries asked a group of experts to prepare a proposal based as far 
as possible on the Council Directive, and respecting those principles which are indica-
ted in paragraph 3 of that text. 288 
1.6. Resulting from technical progress and future de^lopments, the list of harmonised 
signs will require up-dating by the addition of new signs from time to time. Provi-
sions for dealing with this aspect are contained in paragraph 4. 
2. APPLICATION 
2.1. The proposals in this document shall apply to all coal mines. 
2.2. These proposals shall come into force for the buying of new signs, two years after the 
adoption of the document by the Safety and Health Commission for the Mining and 
Extractive Industries, and it will be fully implemented within six years of its 
adoption. 
3. SYSTEM OF SAFETY SIGNS 
3.1. DEFINITIONS 
(a) A system of safety signs, 
means a system of signs referring to a specific object or situation and providing 
information by means of a safety colour or sign. 
(b) A safety colour, 
means a colour to which a specific meaning relative to safety has been assigned. 
(c) A contrasting colour, 
means a colour contrasting with the safety colour of the sign, which provides 
additional information. 
(d) A safety sign, 
means a sign combining geometrical shape, colour and symbol to provide spe-
cific safety information. 
(e) A prohibition sign, 
means a sign prohibiting behaviour likely to cause danger. 
(f) A warning sign, 
means a safety sign giving warning of a hazard. 
(g) A mandatory sign, 
means a safety sign prescribing a specific obligation. 
(h) An emergency sign, 
means a safety sign indicating, in the event of danger an emergency exit, the way 
to an emergency installation or the location of a rescue appliance. 289 
(i) An information sign, 
means a safety sign providing safety information other than that referred to in 
the points (e) to (h). 
(j) An additional sign, 
means a safety sign used only in conjunction with one of the safety signs refer-
red to in points (e) to (h) and providing additional information. 
(k) A symbol, 
means a pictoral representation, describing a specific situation, used on one of 
the safety signs referred to in points (e) to (h). 
3.2. THE MEANING AND USE OF SAFETY SIGNS 
The meaning and use of safety signs and contrast colours and the shape and design, 
and the meaning of the safety signs shall be as defined in Annex I. 
3.3. PRINCIPLES 
The competant authorities in Member States shall take all necessary measures to 
ensure that : 
Safety signs at all coal mines conform to the principles laid down in Annex I; 
To provide the information specified in Annex II only those safety signs defined 
in that Annex shall be used to indicate dangerous situations, listed therein. 
Road traffic signs in force are used to regulate internal works traffic. 
4. AMENDMENTS 
On the request of a delegation of a Member State or in the case of a modification to 
the Directive of the Council of Ministers dated 25th July 1977 (on the approximation 
of the laws regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating 
to the provision of safety signs at places of work (77/576/EEC), or to take account of 
technical progress, the Mines Safety and Health Commission will examine modifica-
tions proposed and will determine the procedure to be followed. 
ADOPTION 
Adopted by the Safety and Health Commission for the Mining and Extractive Indus-
tries in accordance with Article 1 of its terms of reference as a proposal to be sent to 
Governments for the improvement of safety and health in coal mines, on 1st decem-
ber 1978. 190 
ANNEX 1 
Basic principles of the system of safety signs 
1. GENERAL 
1.1. The objective of the system of safety signs is to draw attention rapidly and 
unambiguously to objects and situations capable of causing specific hazards. 
1.2. Under no circumstances is the system of safety signs a substitute for the requisite 
protective measures. 
1.3. The system of safety signs may be used only to give information related to safety. 
1.4. The effectiveness of the system of safety signs is dependent in particular on the 
provision of full and constantly repeated information to all persons likely to benefit 
therefrom. 
2. SAFETY COLOURS AND CONTRASTING COLOURS 
2.1. Meaning of safety colours 
Table 1 
Safety colour 
Red 
Yellow 
Green 
Blue (') 
Meaning or purpose 
Stop 
Prohibition 
Examples of use 
Stop signs 
Emergency shutdown devices 
Prohibition signs 
This colour is also used to identify fire-fighting equipment. 
Caution! 
Possible danger 
No danger 
First aid 
Mandatory signs 
Information 
Identification of dangers (fire, explosion 
radiation, chemical hazards, etc.) 
Identification of steps, dangerous pas-
sages, obstacles 
Identification of emergency 
routes and emergency exits 
Safety showers 
First aid stations and rescue points 
Obligation to wear individual safet) 
equipment 
Location of telephone 
i
1) Counts as a safety colour only when used in conjunction with a symbol or words on a mandator) 
sign or information sign bearing instructions relating to technical prevention. 
2.2. Contrasting colours and symbol colours 
Table 2 
Safety colour 
Red 
Yellow 
Green 
Blue 
Contrasting colour 
White 
Black 
White 
White 
Symbol colour 
Black 
Black 
White 
White 29] 
3. GEOMETRICAL FORM AND MEANING OF SAFETY SIGNS 
Table 3 
Geometricai form 
O 
Δ 
D 
Meaning 
Mandatory and prohibition signs 
Warning signs 
Emergency, information and additional signs 
4. COMBINATIONS OF SHAPES AND COLOURS AND THEIR MEANINGS FOR SIGNS 
Table 4 
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;Red 
> Yellow 
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! Green 
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Blue 
! 
Ship«  O 
Prohibition 
Mandatory 
Λ 
Caution, possible 
danger 
Fire-fighting equipment 
No danger 
Rescue equipment 
Information or instruction 
5. DESIGN OF SAFETY SIGNS 
5.1. Prohibition signs 
Background: white; lymbol or wording: black. 
The lafety colour red mutt appear around the edge and in a traniyer·« bar and muit 
cover at leut 35 % of the surface of the sign. 292 
5.2. Warning, mandatory, emergency and information signs 
Background: safety colour; symbol or wording: contrasting colour. 
A yellow triangle must have a black edge. The safety colour must cover at least 50 % 
of the surface of the sign. 
5.3. Additional signs 
Background: white; wording: black; 
or 
background: safety colour; wording: contrasting colour. 
5.4. Symbols 
The design must be as simple as possible and details not essential to comprehension 
must be left out. 
6. YELLOW/BLACK DANGER IDENTIFICATION 
Identification of permanent risk locations such 
as: 
— locations where there is a risk of collision, 
falling, stumbling or of falling loads, 
(Proportion of safety colour at least 50 %) — steps, holes in floors, etc. 
7. SPECIAL SIGNS 
7.1. In the United Kingdom the principles set out in Tables 1 and 2 of Annex I are 
respected ; however there are two exceptions as follows : 
7.1.1. Safety Signs which are used to indicate the situation o firefighting equipment are 
coloured green with symbol or contrast coulour, white. 
7.1.2. A mandatory sign is a specific obligation on persons to take a positive action ; the 
colour red is used. (Thus the signs listed in Annex II, point 3, are white on a red 
background). 
7.2. The exceptions have been sought by the U.K. in order to simplify the system of sa-
fety signs in use in that country and the desire to use the colour RED for all signs 
which impose an obligation on persons to do or not to do a particular action pre-
cribed in a sign. 
A total of seven harmonised types of signs are affected. In all other projects the 
signs conform to the shapes and designs illustrated. 293 
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SÆRLIG SIKKERHEDSSKILTNING — BESONDERE SICHERHEITSKENNZEICHNUNG — SPECIAL SYSTEM OF 
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1. Forbudstavler — Verbotszeichen — Prohibition signs — Signaux d'interdiction — Segnali di divieto — Verbodssignalen 
¿m* 
=;:!■'*::!! III,,,. 
a) Æ»  κ 
>
:!:!::!¡¡  lil,/ 
m 
■Sjiij:  f 
■
::¡»ffii:, ,f-if 
'«lili 
b) 
¡lililí  .áãÊÊÈKÈi 
Rygning forbudt 
Rauchen verboten 
No smoking 
Défense de fumer 
Vietato fumare 
Verboden te roken 
Rygning og åben ild forbudt 
Feuer, offenes Licht und Rauchen ver-
boten 
Smoking and naked flames forbidden 
Flamme nue interdite et défense de fumer 
Vietato fumare o usare fiamme libere 
Vuur, open vlam en roken verboden 
Ingen adgang for fodgængere 
Für Fußgänger verboten 
Pedestrians forbidden 
Interdit aux piétons 
Vietato ai pedoni 
Verboden voor voetgangers 
d) 
Sluk ikke med vand 
Verbot, mit Wasser zu löschen 
Do not extinguish with water 
Défense d'éteindre avec de l'eau 
Divieto di spegnere con acqua 
Verboden met water te blussen 
Ikke drikkevand 
Kein Trinkwasser 
Not drinkable 
Eau non potable 
Acqua non potabile 
Geen drinkwater 
Mitnahme von Rauchwaren, 
Feurzeuge und Streichhölzer verboten 
No smoking materials, 
lighters or matches 
interdit d'avoir sur soi 
tous produits pour fumer 294 
2. Advarselstavler — Warnzeichen — Warning signs — Signaux d'avertissement — Segnali di avvertimento 
schuwingssignalen 
Waar-
Brandfarlige stoffer 
Warnung vor feuergefährlichen 
Stoffen 
Flammable matter 
Matières inflammables 
Materiale infiammabile 
Ontvlambare stoffen 
Eksplosionsfarlige stoffer 
Warnung vor explosionsgefährlichen 
Stoffen 
Explosive matter 
Matières explosives 
Materiale esplosivo 
Explosieve Stoffen 
Giftige stoffer 
Warnung vor giftigen Stoffen 
Toxic matter 
Matières toxiques 
Sostanze velenose 
Giftige stoffen 
Ætsende stoffer 
Warnung vor ätzenden Stoffen 
Corrosive matter 
Matières corrosives 
Sostanze corrosive 
Bijtende stoffen 
Ioniserende straling 
Radioaktivitet/Røntgenstråling 
Warnung vor radioaktiven Stoffen oder 
ionsisierenden Strahlen 
Radioactive matter 
Matières radioactives 
Radiazioni pericolose 
Radioactieve stoffen 
Kran i arbejde 
Warnung vor schwebender Last 
Beware, overhead load 
Charges suspendues 
Attenzione ai carichi sospesi 
Hangende lasten 
Pas på korende transport 
Warnung vor Flurförderzeugen 
Beware, industrial trucks 
Chariots de manutention 
Carrelli di movimentazione 
Transportvoertuigen 
Farlig elektrisk spænding 
Warnung vor gefährlicher elektrischer 
Spannung 
Danger: electricity 
Danger électrique 
Tensione elettrica pericolosa 
Gevaar voor elektrische spanning 
Giv agt 
Warnung vor einer Gefahrenstelle 
General danger 
Danger général 
Pericolo generico 
Gevaar 295 
j) Mouving machiniery 
Mécanisme en mouvement 
k) Locomotives moving wagons 
Locomotive, locomotracteur, wagons 
en mouvement 
1) Warning Laser 
Attention Laser 
Vorsicht Laserstrahl 296 
3. Påbudstavler — Gebotszeichen — Mandatory signs — Signaux d'obligation 
signalen 
— Segnali di prescrizione — Gebods-
b) 
Øjenværn påbudt 
Augenschutz tragen 
Eye protection must be worn 
Protection obligatoire de la vue 
Protezione degli occhi 
Pogbescherming verplicht 
Hovedværn påbudt 
Schutzhelm tragen 
Safety helmet must be worn 
Protection obligatoire de la tête 
Casco di protezione 
Veiligheidshelm verplicht 
Høreværn påbudt 
Gehörschutz tragen 
Ear protection must be worn 
Protection obligatoire de l'ouïe 
Protezione dell'udito 
Gehoorbescherming verplicht 
d) 
Åndedrætsværn påbudt 
Atemschutz tragen 
Respiratory equipment must be used 
Protection obligatoire des voies respira-
toires 
Protezione vie respiratorie 
Adembescherming verplicht 
Fodværn påbudt 
Schutzschuhe tragen 
Safety boots must be worn 
Protection obligatoire des pieds 
Calzature di sicurezza 
Veiligheidsschoenen verplicht 
Beskyttelseshandsker påbudt 
Schutzhandschuhe tragen 
Safety gloves must be worn 
Protection obligatoire des mains 
Guanti di protezione 
Veiligheidshandschoenen verplicht 
g) hupen 
sound your hooter 
avertissez 297 
4. Redningstavler -*- Rettungszeichen  Emergency signs — Signaux de sauvetage — Segnali di salvataggio — Reddings-
signalen 
a) 
Førstehjælp 
Hinweis auf „Erste Hilfe" 
First aid post 
Poste premiers secours 
Pronto soccorso 
Eerste hulp-post 
b) 
eller/oder/or/ou/o/of 
d) 
Retmngsangivelse til nødudgang 
Fluchtweg (Richtungsangabe für Flucht-
weg) 
Emergency exit to the left 
Issue da secours vers la gauche 
Uscirà d'emergenza a sinistra 
Nooduitgang naar links 
Nødudgang 
(anbringes over udgangen) 
Fluchtweg 
(über dem Fluchtausgang anzubringen) 
Emergency exit 
(to be placed above the exit) 
Sortie de secours 
(à placer au-dessus de la sortie) 
Uscita d'emergenza 
(da collocare sopra l'uscita) 
Nooduitgang 
(te plaatsen boven de uitgang) 299 
ANNEX VIII 
CONSTRUCTION OF GATESIDE PACKS 
FOR LONGWALL FACES 
Report established by an editorial Committee 
discussed and approved by the Working Party 
on Strata Control on 21.11.78 
and adopted by the M.S.HC. on 27th March 1979, 
as an information report to be sent to Inspectorates, Management 
and other interested parties in accordance with Art. 3 and 6 of the Terms ofReference of the M.S. H.C. 
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CONSTRUCTION OF GATESIDE PACKS OF LONGWALL FACES 
INTRODUCTION 
1. GENERALITIES 
1.1. Studies of the frequency of accidents occuring in European Coal Mines by loca-
tion, show that the zones in which gate roads are formed and the junction bet-
ween the face and the gate are areas of high risk. 
1.2. This apart, the largest category of accident in European Coal Mines is now haulage 
and transport. Many of these accidents are known to occur in gate roads outbye 
of the face. To reduce the frequency of accidents occuring here, it is desirable to 
create the best possible travelling and working conditions in these roadways by 
reducing roadway deformation to the minimum to allow free movement of men, 
material and coal. Fringe benefits arise from improved ventilation and lower fire 
risks in clear and tidy roadways. 
1.3. From both the economic and safety standpoints it is desirable to avoid the need 
to repair gate roads for these constitute a large proportion of the total length of 
roadway in use in many mines. 
1.4. Apart from the natural strength of the rocks adjacent to the seam there are a 
large number of other factors which affect the actual strength of the strata in 
which the gate road and the face gate junction are constructed ; some of these 
factors also affect the pressure on the roadway outbye of the face. Examples are 
given below. 302 
1.4.1. The placement of roadways, particularly with relation to stressed or desstressed 
zones caused by over and underlying workings may affect roadway conditions. 
1.4.2. The position of the formation of the roadway relative to the face: normally 
roadways formed behind the face are subject to less convergence than those created 
in advance of the face. 
1.4.3. The method of formation of the roadway: In general the cutting out of the roadway 
profile by machine causes less destruction of the natural strength of the strata 
than shotfiring and gives a better profile to which supports can be set, thus 
reducing the point loading on arches, bars or lagging. 
1.5. Some of the general aspects referred to above and methods of strengthening stata by 
bolting etc. have been studied by the Working Party on Strata Control and Stability 
of Ground. The following papers are available from the Secretariat of the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission. 
2751/74 Experiences with roadhead systems on advancing faces in the 
South Midlands Area of the National Coal Board. 
76I/77 Support in Narrow Workings in the S„ Midlands and S0Notts. Areas 
of the National Coal Board 
I6I2/3/75 Strata Reinforcement by Bolting, Dowelling and Injection 
Techniques 
I462/5/77 The view of the Mines Safety and Health Commission on the 
question of Strata Reinforcement by Bolting, Dowelling and Injection. 
These factors are outside the scope of the present paper which dealB with methods 
of packing. In due course a paper will follow on planning aspects to be taken 
into account when considering the location of roadways and the method of forming 
roadways to be used in practice. 
1.6. Having optimised the natural strength of this strata by taking account of the 
above factors and any local conditions appertaining, attention to the method of 
building the gateside pack remains, probably one of the best ways of reducing accident 
in the roadhead/face/gate junction area, and reducing roadway deformation behind 
faces. 303 
1.7. The following report summarises the advantages and disavantages of the various 
methods of building packs, and from this it should be possible to draw up 
certain recommendations for the improvement of both general conditions« in mines, 
and specifically improvements in the roadhead area of longwall faces. 
2. General Remarks on Packing Systems 
2.1. With most methods of constructing gateside packs persons have to approach 
or enter the pack-hole and in this position they may be behind the 
general breaking off line of the waste. It is important that proper consideration 
should be given to methods of increasing the stability of support in this area, 
either by the construction of the pack in front of the general breaking off line, 
or by the use of special supports designed to prevent falls occurring in the pack 
hole, 
2.2. In general the method of building a gateside pack should be aiuch as to reduce 
the risk of persons being injured either by falls of roof in the pack-hole 
or adjacent thereto and to risks from the use of materials or tools. 
2.3. Por any given situation the method of building the pack should take into account 
the desirable length of the pack, its strengthtthe distance of the completed 
pack from the face and its rapid placement. 
2.4. The strength of the pack should, wherever possible be adjustable to give minimum 
roadway deformation behind the face. 
3. The Classification of packing systems 
3.1. The gateside packing systems in use in European Coal Mines can conveniently be 
divided by the origin of the material from which the pack is built, and by the 
method of placing the material. 
3.1.1. by the origin of the packing material 
3.1.1.1. Indigenous material (stone or coal coming from the face or the creation 
of the roadway) 
3.1.1.2. Inported material (natural or synthetic) 304 
3.1.2. by the method of placement of the packing material 
3.1.2.1. placed by hand 
3.1.2.2. placed by mechanical means 
3.1.2.3. placed hydraulically or pneumatically 
following this classification there are six methods of packing normally 
available. The advantages and disavantages of each of these methods is considered 
in the next three parts of the report, which are based on information derived 
from the main coal mining countries of -che European Community. 
4. Hand Packing methods 
4.1. The proportion of the total number of gate roads in which packs are constructed 
by hand varies throughout the various member states. A fairly detailed breakdown 
for the United Kingdom suggests that about 00% of the roads where packing is 
practised (nearly 1 000 out of 1,250) are hand packed. Of these some three quarters 
use indigenous material and the balance use imported material (either 
concrete blocks or wood). It is believed that in Germany, a rather lower proportion 
of the gates are packed by hand. In Prance and in Belgium, hand methods still predo-
minate, though mostly using imported material. 
4.2. Since men must enter the pack-hole to construct the pack and so expose themselves 
to the danger of falls in this area, it is extremely important with this technique 
that wherever possible the pack is built in advance of the general breaking off line 
of the waste, and that the pack-hole is well supported. In the latter case, the use 
of powered supports either with powered rear facing-¡cantilevers, or of telescopic 
length, is one way of ensuring a greater degree of stability in this area. In one 
country, the use of a tandem or buttress chock is sometimes advocated to prevent 
the risk of the general caving of the waste extending into the pack-hole where 
men may be working. 
4.3. A disadvantage of the method as compared with mechanised means of placing the pack 
is that it is impossible, de facto, to remove the men from this area. On the other 
hand, they are not exposed to any of the risks associated with the use of dirt 
moving equipment. 305 
4.4. Hand Packing using indigenous material 
4.4.1. This method is still widely used in the United Kingdom; it is less common in other 
member states of the Community. The material has to be broken into an acceptable 
size by shotfiring or mechanical means. Sometimes, especially, in thick seams, 
there are insufficient stones for the building of the pack walls, and for this, fine 
material has to be bagged in paper, hessian or wire-mesh sacks. 
4.4.2. By comparison with mechanised means of pack construction, the method is slow 
and the resultant pack has a very variable performance, largely dependent on the 
quality of workmanship and the stone available. These factors may be difficult 
to control. However, the lower strength can be valuable with certain roof conditions 
where it is necessary to allow the roof or floor beds to move to destress th.* gate. 
4.4.3. The work involved in the construction of the pack is difficult and arduoUjs especially 
in thin seams. Ti:e resultant cost per metre of packed space, is probably higher 
than for a similar pack of^imported material. Equally this system is slow and arduous 
in thick seams. 
4.4.4. Also this system of packing has the disavantage of producing a gateside pack 
which is previous to air which, if there is either roof coal or an appreciable 
coal content in the pack itself, may give rise to spontaneous combustion either in 
the gateside pack itself or in the neighbouring strata. The difficulty can be 
overcome by plaster injection into or onto the pack, but at additional cost. 
4.4.5. With very rapidly moving faces, it is difficult to keep up with the face advance. 
4.4.6. On the other hand, there are no capital costs for equipment, and the ripping 
dirt is kept within the mine. There is a lower risk of transport accidents 
arising as compared with where imported material is used. 
4.4.7. In summary, modern technology seems to offer better alternatives in the majority 
of circumstances. 306 
4.5. Hand Packing with imported materials 
4.5.1. The imported materials for packing are generally either hard or soft wood or 
concrete blocks. With soft wood a longer pack is frequently built and the cribs 
formed may be filled with stone. They possess a measure of yield which may 
be valuable under a pliable roof or with a soft floor. Hardwood chocks give 
a higher resistance for any given area but the chocks are normally smaller 
and consequently are better suited to the more resistant strata. 
4.5.2. The use of imported wood enables hand packing to be speedily completed to a fairly 
well assured standard. However it has a serious dissadvantage in that it permits 
air to pass through the waste and this may give rise to spontaneous heating parti-
cularly near to faults or air crossings etc. and it should never be used without 
special precautions in seams liable to spontaneous combustion. Under such circumstances 
it is necessary to seal the gateside pack either with plaster or foam of a fire 
resistant type. Both processes are costly. 
4.5.3- The alternative system of using concrete blocks has certain advantages. In particular 
it allows a pack of known resistance, to be constructed quickly and economically. 
Such packs are not liable to cause spontaneous combustion, either in or close to 
the pack, or in the waste. When.crossing faults, it is relatively easy to seal 
the pack completely, against air leakage by facing witii gypsum plasters or by 
injection. 
4.5.4. Tests with concrete blocks have generally shown that aerated concrete is both 
cheaper and better than solid concrete. The resistance of a solid concrete block 
is frequently lost as soon as it breaks; it is heavy and costly to transport 
and place; packs of this material tend to break either the roof or floor beds. 
The aerated block can be manufactured to give the desired strength and amount of 
yield; they are virtually impervious to air oncefaced with gypsum plaster, 
4.5·5· Both hand packing· wita imported wood and with imported concrete pose a serious 
disadvantage from the safety standpoint: they create a transport requirement 
which does not occur with indigenous material and hence an additional risk of 
accident. However the improved roadway conditions which frequently result from the 
use of a more homogeneous and reliable material in t..e pack, may more than offset 
this additional risk. Already transport occurs in these roadways for men, materials 
and sometimes coal, but the packing material does increase t. e load on these 
facilities. 307 
5. Mechanical methods of placing packing material 
5.1. The mechanical methods of placing packing materials in the packs of gates 
of longwall-faces, almost invariably use indigenous material. They account 
for some 20$ of the gateside pack installations in one country (the U.K.). 
Of 261 installations in March 1978, 
115 were slushers 
19 were Webster packers 
26 were Cam packers 
10 were Dowty ripping tables 
French and Belgian experience of application of these techniques 
again shows the preponderence of the established technique of slushing. 
It is convenient to deal with these systems in three main groups, Slushers, Blade 
Packers and Ram Packers. Previous systems using high speed belts for the 
discharge of material into the waste have now largely been superceded. 
5.2. Slushers 
5.2.1. For slushing to be successful, the ripping dirt must be well fragmented by either 
the shotfiring or the mechanical ripper. Large stones present serious problems 
and result in many stoppages. 
5.2.2. The second requirement for successful slushing is the careful preparation of the 
pack-hole, which must be straight and well supported. It can be argued that the 
return wheel should be securely anchored to a rear extension of a powered support 
or remotely controlled hydraulic chock. 
5.2.3. The method has the advantage that it can deal with virtually all the dirt 
produced from quite sizeable rippings in thin seams very quickly. (I5 to 20 tons 
per hour in packs up to 35 ni. long). 
5.2.4. It has the disavantages of the pack being (a) further from the face than with 
certain alternative systems and hence allowing greater convergence of the roof 
beds before placement of the pack (*,) erratic pack quality which is dependant 
on the two factors listed in 5.2.1. and 5.2.2. and (c) exposing personnel to risks 
associated with the movement of the bucket and ropes in confined spaces and 
haulage drums. Notwithstanding this, it finds considerable application in thin seams 
where the coal from the face must not be contaminated with free mine dirt. It is 
thought to be less effective than other methods in the thicker seams 
(more than I/2 metres). 308 
5.2.5. líever-the-less properly applied,packing can be economically and safely completed 
with less physical effort than by hand means, and less risk. 
5.3. Blade Packers (The Webster system) 
5.3.1. This system consists of a blade drawn along the waste side of the powered 
supports by a continuous chain driven by a hydraulic piston 
motor attached to the gobside of the support at the waste end of the pack 
(a photograph is attached). 
5.3.2. Like the slusher packer, the dirt must be carefully graded, and the pack-hole 
maintained straight. This is best done behind modified powered supports with 
rearward facing cantilever roof "beams (see photograph). 
5.3.3. The system has certain advantages over the simpler slushing system 
a) it has a higher capacity at up to 50 tons per hour. 
b) it can cope with a rather wider range of seam thicknesses from 
1 metre to 2,5 metres high. 
c) the dangers associated with ropes, drums and return wheels are largely 
eliminated. 
5.3.4. I"t has the disadvantage that it can as yet only deal with packing on one side of 
the gate and has only rarely been applied to main gates,(In the U.K. 
some 25$ of gates still have packs on two sides for one reason or another) „ 
5.3.5· In general, t :is seems a more refined alternative to slushing and its development 
appears to merit encouragement. 
5.4. Ram Packers (a) Cam Packers 
5.4.1. This system can only be used in conjunction with powered supports which extend 
albng the face right up to the gate side. It consists basically oí' a series 
of cams fitted to the rear legs of the powered supports and operated through 
a turning angle of 90° by integral hydraulic rams. The bore of the ram is 114 "im 
giving a maximum tip force of 6.9. tonnes when operated at a pressure of 15.2 IJPa. 
The cams are arranged in odd and even units, which are separately controlled by 
two valves, and operate sequentially to move the dirt along the face, the cams can 
be either floor or roof mounted on the supports. 309 
5.4.2. The system has the advantage that it can work on both sides of the gate 
with either sitôt fire d or machine cut dirt. There must be a good dirt 
feed to the first cam, but once this has been achieved, packing dirt 
movement and placement is good. 
5.4.3. Its greatest application is in the thinner seams (below 2 metres) but like 
some systems described previously it tends to increase the distance between 
the pack and the face, 
b) Douty Parking Table 
5.4.4. Another system of mechanical packing particularly well suited to the thicker 
seams is t at described in the following note. 
Broadly the same consideration apply to this as to the Cam packers, 
5.4.5. Pouty Packing Table 
The Powty Packing Table is a ripping platform with drawers which move 
debris on "the table onto either side and then ram it into the pack-hole 
up to a distance of 4.5. m. The platform consists of a trough section containing 
the top and bottom drawers and a hinged table section which can be elevated through 
90
o feeding the debris on it forward into the drawers. The bottom drawer is usually 
double telescopic giving an overall stroke of 2.2 m and a thrust of 12,700 kg at 
13.δ MPa. On each side of the trough are mounted a pair of hydraulic legs 
and a roof beam which stake the unit against the lateral forces generated in 
packing and also assist in the control of roadway sides at the packhole entrance. 
A 4.5 m pack can be placed in 25 minutes at a rate of 35 tonnes per hour. The table 
is best operated in conjunction v/ith roadhead powered supports capable of suppor-
ting te ripping lip in cantilever. Access to t e face is inevitably limited 
because of t e size of t e table. The table is best operated in sections greater 
than 1.75 ™ and has been seen to give good pack consolidation, 310 
5.6. Overall, mechanical packing offers one solution to the problem of speedily 
constructing a pack, whose resistance can be assured in advance, without 
resort to costly and arduous hand work. With the exception of slushing the 
system can be remotely operated from a position of safety on the face under 
powered supports. 
By the proper choice of system to suit the seam thickness (e.g. slushing forthin 
seams, cam packers for medium seams and ram packers and packing tables for 
the thicker seams) virtually all the ripping dirt can be absorbed allowing 
a cleaner coal to be sent from the face. 
No water is used other than for dust suppression; this is frequently an impor-
tant factor when working an a soft fireclay floor which will soften markedly 
and subsequently lift to cause dinting to be necessary outbye of the face 
if free water is left on the floor. 
All systems require careful dirt preparation, and straight pack-holes. 
The use of slushing generally results in the completed pack being further 
from t lie face t ..an other systems. 
The entry onto and exit from the face are encumbered by rather large 
equipment, and there is a.capital cost to be found and equipment to be 
serviced. 
5o?. In summary, the correct choice of system for the conditions and attention 
to the above details should result in "improvedworking conditions at the 
face, and better roadway conditions outbye. Further trial applications of 
the more modern systems under a wide range of conditions are required. A better 
system to replace slushing for the thinner seams, avoiding the need for 
persons to enter the dirt morement track, is desireable. 
6. Hydraulic and pneumatic stowing 
6.1. Whilst both these processes have been known and used for a considerable 
time as a method of controlling roof bed moven.ent on the main parts of long-
wall faces, their application to the construction of a gateside pack is re-
latively recent. There are a number of differences in the method for general 
application and gateside application. 311 
ó.2. In particular, the gateside pack has only a short length and must be 
self supporting at its sides. It is therefore usual to add setting agents 
to either the stone or raw coal used to construct the pack. These are 
generally in the form of cement or cement-bentonite mixtures, t-ough 
in Germany, there is widespread use of anhydrite and anhydrite—flyash mixtures. 
6.3. Hydraulic or pump packing systems 
6.3.1. Screened run of mine coal, or dirt from a conventional ripping lip is normally 
carried a short distance outbye to a mixing station by a variable speed, 
narrow cain conveyor. Here water and a floxij agent such as bentonite are added, 
and the mixture is pumped back to the face. Just before the material is 
emitted from the pipe, a setting agent is added to form a quick setting grout 
which is pumped into a shuttered area behind the face supports. The dirt 
or coal has normally to be screened to less than 25 mm in size. A pack can be 
pia (Æd in 30 minutes and the shuttering removed in 45 minutes after termination 
of the packing. 
6.3.2. The great advantage of this systems is that it utilizes material directly 
available on sits, "With the proper control of the process it is speedy, and 
constructs a pack of fairly well determined but regulateable compressive 
strength. 
6.3.3. Water control and mixture control is difficult, and with certain types 
of setting agent, protective clothing has to be worn. 
6.3.4. The biggest single disadvantage of the system is that the frequent spillage 
of water on the floor of the gate road may cause increased floor lift with 
seams where the underlying beds contain appreciable amounts of fireclay. 
6.3.5. Anhydrite based systems are usually largely compressed air fed systems, 
where water is added at the point of emission. In Germany, where the 
system has been applied for a number of years, it is frequently the practice 
to use no dirt from either the ripping or the advanced head, and to stow 
in solidly all timber props used for the support of the pack-hole. Hessian cloth 
taclced to the wood props is used to contain the pack. Consequently the amount 
of water used is much less, and the system may be better suited to the fireclay 
floor conditions associated with some seams. 312 
Centralised and long distance dirt feed systems have been developed, 
(some applying fly ash from the surface and transporting threugh pipes 
for up to 4 km). 
6.-}>.6. Again, such systems permit a pack to be built safely, speedily and with 
a known but regulateable compressure strength. The disadvantage of the 
anhydrite system is that normally dirt from the ripping or advance heading 
contaminates the coal produced, as it has to be sent out of the mine, 
6.4. Pncumat i c stowing 
6.4.1. Both low and high pressure stowing units have been utilized for the construc-
tion of gateside packs (0,5-lbar and 5-6 bars), largely dependant on whether 
compressed air is widely available in the mine; low pressure units being 
generally used where there are no high pressure air lines for general appli-
cation in the mine. 
6.4.2. In the high pressure system, screened or crus ed dirt is sent to a stowing 
mac ine supplied with compressed air from the normal mine range. 0,26 m 
diameter pipes are used to deliver the dirt into the pack-hole. 
6.4.3. The system is particularly suited to faces where advanced heading is used 
and in seams 1 to 1/2 m thick. Pack quality is good, and if the pipe handling 
is properly mechanised there is little risk of injury either in the handling 
of pipes, or from falls of roof. 
6.4.4. The low pressure system uses a compressor located close to the similar 
stower unit to the high pressure system. T^e dirt is blown to the face 
through 300 mm pipes. Graded or crushed dirt must be used. 
6.4.5. A good quality pack can be built, at the rate of 20 to 40 tonnes per hour, 
but dust and noise have been a problem. 
6.4.6. Both systems have proved to be effective, though pipe-handling is something 
which requires to be mechanised and so arranged that there is no need for person 
to enter the stowing trade. For this purpose, systems using pipes attached 
to the rear of powered supports merit serious investigation. Dust problems 
should be overcome by adding water to the dirt on entry to the stowing 
machine. 
6.5. Annex I includes data submitted by the German delegation on the pneumatic and 
hydraulic systems of constructing gateside packs in that country, where they 
have been widely used 
Annex II contains useful comparative information in tabular form. 313 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. A number of systems exist for the rapid placement of packs alongside the gates 
of longwall faces. These systems can result in improved safety for men working 
to construct the pack, and at the face/roadway junction, due to the improved 
support of the area as compared with earlier hand packing methods, using indi-
genous material. 
7.2. The use of imported packing material for hand packing may result in much impro-
ved conditions in roadways outbye of the face; this improvement in mine condi-
tions, may more than off-set the increased load on materials transport systems, 
and the risks to persons involved with that transport. The use of xvood in 
gateside packs in any area liable to spontaneous heating, should be avoided. 
7.3. The three mechanical systems of packing indigenous dirt merit further appli-
cation and investigation, particularly when they are used in conjunction with 
powered supports adjacent to the pack area. They have the advantage of placing 
a pack quickly and in safety, without the use of water which in certain seams 
may cause floor lift in the gate outbye. 
7.4. Pumped and pneumatic packing systems are ideally suited to the rapid and safe 
construction of a pack of known resistance. However the equipment can be cum-
bersome, and water loss onto soft floors can aggravate the difficulty with 
floor lift in the gate. 
7.5· Mechanical and pneumatic/hydraulic packing systems generally reduce convergence 
in roadways and the risk of spontaneous combustion in mines where this was for-
merly a problem with hand placed wood or indigenous material. If these instal-
lations are not justified, then concrete blocks placed by hand can achieve the 
same ends. The development of a. simple machine for placing such blocks from a 
position of safety is desirable. 
7.6. The Working Party sends this report to the Mines Safety and Health Commission, 
with a recommendation that it be circulated as an Information Report in accor-
dance with Article 3 of its mandate. That Commission may decide that a proposal 
be made to governments in accordance with Article 1 of its Terms of Reference, 
that further trials of the various types of mechanical and pneumatic/hydraulic 314 
systems of constructing gateside packs be completed over as wide a range of 
conditions as possible and that the results of these trials should be carefully 
recorded and summarised; these results would be useful for planning systems 
likely to improve general safety in mines. 
*»**»***** 3j5 ANNEX. 1 
NOTE FROM MR GROTOWSKY ON PNEUMATIC/HYDRAULIC PACKING 
1f Pneumatic and hydromechanical packing 
1 1 Pneumatically built packs of hydraulically binding materials 
This process is coming into increasing use in German mines. The maximum 
distance from a supply station to a discharge point is approximately 3000 m. 
However, by means of intermediate stations, supply can be made from above 
ground. Pack materials mainly consiàt of coarse-grained substances such as 
natural anhydrite, Quick Mix and Wiilfrath mortar but finer-grained materials 
suchas Stocker mortar are also used. The transport capacity, which is 
greatly dependent on the travel distance, can be up to 20 m /h. 
Since pneumatic transport requires high investment, the costs very much 
depend on the degree of utilization of the plant.. It is therefore desirable 
to supply several packs from one station. The normal pack width is 0.6 to 
0.-5 times the thickness of the. seam. ','ith the aim of saving costs and im-
proving strata control characteristics, tests have been cond.ucted with 
packs widths o ί' 0.2 to 0.4. times the seam thickness (but not less than 
0.0. m) with successful results, especially in soft rock. 
Compared with hydromechanical methods, the construction of shuttering is 
simple. Packs so built also attain higheststrengh earlier. 
However their disadvantage lie in greater dust formation and equipment wear. 
For greater seam thicknesses and cases where the caved goaf has to be made 
impermeable to air, these /rateside packs are less expensive than wooden 
chocks (1). 
Gateside packs stowed pneumatically into open shuttering have so far proved 
to have the best effect, on -"ateroad stability, compared with all other 
o 
methods. This is due to their early, high load-bearing capacity of 5000 km/m'" 
after 5 hours and the possibility of also filling roof cavities in packholes. 
This does not apply to powdery materials which have to be stowed pneumati­
cally into closed containers. As far as strata control characteristics are 
concerned, these packs should be put in the same category as wooden chocks 
because they do not join on to the roof and are not early-bearing. Two 
thirds of all -^ateside packs built in West German mines from hydraulically 
binding materials are constructed from early-bearing material stowed 
pneumatically into open shuttering. 
(1) Breer, W. und W. Götze : Saumversatz im bundesdeutschen Steinkohlen-
bergbau. Glückauf 109 (1973) pp. 1259-76. 316 
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Hydromechanically-built packs of hydraulically binding materials 
This method, which is mainly employed in German mines, but has recently 
been introduced into British mines, is applied according to one of two 
systems ; with the pumping station near the pack, or with a central station 
above ground. 
Both systems involve the construction of relatively complex, dense and 
compression-resistant shutteting with mainly fine-grained pack materials 
such as synthetic anhydride and Blitzdämmer. 
In the case where the pumping station is located in the vicinity of the 
pack, the distance to the pack can be up to 200 m. However, this distance 
can be increased by employing intermediate pumping stations. An advantage 
of this method is that the ratio of water to solid matter can be kept low, 
i.e. thicker slurry can be used. As a result, there are lower requirements 
with regard to the impermeability of the shuttering. Moreover, the setting 
period for the pack material is shorter and the load-bearing capacity higher. 
A disadvantage, however, lies in the higher costs since conventional 
transport and manual handling have to be used. 
The system incorporating the use of a central station above ground is very 
efficient. However, it has to be operated with thin slurry. Also, large 
quantities of rinsing water (up to 5 m ) are required at the face end. 
Stowing capacities of up to 25 m /h and maximum transport distances of up 
to 6000 m are possible. 
The effectiveness of these packs in terms of strata control can be compared 
with that of Ttfooden chocks. They are used for thin to medium-thick seams. 
Packs from dirt and coal fines available underground combined with imported 
binding and flow agents 
This method is called the pump packing system and is currently in use in 
British mines only. Screened ROM dirt and coal fines are stirred into a 
thick slurry with the addition of 2 yb Bentonite, which acts as a flow agent. 
The slurry, which can be pumped over a distance of I5OO m, can remain in the 
line for six months without separation occuring. 
Immediately prior to the coal-dirt mixture being poured out of the pipe and 
into thepack shuttering, the cement suspension is fed into it via a mixing 
nozzle. 317 
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The cement suspension is prepared in one of the two gateroads of a face from 
cement supplied in sacks. The mixer for the cement suspension is located a 
maximum of 200 m from the face. With the addition of a setting agent, the 
cement sets so quickly that the shuttering can be removed again after two 
hours (1). In order to set, the coal-dirt mix requires 10 % of its weight 
in high quality cement. The final compressive strength of 3000 N/m is low. 
The packs must therefore be made very wide (twice the thickness of the seam). 
The shuttering is movable and is advanced to follow the face supports. It can 
be extended against the roof and seals off the stowing space from the face 
and caved goaf. The space between the roadway supports and the shuttering is 
sealed off manually with paper sacks filled by hand with small dirt. 
The shuttering must be accessible from the caved goaf. One or two support 
chocks must therefore be placed behind the face end to protect the working 
force. 
Substantial problems are encounted in advancing the shuttering when there 
are cavities in the packhole roof. The best areas of application are there-
fore roadways driven ahead of or in line with the face with good packhole 
conditions not liable to spalling roof. 
Two manshifts per roadway packhole are required per shift - one manshift for 
the cement mixer and one for the mixer preparing the coal-dirt slurry. 
Gateside packs built according to the pump packing system are considered to 
have a better effect on the stability of roadways than the packs built 
mechanically from roadhead rock (2,3). 
(1) Breer, W. und W. Gotze : Mitgefahrene und nachgefahrene Abbaustrechen 
im britischen Steinkohlenbergbau. 
Gluckauf 112 (1976) pp 70-75 
(2) National Coal Board "Ideal requirements of packs" 
Progress report Nr. 6, July-December 1977 
(3) Wills, N.B. : 
" The Pumped Packs System at Markham Main Colliery" 
Colleiry Guardian, Dec. 1977 PP 901-906 ANNEX II 
Packhole stowing methods  Table 1 
Type of 
construction 
Hand 
Mechanical 
(scrapers, ploug 
Cam-Packer etc.) 
Hydromechanical 
(Mixer, pumps, 
leakproof 
shuttering) 
Pneumatic 
stowinp machine 
and ancillary 
equipment 
Material used 
Dirt 
Wooden chocks 
2 wooden chocks 
with Isoschaum 
Concrete blocks 
is, Dirt 
Dirt or coal with 
binding agent 
Hydr. binding· 
materials 
Hydr. binding 
materials 
Dirt with binding 
agent 
Pack charac 
Load beai 
Start 
Late 
Late 
Late 
Average 
Late 
Average 
Average 
Early 
Average to 
early 
¡teristics 
•ing 
Capacity 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Medium-low 
Low 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Medium 
Air 
permea-
bility 
Hi,eh 
High 
Medium-
low 
High 
High 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
Costs 
Per m roadway for seam th 
1m 1.5· m 
2OO-4OO DM 
IOO-25O 
approx. 350 
approx. 150 
100-200 
approx. 300 
200-400 
150-250 
approx. 300 
300-600 DM 
150-350 
approx. 500 
approx. 220 
150-300 
approx. 35O 
25O-5OO 
2OO-35O 
approx. 400 
ickness of 
2.0 m 
400-600 DM 
2OO-5OO 
approx. 700 
approx. 300 
200-400 
approx. 4OO 
4OO-8OO 
300-600 
approx. 5OO 
Proportion 0 
Labour 
Very high 
High 
High 
High 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
f costs 
Material 
Very Low 
Low 
Low-
medium 
Low 
CO 
Low- ñ 
medium 
Medium 
Medium 
High 
High 
Table 1 shows the different materials used for gateside packs, classed according to the type of 
construction, including their characteristics and the estimated costs of the different systems according to 
seam thickness. The cost estimates are based on the normal pack widths for the different processes and an 
average length of workings of 1 000 m. 319 
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THE USE OF FILTER SELF-RESCUERS 
IN COAL MINES IN MEMBER STATES 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
PART III 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
A report established by a Committee of experts 
which was adopted by the Working Party on Rescue Arrangements, Mine Fires and Underground Combustions 
on 10th November 1978 
and the Safety and Health Commission on 27th March 1979 
as an information report which should be sent to Mines Inspectorates, 
Managements and other interested parties 
in accordance with Articles 3 and 6 of its Terms of reference 
3919/79 E (Part I- II- III) 323 
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USE OF FILTER SELF-RESCUERS IN COAL MINES 
IN MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
PART ΠΙ 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
1. GENERAL 
The following discussion refers solely to the future development of filter self-
rescuers and associated problems. It must be stressed that other rescue systems 
are also feasible, with particular reference to the so called "oxygen self-rescuers". 
These devices have - among several drawbacks - the advantage that they are 
in use independent of the surrounding atmosphere. (It is proposed to make 
this type of apparatus the subject of a special investigation). Like most techni­
cal instruments and apparatus the filter se If-rescuers with which most of the 
European miners are equipped, represent a compromise between an ideal and 
technical practicability. In particular the requirement as set out in Part II - that 
the F S R should always be carried on the person restricts its dimensions and 
weight and thus limits its development. The following discussion, therefore takes 
account of the criteria laid down in Part. I. Within the framework of these tech­
nical requirements the useful life of the latest FSRs has been considerably 
extended. 
The evaluation of experiences with self-rescuers used in incidents underground is 
also of great importance for the improvement of the FSR. Such practical expe­
rience should be pooled and systematically evaluated in order to obtain a basis 
for further FSR development. 
The applicability of an FSR escape system cannot be judged in isolation from 
general conditions in underground workings. Of particular importance is the 
question of fire intensity and the chances of a really large fire developing. Impro­
vements in fire protection and of the self-rescuers must be regarded as important 
and complementary. 
There is a general opinion that the current design of FSR' can be regarded in the 
main as fully developed. It is not expected that fundamental improvements can 
be achieved in the near future. This could surely be possible only at an enormous 
expense. It seems doubtful whether such an expenditure would be warranted in 
view of the results likely to be achieved. However, the following pages are inten­
ded as guidelines that should be taken into account, so far as possible, in the 
future development of the FSR. 325 
It has been established that the efficiency of the FSR may be impaired by 
smouldering or burning plastics. In this context, the term plastics refers to all 
organic matter of high molecular weight, including the elastomers which may 
be contained in conveyor belts. According to observations so far, the gaseous 
matter produced when these plastics smoulder or burn is retained sufficiently 
by the FSR now used, whereas certain materials can cause the FSR to become 
blocked with soot or other particles. 
It is therefore considered essential that in mines where filter self-rescuers are 
used only plastics which do not impair the functioning of the FSR in the' event 
of a fire,should be used underground . 
2. FURTHER TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FSR 
2.1. SIZE AND SHAPE 
As the FSR has to be carried "on the person" underground at all times, any 
large increases in the dimensions and weights specified in Part I appear unlikely 
It would be desireable to aim at a shape better adapted to the human body when 
carried. Even with the early types of European FSR attempts were made to pro-
vide a kidney-shaped cross-section. Such a design, however presents difficulties in 
the packing of chemical layers and it seems doubtful whether a satisfactory resis-
tance to mechanical shocks and vibration could be achieved. 
A high resistance to vibration and shocks is a desirable aim of further develop-
ment. Aluminium alloys should not be used for the case of the filter self-rescuers. 
The hazards of electrostatic charges likely to occur with the use of plastic mater-
ials should also be investigated. 
In the future development of filter self-rescuer it would be advantageous to 
develop an indicator showing in a simple manner that the filter self-rescuer is 
in a satisfactory condition for use. It would be a step forward if a system to indi-
cate the ingress of air into the self-rescuer case could be devised. This would not, 
however, affect the life of the filter self-rescuer. 326 
2.2. CARRYING POSSIBILITIES 
Whilst it is difficult to fit the shape of the FSR to the human body it seems 
possible to improve its carrying on the body. Here it must be borne in mind 
that - on the one hand - there is sufficient insulation between the metal case and 
the body and - on the other hand - that the FSR cannot swing about when the 
man is walking or working. Another attempt should be made to check how prac-
ticable it is to have the FSR in a "pocket" or bag that can be attached to the 
belt or included in miner's trousers. Consideration should also be given to the 
picking up and return of the FSR before and after a shift and to the storing of 
the apparatus outside working hours. 
2.3. BREATHING CONNECTIONS 
Only mouthpieces or full-face masks can be considered under this heading. Half-
masks must be rejected because of the hazard of leaks. 
The mouthpieces in almost exclusive use today should be improved as far as 
possible so that no irritation of the mucous membranes can take place even du-
ring prolonged use. Attention must be paid to the quality of the rubber with 
respect to prolonged storage in a very dry atmosphere. 
Some people may find the use of a mouth piece very unpleasant. This disadvan-
tage may be overcome by a full-face mask, but this in its turn creates new pro-
blems. The dimensions of the FSR would have to be increased. Because of the 
long contact line with the face the danger of leakage is much greater. Although 
face-masks protect the eyes and allow speech, these advantages are counteracted 
by the difficulty of keeping the lenses clear and by the longer donning time. 
The advantage of better communication is regarded as very important by some 
experts, leading to a consideration whether supervisory underground personnel 
should not be equipped with face-mask FSRs. 
In the end the mouthpiece appears to be - for its purpose - the safer method. 327 
2.4. BREATHING TUBE 
The difficulty of holding the FSR "at the mouth" and the problems with the 
head-harness, considered in more detail in 2.5., are much reduced when the 
FSR is worn on the chest and connects with the mouthpiece by means of a 
corrugated breathing tube. This design has been used in some European FSRs 
and is usual in the oxygen self-rescuers. Another advantage is the possible 
cooling of inspired air. 
A disadvantage of such a design is the greater weight, bigger dimensions and 
difficulties associated with the carrying of the FSR on the chest which have 
not yet been eliminated. There is also the danger of a "kinked" breathing 
tube. 
For these reasons the general trend in the Western European countries is not 
to use a breathing tube. 
2.5. HEADHARNESS 
The head-harness should support the greater part of the weight of the FSR 
when worn. Difficulties can arise because of differences in head sizes. The 
design of the harness must be such that on small heads there is sufficient sup-
port and on large heads the tight fit does not cause pain. The donning of the 
harness must also be simple and easily carried out in the dark. 
Investigations into the best design of the harness are currently in progress in 
several member states. 
2.6. NOSE CLIP 
Wearing the current nose clip for a long time can cause difficulties to some 
people and can be very painful to men with large noses. 
The purpose of the nose clip is to seal the nose. As in the case of the head-
harness the technical difficulties arise from the very variable anatomical shape 
of the human nose. In the history of breathing apparatus development there 
are a number of proposed solutions for a suitable nose-seal ; but the nose clip 328 
has proved to be the most reliable method. However, it is considered to be advisa-
ble to carry out special investigations into this question. For special cases it may be 
necessary to design special devices, (an example of this is the development of 
a special nose-seal for Korean miners in Germany). 
2.7. GOGGLES 
There is to date no known instance of an incident where the lack of protec-
tive goggles has been of any lasting consequence. On the other hand daily 
carrying of such goggles would increase the weight and size of the FSR. Addi-
tional difficulties arise as in the case of face-masks, from the need to keep 
lenses clear of condensation and dust. The provision of the goggles currently 
is not regarded as essential. 
2.8. CHEMICALS 
A considerable proportion of the weight of a FSR derives from the drier. The 
FSR therefore could be made lighterand smaller if a CO-catalyst could be 
developed that would have without pre-drying, the same performance as the 
currently employed Hopcalite. The search for such a catalyst has been going 
on for decades. Such catalyst could also lead to reduced breathing resistance. 
However, the prospects of discovering such a catalyst are very remote. It is 
not suggested that special research should be undertaken in this field but pro-
gress in the technical developments of catalysts should be followed carefully. 
The same applies to the improvement of the performance of the drying agent 
used in filter self-rescuer. Both the Hopcalite and the drier must satisfy a large 
number of technical requirements which need not be discussed here. Apart 
from the development of new reagents a step forward would be a successful 
reduction in the degradation of chemicals during carrying. Such degradation 
can be disagreable to the user. 
Prolonged carrying of FSRs underground with associated shocks and vibration 
may lead to an accumulation of reagent fines in the case and in the FSR itself 
Large amounts of dust reduce the performance of the FSR. But even small 
amounts of reagent dust can be unpleasant and disturbing to the wearer. An 
improvement in the stability of the reagents and in the filling technique is 
therefore desirable. 329 
2.9. TEMPERATURE OF INHALED AIR 
The inhaled air temperature is raised in a FSR by the oxidation of CO to C02, 
and by the absorption of water vapour by the drying agent. Heat exchangers 
and other devices are introduced to remove a large part of this heat. At higher 
CO contents the temperatures of the inspired air and of the actual FSR (in 
close proximity to the wearer's chin) are so high that wearing the FSR beco-
mes unpleasant. New designs should therefore consider improved coolers and 
better protection for the lips and chin of the wearer. 
3. IMPROVED CHECKING AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES FOR 
FILTER SELF-RESCUERS. 
3.1. NON DESTRUCTIVE TESTING 
In countries where filter self-rescuers are used by the mining industry then-
quality is checked both by testing specimens off the production line and by 
taking spot-samples in the field. The performance testing of a self-rescuer in-
volves its destruction. Although at the moment there appears to be no non-des-
tructive test method in sight the desirability of developing such a test should 
not be forgotten. A non-destructive test would considerably increase the cer-
tainty that the filter self-rescuers will have the required performance. 
3.2. TREND ANALYSIS 
A further improvement in the checking of filter-rescuer stocks could be 
achieved by the establishment of a trend analysis. For this it would be advis-
able to store all test results of self-rescuers in a given series in a computer data 
bank and to devise a data processing programme for predicting with sufficient 
accuracy the likely test life of filter self-rescuers. 
3.3. ANALYSIS OF DETERIORATION FACTORS 
The self-rescuers deteriorate after several years for various reasons. Some of 
the factors, e.g. water vapour absorption and aging of rubber, are known. 
Others, such as vibration and shock effects, are difficult to quantify exactly. 330 
An investigation of the type and seriousness of these factors could provide 
useful information for monitoring filter self-rescuer stocks and for the cons-
truction of new apparatus. 
4. IMPROVEMENTS IN FSR TRAINING 
4.1. EVALUATION OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN INCIDENTS 
Experience in the use of the FSR in fires or following explosions must be 
evaluated very carefully because of its importance for the further technical 
development of this apparatus and, in particular, all questions relating to the 
training of the workforce in its use. There is general agreement that after 
using an FSR, all miners should be questioned thoroughly on their experien-
ces. For this purpose, an FSR questionnaire has been drawn up and introdu-
ced in Germany. The questionnaire in ANNEX I has the advantage of being 
easy to evaluate statistically while providing the guarantee that no important 
questions are omitted. In addition, a general survey should be conducted. 
It is suggested that the exchange of experiences in wearing the FSR in inci-
dents should be continued and improved within the Working Party on Mine 
Fires by establishing a routine for the exchange of experience reports. For 
this purpose, a uniform questionnaire would be desirable. 
4.2. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE TRAINNG MODEL SELF-RESCUERS 
Training model self-rescuers are an important element in the training of the 
workforce in the use of the FSR. In their outer structure and, above all, the 
way they are handled, they should differ as little as possible from the original 
apparatus. The training model self-rescuers currently on the market largely 
meet this requirement except for the fact that they do not simulate the heat-
ing of the inhaled air as a result of the conversion of carbon monoxide to car-
bon dioxide and the absorption of water vapour by the drier. 
However, the heating of the inhaled air is considered so important that deve-
lopments in this field should be promoted. 33] 
In this regard, the developments in the United Kingdom in particular appear 
to be promising, where the concept of the heating of inhaled air by means of a 
chemical reaction is being studied. In the training model self-rescuers, the fil­
ter container is filled with soda lime (Atemkalk). The exhalation valve of the 
training model self-rescuer is sealed, with the result that the filter is used for 
both inhalation and exhalation. 
The combination of carbon dioxide, water vapour and soda lime is an exother­
mic reaction with which the heating of the original apparatus during inhala­
tion of noxious gases can be simulated. 
It is proposed to continue work on the development in cooperation with the 
manufacturers and to introduce the training model self-rescuer on a trial basis 
to begin with. 
4.3. TRAINING EXERCISE ALONG THE NORMAL ESCAPE ROUTES 
The layout of present-day coal mine workings is such that the workforce's 
normal route to the place of work frequently does not correspond to the 
presumed escape route in the event of a fire or similar incident. However, it 
is highly important that the miner should be acquainted with the escape 
route to be followed when using the filter self-rescuer. Each 
miner should wherever possible go along the different escape routes at set 
intervals. 
4.4. NEW SCHEME FOR FILTER SELF-RESCUER TRAINING IN ΉΕ 
UNITED-KINGDOM 
In the United Kingdom, training in the use of filter self-rescuer has been reor­
ganized. The new training scheme is to be introduced at several mines on a 
trial basis. 
A summary of the proposed training scheme is given in ANNEX 2. 332  ANNEX I 
REPORT ON THE USE OF FILTER 
SELF - RESCUERS 
COLLIERY 
Date, Place and Nature of the Incident 
Type of 
FSR 
Series  Year of 
Manufacture 
Name of wearer  Age  Occupation u/g 
1. Where were you at the time of 
the incident? 
2. Who and/or what caused you to 
put on your FSR? 
1. Instruction 
2, Own decision 
3.nSmoke, Fumes Smell 5.Q0ther 
Λ r-i η „ ru reasons 
4. Q Open Fire 
3. Where was your FSR at time of 
incident? 
1. On your belt  2. Close to hand  3, Elsewhere 
4. When did you put your FSR  1. Immediately  2. During escape 
onr 
5. Did you have any difficulty 
in opening and removing the 
FSR? 
1. Yes, If Yes 
2. No, 
11. Opening lever 
12. Lid 
13. Sticking 
in case 
14. Other diffi­
culties 
6. Any difficulty in donning the 
FSR? 
1. Yes, If Yes 
2. No 
11. Mouthpiece 
12. Nose clip 
13. Head Har­
ness 
14. Other 
7. Did you find any defects or da­
mage to the FSR? 
1. Yes, If Yes 
2. No 
11, Mouthpiece 
12. Noseclip 
13. Head Har­
ness 
14. Dust 
15. Other de­
fects 
8. How did you escape';  1. Walking normally 3. Crawling 
2. Running 4. Climbing 
5. By touch 
6. Mechanical 
transport 
9. Did you find the escape strenu­
ous or have any difficulties? 
1. Yes, If Yes 
2. No 
3. Breathing difficulty 14. Eye irri-
. „, tat ion 
4. Nausea 
15. Other dif­
ficulties 
5. Headache 333 
10,How was the temperature by 
inhaled air? 
1, Normal 
2. Warm 
3. Hot 
4. Intolerably hot 
11.How was the breathing 
through the FSR? 
1. Normal 3. Very difficult 
2. Difficult 4. Intolerably difficult 
12.Did you interrupt the use 
of the FSR? 
1. Yes, If Yes 11. Air too hot 
2. No 12. air resistance 
to high 
13. Nausea 
14. Other reasons 
13.What was the visibility like 
during the escape? 
1. Normal 3. Much impaired 
2.  Slightly 
impaired 
4. Could not see 
(blackout) 
14.How long was theescape route'  m 1. up to I5OO m 
2. I5OO - 3000m 
3. 3OOO-4OOO m 
4. 45OO m 
15.How long did you escpape 
take? 
,min. 1. up to 30 min. 
2. 3O-5O min. 
3. 60-90 min. 
4. 90 min. 
16. How long aje àia y©* kave 
your last FSR training? 
Additional comments 
and explanations 
Place 
1, up to 6 3. 
months 
2. 6-12 months 4. 
12-18 months 
I8-24 months 
Date  Signature 
Tick y'.ierc r.irnrom-iatc 334 
ANNEX 2 
SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED REVISION 
OF THE NATIONAL COAL BOARD'S 
SELF-RESCUER TRAINING SCHEME 
(to be validated by pit trials) 
INTRODUCTION 
The report on the explosion at Houghton Main Mine, 
in the UK on 12 June 1975 recommended in paragraph 
129 (?) that the NCB Committee studying the design 
of self rescuers should be reconvened as soon as 
possible and that the membership and terms of refe-
rence should be reviewed. That committee set up a 
Working Party to consider self rescuer training, to 
review the current training procedures and suggest 
improvement. 
A summary of the National Coal Board's self rescuers 
training scheme proposed by the Committee was pre-
sented to the Committee of Experts on Filter Self 
Rescuers by the UK members at Edinburgh on 19 July 1978, 
The revised self rescuer training scheme is to be 
implemented at three mines in the UK to assess its 
suitability for implementation at all UK mines. 
1. NATURE OF TRAINING 
1.1. To train persons more effectively there is a need to 
simulate more closely the conditions in which the 
rescuer might be used. 335 
1.2. It is considered that both classroom and underground 
training sessions be incorporated into a new training 
scheme. Accordingly Phase 1 training would be on the 
surface and Phase 2 underground. A training model 
would be used in both phases. There should be prac-
tice in donning the self rescuer in darkness. 
1.3. It is not suggested that all self rescuer trainees 
be required to breathe warm dry air during training 
but optional facilities should be provided. Prior to 
this optional facility being incorporated into a 
Self Rescuer Training Scheme, a pilot trial of this 
form of simulation by ordinary colliery personnel at 
a selection of mines should be carried out. The 
inspired air during any such training should be dry 
and of a sufficiently high temperature to be sensed 
as being warm. This temperature should not exceed 
70° C. 
2. ORGANISATION OF TRAINING 
2.1. The "make-up" of the session is an all important 
factor. It will be advantageous to have men from 
various sections of the mine trained at one time 
because small groups of men uniformly spread through 
the mine would have relatively recently undergone 
training. These men should, therefore, be capable of 
taking a lead if an emergency arose. 
2.2. The timing of the sessions is important and small 
groups should be trained each week. The maximum num-
ber of persons being trained in any group should not 
exceed 20. This continuous training will improve the 
probability in an emergency of there being a relati-
vely recently trained man in any team of workmen. 
The number of groups and the size of the classes will 
depend on the size of the colliery, in order that, 336 
by these weekly training sessions, the whole col­
liery workforce would be trained within the stipu­
lated period (2 years). 
2.3· This organisation would apply to both Phase 1 and 2 
situation. Underground contractors at collieries 
would be regarded as colliery employees and integrated 
into this organisation. There should be different 
training for : 
a) colliery employees going underground and, 
b) other personnel (visitors). 
The training for other personnel whose pit visits 
are less frequent may be less comprehensive, in view 
of the fact that they would be accompanied on their 
visits by colliery personnel. 
2.4. H.M. Inspectors of Mines and Quarries would be ex­
cluded from the Visitor Scheme and separate arrange­
ments made for them. Separate arrangements are also 
advised for permanent employees of Unions. 
3. THE PERIODICITY OF TRAINING FOR COLLIERY EMPLOYEES 
3.1. It is proposed that the two phases of training should 
be completed within each 2 year period. The sequence 
of Phases for any colliery employee would be Phase 1, 
Phase 2, Phase 1, Phase 2 ... etc. Each Phase would 
be separated by at least 9 months and accordingly the 
intervals between any two consecutive phases would 
be 12 ί 3 months (2 phases completed in each 24 month 
period). 
3.2. The Phase 1 training in the classroom may include the 
optional facility of breathing warm air. It would be 
necessary for special facilities to be provided. 337 
Phase 2 would provide for persons travelling from 
their work place to an assumed place of safety and 
where appropriate the second means of egress could 
be incorporated in the training. 
The more detailed draft syllabuses for Phase 1 and 
Phase 2 training are attached as Appendices 1 and 2 
respectively. 
CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATION 
In addition to the formal training sessions it is 
necessary for some form of continual reminder to be 
given on the essential elements of wearing the Self 
Rescuer. With a view to achieving this aim displays 
of notices, personal reminder card3, display cabinets 
etc. should be provided. 338 
ANNEX 2.1. 
PROPOSED SYLLABUS - PHASE 1 
1. Explain the need for the Self Rescuer and the purpose 
of the training. 
2. Describe the gases produced by fires and explosions 
and the hazards arising from carbon monoxide. 
3. Describe the prime purposes of the Self Rescuer to 
act as a filter to give protection against carbon 
monoxide and to provide the wearer with an apparatus 
for escape purposes only. 
4. Describe the construction and operation of the Self 
Rescuer. 
5. Summarise main points and invite questions as a basis 
for discussion. 
< 
6. Demonstrate the importance of the position of the 
Self Rescuer on the belt relative to the cap lamp 
battery, etc. (instructor's own waist belt and 
attachments to be used). 
7. Demonstrate the fitting of the Self Rescuer from the 
normal carrying position on the waist belt to the 
fully fitted position on the head, noting the breaking 
of the seal, the release of the canister from the 
belt when the release lever is pulled, the firm gra-
dual withdrawal from the carrying case, the correct 
fitting of the mouthpiece, nose clip and head har-
ness. Discuss the need of personal decision on den-
tures and spectacles. 
8. Explain the correct method of travelling whilst 
wearing the Self Rescuer. Emphasise the need to rest 339 
for short periods to reduce any discomfort or distress 
and to avoid at all costs removing the Self Rescuer 
from the wearing position. 
9. Re-emphasise main points by showing the film 
"YOUR SELF RESCUER". 
10. Invite questions. 
ISSUE 1ST SELF RESCUER TRAINING MODEL 
11. Practise removal of the Self Rescuer from the waist 
belt and carrying case fitting it correctly, and 
movement whilst wearing as follows : 
a) Standing for several minutes to permit)lllumination 
Instructor to carry out the inspection\main beam 
of the fitted Rescuers ; )cap lamps 
b) Walking at a brisk pace for 5 minutes) supplemented 
to induce movement of Self Rescuer to\ by any gene-
verify fit and comfort ; ) ral lighting 
c) Standing for several minutes to enable) 
the Instructor to recheck fitting of \ 
Rescuers. ) 
12. Remove Self Rescuer and discuss with Trainees the 
first practice wearing of Self Rescuer. 
ISSUE 2ND SELF RESCUER TRAINING MODEL 
13. Don the Self Rescuer in complete darkness and then 
repeat Item 11 (a). 
14. Outline the need for care during daily carrying of 
the Self Rescuer. Emphasise that a broken seal or open 
canister occurring during the shift should be reported 
to an official but will not necessarily result in the 
Self Rescuer being inoperative during that shift. 340 
15. Summarise main points. 
16. Supervise trainees opting to experience breathing of 
warm air. 341 
ANNEX 2. 2. 
PROPOSED SYLLABUS - PHASE 2 
1. Phase 2 of the Self Rescuer Training for new entrants 
should be implemented within one month of their 
receiving Phase 1. 
2. The Instructor will need to make appropriate arrange-
ments, through the district official(s) to take suf-
ficient Training Models of the Self Rescuer under-
ground and issue them to the trainees involved, and 
inform them of the agreed travelling route. A suitable 
disposal bag should be provided on each occasion for 
transporting used Self Rescuers out of the mine. 
3. Trainees should be pre-informed of the time to don 
their Self Rescuer at their own working place and 
after collecting as a group proceed to travel the 
agreed route to the point of assumed safety. 
4. The district official should lead the group and the 
Instructor should travel out at the rear of the group 
to give any assistance that may be required. The 
group should pause for a short rest at approximately 
500 yard intervals and allow the group to re-form. 
5. At the point of assumed safety, when instructions 
have been given to remove the Self Rescuer they should 
be returned to the Instructor and be carried out of 
the mine in the disposable bag. 
6. The Instructor should briefly question each trainee 
on the training experience before they proceed to the 
surface. 
7. Any trainee expressing lack of personal satisfaction 
with the training should be encouraged to attend 
further training and asked to give his name to the 
Instructor for inclusion for a future session to 
repeat either or both Phases of Self Rescuer Training. ANNEX Χ 
PROPOSAI, TO GOVERNMENTS 
for 
DRILLING WELLHEAD SAFETY INSTALLATIONS OFFSHORE 
This proposal is the second stage of the work of the Committee of experts 
íerred to in paragraph 2 (2.2.) of paper 3318/6/77 and forms the continuation ofthat document. 
Adopted by the SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
FOR THE MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRES 
on 1st December 1978 
in accordance witharticks 1 aid 4 of the terms of reference, 
and articles 1 and 2.2. of the Council decision of 27 june 1974 
on the extension of the responsabilities of the Safety and Health Commission 
Doc. 37Ó7/4/77 E 344 
BASIC INFORMATION WHICH WHOULD BE CONTAINED IN 
DRILLING PROGRAMMES OF OFFSHORE WELLS 
W. S. I. 
1. The W.S.L will be required when drilling for oil and gas offshore. 
1.1. The W.S.I, depends on the depth of the well, the setting depth of the va-
rious casing and the contents and pressures of the formations to be drilled. 
2.1.1 If shallow gas can be expected or is known to exist a diverter or a similar 
system should be installed after setting of the first casing, whether driven, 
jetted or drilled. 
Other methods may be adopted, after justification has been submitted to the 
competent authority. 
2.1.2. After setting the next casing, the W.S.I, must at least consist of an annular type 
preventer which can close off the borehole with or without drilling tools in the 
hole. 
2.1.3. After setting subsequent casing strings, the W.S.I, must consist of : 
2.1.3.1. An annular type preventer which can close off a borehole with or without 
drilling tools in the hole. 
2.1.3.2. A ram type blow out preventer with blind or shear rams. 
2.1.3.3. Two ram type blow out preventers with pipe rams appropriate to the diameter 
of pipes in the borehole. 
2.1.3.4. Safety valves for the drill pipe and the drill collar string should be kept at 
hand on the drilling floor for immediate use ; 
2.1.3.5. An upper - and lower kelly valve. 
2.2.1. The blow out preventers in 2.1.3.1., 2.1.3.2., 2.1.3.3. should have remote con-
trol and where appropriate, manual control. 
2.2.2. The apparatus for the energy supply to the W.S.I, must be located at a safe 
and easily accessible place. 
2.2.3. The apparatus must be constructed and maintained to guarantee that there is 
always sufficient stored energy available to operate the W.S.I, properly. 
2.2.4. The Unes for the energy supply to the W.S.I, must be able to withstand at 
least the same pressure as can prevail in the apparatus referred to 2.2.2. 345 
2.2.5. A control panel for the W.S.I, must be located on the derrick floor 
at a place which is easily accessible to the driller. 
2.2.6. Furthermore, there must be another control panel for the W.S.I, at 
an easily accessible place at a safe distance from the drilling floor. 
3· If casing head housings or casing spools fitted with side outlets 
can be exposed to pressure, two valves should be fitted at each 
outlet. 
4.1. The W.S.I, must tolerate the discharge of fluid and gas as well as 
the injection of fluids into the well either separately or simultaneously. 
4.2. Each discharge or injection point on the W.S.I, must have two valves, 
at least one of which must oe operated by remote control. 
4.3. At the injection point, connections for rig pumps and a high pressure 
pump must be provided. 
4·4· All lines serving the W.S.I, must be flexible to allow for movement of 
the drilling platform. 
5.1. The choke manifold must be easily accessible. 
5.2. The choke manifold must be provided with at least two chokes which 
can be replaced separately with the manifold in operation. 
5.3» A mud gas separator with by-pass facilities must be installed in the 
discharge line from the choke manifold. 
5.4. A mechanically operated degasser is required in the mud system. 
6. The choke manifold and the discharge lines from the choke manifold 
must be so fixed as to absorb reaction forces from the discharge of 
liquid and gas without movement of the choke manifold or discharge 
lines. 346 
7· Ram type preventers must be able to withstand the maximum pressure expected 
at the wellhead. 
8. The lines from the W.S.I, to the choke manifold must be able to withstand 
the same pressure as the ram type preventers. 
9.1. The W.S.I, should be tested regularly for proper operation. 
9.2. The W.S.I, (with the exception of the annular preventer) must be tested to 
a pressure at least equal to the maximum pressure to be expected in the bore-
hole at the wellhead. 
9.3. The annular preventer may be tested to a lower pressure than in 9·2. 
9.4. Pressure tests should be carried out at weekly intervals, before drilling 
out the cement in the casing, after changing rams, after each reconnection 
(for dynamically positioned floaters and drillships) and whenever repairs have 
been carried out.. These'pressure tests must be maintained for at least I5 min. 
10. A well control drill should be held, at least weekly for each crew. 
11. All tests and well control drills must be recorded. 
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ANNEX XI 
PROPOSAL TO GOVERNMENTS 
for 
BASIC INFORMATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONTAINED 
IN DRILLING PROGRAMMES OF OFFSHORE WELLS 
Adopted by the SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
FOR THE MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
on 1st December 1978 
in accordance with articles 1 and 4 of the terms of reference, 
and articles 1 and 2.2. of the Council decision of 27 june 1974 
on the extension of the responsabilities of the Safety and Health Commission 
Doc. 3318/6/77 E 348 
DRILLING WELLHEAD SAFETY INSTALLATIONS OFFSHORE 
1. This Draft proposal was prepared by the Committee of Experts on well control. 
It refers to offshore wells and concerns the risk of blow-outs occuring 
especially in the case of drilling for, or producing oil and gas in 
offshore operations. The terms of reference were defined in the light of 
the conclusions of the enquiry into the Bravo Ekofisk disaster, which occured 
on 22th. April 1977. 
2. It was decided that it was logical to consider this subject in several 
stages; each one being an entire draft, which may be applied without 
waiting for the remaining parts. 
2.1. Drilling programmes (a summary of data necessary for drilling a well) 
2.2. Drilling well head safety installations 
2.3. Production well completion 
2.4· Work over programme , and well head safety equipment in offshore operations. 
2.5· Well documentation 
3. General remarks. 
3.1. These requirements apply to many aspects of drilling offshore, not only 
the prevention of blow-outs, for it seems impossible to consider this sub-
ject without reference to general safety precautions. 
3.2. Certain of these measures for accident prevention also apply to the 
protection of the environment; however measures which apply solely to envi-
ronmental protection or to contingency plans for major accidents and emer-
gency situations have not been included. 
3.3. The safety of operations depends largely on the skill of the workforce. 
Regular protective safety drills and safety meetings should be held. 
Separate proposals will be made in further papers. 349 
4. The Governments of Member States of the European Community require the 
submission of a drilling programme for each well before drilling opera-
tions commencent. 
5. By asking for the drilling programme to contain minimum data, the risk 
of unforeseen circumstances leading to accidents, and in particular, 
blow-outs will be reduced. 
6. The content of such a programme is outlined under item 7 which includes 
"Remarks" drawing attention to matters to be borne in mind when preparing 
a drilling programme. 
7. A written drilling programme should, at least, include the following : 
7.1. The name and number of the well and its geographical coordinates, the 
depth reference point and the distance of the depth reference point to 
the average waterlevel and seabed. 
7.2. Objectives and the proposed depth of the well. 
All available relevant information should be used when drawing up the 
drilling programme such as available seismic information and information 
from surrounding wells. 
The programme should contain the predicted geological formation depth, 
the expected hydrocarbon accumulations, the expected abnormal formation 
pressure gradients, possible intervals with muddosses, indications as to 
the likelihood of squeezing formations. 
The above information may be shown in a striplog or otherwise. 
7.3. The type of drilling installation to be used. 
7.4· Proposed diameters of the hole and depths. 
7.5· Proposed diameters and depths of the casing strings including the speci-
fications of the casings. 350 
Remark : The surface and subsequent casing shoes depth should be programmed 
such that sufficient formation strength exists to prevent cratering. 
7.5·''· Testing procedures to be applied to the casings. 
Remark 1 : Casings should be pressure tested before drilling out the cement 
of the shoe and, when warranted, the formation should be pressure tested 
after drilling through the cement of the shoe. 
Casing pressure tests should be made at a pressure, which equals at least 
the maximum expected pressure. The production casing should be tested to 
the expected wellhead pressure. 
The results of pressure tests should be recorded. 
Remark 2 : Where tests, such as leak off tests, lead to revisions being 
necessary, the revised provisions numbers 7·4·» 7·5·» and 7·5·1· shall 
form part of a new programme of casing and casing shoe depth. This programme 
should be issued as soon as possible. 
7.6. A statement on the cementation. 
Remark 1 : It is expected that all abnormally pressured formations should 
be cemented off. Every effort should be made to cement the first casing 
in which subsequent casings are landed from the setting depth to the sea 
bed or mudline suspension. 
Remark 2 : Where wells will be completed as sub-sea completion wells or 
will be abandoned (even temporarily), careful consideration should be given 
to the desirability of overlapping cement columns in the annular space. 
Critical cementations should be checked with available monitoring devices 
such as cement bond logs, cement temperature logs, etc.. 
7.7· A statement on the planned core intervals. 
7.8. A statement on the planned petrophysical logs. 
7.9· A statement on the planned methods of formation tests and equipment. 351 
7.10. A statement on the mud system to be used. 
Remark 1 : The presssure exerted by the mud column should exceed the ex-
pected pressure of the formation to be drilled. 
Remark 2 : Adequate stocks of mud or mud chemicals should be readily avai-
lable to deal with mud losses or excessive pressures at all stages of the 
drilling operations. 
7.11. A statement of the planned well deviation and azimuth, and the measurement 
technique used as well as the survey plot of adjacent wells. 
7.12. A statement of the well head safety installation (B.O.P.) in connection 
with each casing, stating the type of safety devices, as well as pressure 
rating and working pressures. 
Remark : For the requirements for well control see separate paper on 
Wellhead safety installations. 
7.13. A statement of the mechanical raud treatment and 
mud monitoring equipment such as mud pit level indicator, degasser, etc... 
GENERAL REMARKS 
1. Details on the method of completion and the approximate installation depth 
of down hole equipment, the working pressure for which the Christmas tree 
is rated, the diameter of the flow-string, the type and depth of wireline 
devices, the type and depth of packers and downhole safety devices should 
be given in a separate programme. 
2. In case of abandonment a separate programme should be issued, 
3. Important changes of programme must, when safety conditions permit, be 
notified in advance. 353 
ANNEX XII 
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C VENTILATION. FIREDAMP AND OTHER MINE GASES 
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Ventilation Stabilization of Ven-
tilation in Pit Fires - investi-
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13th Report of the MSHC, Annex VII 358 
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1. Notes concerning the statistical com-
parison of serious and fatal accidents 
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4. Strata reinforcement by bolting and 
injection techniques 
Printed separately 1979 Doc. I612/3/76 
E F D 
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1. Decision on the removal of oil 
from resistors, condensers, trans-
formers, switches and relays used 
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2. The use of non-flammable materials 
for the manufacture of electric 
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November 1966 
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2.1. Interim report on the continued 
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European Community 
Part I - Minimum design requirements 
and testing procedures 
Part II - Maintenance and Training 
Part III- Future developments 
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5.1. Opinion on the use underground of 
Polyurethane foam in the coal mining 
industry 
7th Report of the MSHC, Annex VI 
September 1970 
6. Conveyor belts 
6.1. First report on tests and criteria 
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STATISTICAL TABLES FOR EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES OTHER THAN COAL 
ANNEX XIII - 1  - 1 
Year  1978  FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
MINERAL 
COAL 
LIGNITE -
OIL 
NATURAL GAS ... 
t 
IRON 
ALUMINIUM ..(°
rS?). 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) . 
7ΙΜΓ (areX 
POTASH SALTS 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt) , , , 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY "'" 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SANDS (SLATE. FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
(DR BORE-
HOLE 
s 
0 
0 
D 
D 
S 
S 
:1 
s J 
S 
s 
S + 0 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
4.8. 
150 
240 
10 
1 
3. 
11 
.....8 
24 
...1....3.9.8 
PRODUCTION 
.8.3....964...8.9.9..... 
123...53Ã..3Â3..... 
5...05.8...9.4.3 
19 382 638 
1 600 781 
280 
821..... 
' 23 181 
9.7...-..4.0.5 
5 018 001 
6....8.4.5....7..6.5.... 
80 054 
178 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
,t...aaleablf 
IIZII 
1000 m
5J 
t 
t 
..Λ .Cu. 
t Pb 
....t ZJX 
t„K20 
±. 
t 
!.m.i.o..n.t. 
PERSONS 
1S.7...21.9.... 
1S....4.6.5.... 
7 087 
9.1.3.... 
: 
1...2.3.3..... 
8....5.13 
L...6.7Û 
548 
25.....Q..4.8. 
S : deep mining  O : opencast mining or D : 
quairing 
boreholes 380 
STATISTICAL TABLES FOR EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES OTHER THAN COAL 
ANNEX XIII - 1 - 2 
Year  1978 
MINERAL 
HARD DIMENSION STONE , 
- BUILDING STONE ...: 
- PAVING STONE 
- MONUMENTALSTONE... 
HARD CRUSHED STONE. 
- FOR CONCRETE 
- ROAD BASES -
- .-SURFACING :. 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Chalk and Lime 
Gypsum 
Steatite 
Kaolin 
Pegmatite 
Calcspar 
Sandstone 
Dolomite 
Sulphur 
Pyrite 
Graphite 
Fluorspar 
Feldspar 
Uranium 
Talc 
Natural Stone 
Limestone 
Barytes 
* Combined Workforce 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE-
HOLE 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
S 
S 
s 
s 
0 
s 
o/s 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
.1...2..8.0.... 
113 
40 
4 
29 
12 
5 
1 
2 
3 
3 
1 
13 
18 
13 
5 
9 
7 
PRODUCTION 
51 833 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
m" 
.1.3.5.....Q.Q.Q...OOO. 
68 000 000 
1 749 136 
9 673 
520 982 
88 570 
11 817 
37 600 000 
636 001 
767 790 
501 696 
11 927 
75 722 
385 590 
9 770 
5 773 
2 614 617 
182 948 
.M.' 
t 
t 
t 
t 
piece 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
PERSONS 
34 495 
10.577 
1 421 
51 
1 676 
133 
19 
25 
35 
178 
837 
192 
171 
171 
147 
16 
182 
272 381 
STATISTICAL TABLES FOR EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES OTHER THAN COAL 
Year : 1978 
MINERAL 
COAL. 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS . 
IRON 
ALUMINIUM ..(P.iS?).. 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (DT.zy 
POTASH SALTS 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt).. 
ANNEX XIII -2-1 
BELGIUM 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
(DR BORE-I MINERAL IS 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SLATE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
HOLE 
S 
0 
S 
o 
s 
o 
0 + D 
WORKED 
2 
6 
.4.2.9.. 
PRODUCTION 
.6....5.9.Q...2.6.8..  jaleable 
.4.5.Q.. 
.4.2....5..4.Q.. 
3..608. 
211 002 
no fig.available 
id. 
1.9...P.3.P....3.55 
Total 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
m-
m  2(20  mm 
S : deep mining  O : opencast mining or D : 
q u arring 
■IIWI.MI mi.Íi.1.ilH—.HiWilW ■ lili H—MCMJì 
boreholes 
PERSONS 
.2.3.....Q.2.3. 
16 
13 
21 
87 
3 
2 070 
25 233 382 
STATISTICAL TABLES FOR EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES OTHER THAN COAL 
ANNEX XIII -2-2 
Year : 1978 
MINERAL 
HARD DIMENSION STONE .. 
- BUILDING STONE 
- PAVING STONE 
- MONUMENTAL STONE 
HARD CRUSHED STONE ' . 
- FOR CONCRETE ... 
- ROAD BASES 
- SURFACING 
HARD STONE FOR CALCINATION 
- FOR LIME 
- FOR CEMENT KILNS 
CHALK fi55 „M?.?*. 
GYPSUM : 
OTHER ROCKS : 
DOLOMITE 
KAOLIN 
CLAY 
• 
* estimations 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE­
HOLE 
0 
ί 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
..„. .6.5 
112 
24 
1.3 
11 
5 
114 
Cb 
BELGIUM 
PRODUCTION 
1 057 419 
31 324 026 
4 
10 902 261 
4...2.I4...1.5..7. 
3 655 855 
39 717 
5 200 000 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
PERSONS 
1 269 
V 
.2.1.3.8.3. 
t ¡Liai 
13.6 
421 
10 
4 576 383 
STATISTICAL TABLES FOR EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES OTHER THAN COAL 
ANNEX XIII -3-1 
Year  1978 
DENMARK 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS 
IRON 
ALUMINIUM ..(°IS?)..... 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) Lid.. 
(2)  ZINC (OKI.. 
or sea 
POTASH SALTS ...Sgl £§„. 
ITA Gl 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt).. 
PEAT (for soil 
xmprovemen  t) 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY '"" 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SLATE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
(sea) 
(1) Pb 42.000 concentrate 
(2) Zn 148 000 t 
MINE, | 
■ I 
NUMBER OF 
QUARRY [ SITES WHERE 
OR BORE-f MINERAL IS 
HOLE  WORKED 
D 
0 
0 
18 
926 
(with sili 
PRODUCTION 
no fig.available 
id.,.. 
.621....Q.0.0 
..3.38....0ÛÛ.. 
322 953 
795 
30...049...205 
.....4...5.8.4....2.1.9..... 
er  ) 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
L...Q.Q.Q.J».·: i.<3L 
,.P.b.. 
.t....Zja.. 
HI-
PERSONS 
■nö"fi"guT"es" 
.a.y.a.i.la.bl.e 
..300·. 
•id-, 
id. 
id. 
.icL. 
.ÙL... 
S : deep mining O : opencast mining or D 
quailing 
boreholes 384 
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ANNEX XIII - 5 - 2 
Year : 1978  DENMARK 
MINERAL 
SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION 
HARD DIMENSION STONE 
- BUILDING STONE 
- PAVING STONE 
- MONUMENTAL STONE 
HARD CRUSHED STONE :.... 
- FOR CONCRETE 
- ROAD BASES 
- :SURFACÎNG 
HARD STONE FOR CALCINATION 
- FOR LIME 
- FOR CEMENT KILNS 
CHALK .f.....îi.I.î?.?..... 
GYPSUM : 
OTHER ROCKS : 
FIRE CLAY 
CLAY, BRICKS, TILES 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE-
HOLE 
0 
0 
0 
| NUMBER OF 
[ SITES WHERE 
j MINERAL IS 
[ WORKED 
PRODUCrON 
1 55 492 
28 
11 
123 
* 
• 
2....1.7.5....4.1.7. 
119 121 
2 311 676 
TONS ROM 
' ORE OF 
MINERAL 
m
5 
m? 
m5 
PERSONS 
? 
9 
? 
? 385 
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Year  1978 
MINERAL 
COAL. 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS . 
IRON 
ALUMINIUM .X°rS?).. 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (ote). 
POTASH SALTS 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt).. 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
ANNEX XIII -4-1 
IRELAND 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
* Shortfall due to 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE 
HOLE 
S 
0 
D 
D 
s) 
D 
prolo] 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
.8. 
4 
8 
no figure 
•a-v-ail-afcl« 
Τ 
·2· 
PRODUCTION 
.2..4....Q.Q.0.:. 
...1...93.1 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
..1..Ä.QÄ. 
t ROM 
..£.°....P.£.°AuÇ.íl.9.
n.. 
.n.Q....fig.,.axaila.bl.e 
no figure 
available 
nge 
....380 
d indust 
2-0-1-9-6· 
..'...1.A...155.J 
..3.1.2....1S5 ï 
S.9....f ig.,.ayai.l.aj?.le 
.XQ.Q.Q...ml 
'FROM 
eon-een-tr-kte 
c-ono -en-
trate 
PERSONS 
.2.6.5.. 
IZ. 
..9.1.1. 
no figures 
avail-ab-le····· 
I 
222 
.1.....6 
no fig. 
axa.il.». 
aQ...fig„a.ira.iLabli 
ial dispute 
no fig. 
..a-TTA-LL^... 
.1.7.. 
..9.1.9.. 
S : deep mining  O : opencast mining or D : 
quarring 
boreholes 386 
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ANNEX XIII _ 4 _ 2 
Year : 1978 
IRELAND 
MINERAL 
MINE, 
jOUARRY 
1
OR BORE 
HOLE 
■Mtt—ι tømaam 
HARD DIMENSIONSTONE. 
- BUILDING STONE 
- PAVING STONE 
- MONUMENTAL STONE ... 
HARD CRUSHED STONE. 
- FOR CONCRETE 
- ROAD BASES 
- ¡SURFACING 
HARD STONE FOR CALCINATION 
• FOR LIME 
- FOR CEMENT KILNS 
CHALK 
G YPSUM : 
OTHER ROCKS 
LIMESTONE 
SHALE 
BARYTES 
PYRITE 
* byproduct 
•  • 
of  coppe 
0 
0 
0 
0 
s 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
.22.. 
&. 
.17.. 
64 
.............. W. Tf-· 
92 
6 
1 
PRODUCTION 
dry metric tons 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
no--f-i gravai 1-able 
no. „fig. ..available 
n.a....f±g...ay.aila.ble 
ao"'"fig7" 
.a.vjaJuL 
no fig. 
-ava-il-»··· 
no fig. 
avail. 
PERSONS 
..3.8.5.....7SJ...  R....0...M, 
no fig.availabl 
no fig.available 
42 542 > 
12 473 \ 
338 100 
41 793 
(already .ncluded under 'c 
no fig. 
avail. 
no fig. 
avail. 
R.O.M.'J 
joncetrJ 
R.O.M. 
concetr. 
opper
1) 
,13., 
.6.1.3.. 
..7.4.. 
1 308 
9 
60 
75 387 . 
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ANNEX XIII -5-1 
Year :  1978 
ITALY 
| MINE, 
MINERAL [QUARRY 
|<DR BORE-
| HOLE 
A. 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS 
1 
IRON 
ALUMINIUM ..(fires). 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (oce). 
POTASH SALTS „ _ 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt) 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY '"*' 
MARBLE IGNEOUS ...: 
Total MARBLE 
SLATE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
SAND OF volcanic 
origin 
EARTH COLOURS 
POZZOLANA (sand) 
S 
0 
. 
0 
( 
"-
s+o 
0 
s 
s 
s 
0 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
1 
2 
3*1 
a 
3. 
2.4..C1.).... 
5. 
i) 
100 
1.0.0. 
.2....5.0.0. 
15 
1Ό0
 Kd' 
PRODUCTION 
...i...a.68....o.ia 
34fi....9.72. 
2..4....4.1.Q. 
1...3.3.2. 
7·3·-5·58 
1....6.3..6....3.Q.4. 
3....121...Z53. 
100 000 
.4....2.Q.0....Û.Q.Q 
L20.....Q.Q.Q....Q.Q.O. 
150 000 
170 000 
5 000 000 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
....*...Ä.O.» 
....4.Q...#...F.a 
.Λ 
...t..Æn 
tK2.Q.Cl2$. 
PERSONS 
; 16.3 
6.7.6 
.5.3.3 
6. 
19.0. 
2··..6.7·4·^··· 
1..35.3 
3.Q3 
400 
5.6.Q 
8....6.5.0. 
20 
55 
25θ(2) 
boreholes  S : deep mining O : opencast mining or D : 
quairing 
Also included in activity and work force : l) lead ores . 
2) hard stone for calcin
atio
n
 
(see followine: va.xe) / 388 ' 
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ANNEX XIII -5-2 
Year : 1978 
ITALY 
MINERAL  QUARRY 
OR BORE- MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
HARD DIMENSION STONE 
- BUILDING STONE 
- PAVING STONE 
- MONUMENTAL STONE 
SEDIMENTARY MARBLE 
METAMORPHIC MARBLE 
HARD CRUSHED STONE. 
- FOR CONCRETE 
- ROAD BASES 
- ¡SURFACING 
MINE, 
HOLE 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
HARD STONE FOR CALCINATION 
- FOR LIME 
- FOR CEMENT KILNS 
CHALK ... 
GYPSUM 
OTHER ROCKS 
CLAY 
DOLOMITE 
GRAVEL 
.5..Q.. 
..2...ao.ß.. 
135 
1 010 
PRODUCTION 
.22...Û.6.Q....Q.Q.0.. 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
„9·.·3.2£...Χ).0.α., 
1 044 000 
1 935 000 
3.5....4.QCL.0..Q.Q.. 
* Combined 
.9.0.  4....0.5.O...ÛÛO., 
1 050 
13 
.ncluded 
mder othe] 
headings 
36 000 000 
1 100 000 
65 920 000 
PERSONS 
2.5.0·· 
1É...ÛOXX. 
1 350 
7 250 
..550.. 
2 500 
100 
included 
elsewhere 389 
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Year: 1978 
ANNEX XIII - 5 - 3 
ITALY 
' MINERAL 
PYRITE 
MANGANESE 
SULPHUR 
ANHYDRITE 
ASBESTOS 
BARYTES 
FELDSPAR 
FLUORSPAR 
GRAPHITE 
MARL 
ASPHALTIC ROCK FOR 
SURFACING 
BITUMINOUS ROCK 
HYDRATED ALUMINIUM 
SILICATES 
TALC AND STEATITE 
MERCURY 
ANTIMONY 
CELESTITE 
STEAM 
CLAY 
PEAT 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE 
- ..J!2!rL„ 
S 
s 
s 
0 
0 
s 
s 
s/o 
s 
0 
0 
0 
s/0 
s 
s 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
5 
1 
12 
15 
2 
14 
7 
11 
1 
27 
3 
1 
40 
16 
1 
12 
PRODUCTION 
786.666 
9 741 
357 444 . 
49 531 
135 402 
236 613 
251 083 
171 216 
4 108 
10 309 239 
68 560 
46 638 
663 879 
175 157 
1 855 
365 
29 104 120 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
37,8$ S 
39 % Mn 
12 $ S 
î5#CaF2 
>0,2# SS 
PERSONS 
873 
13 
1 758 
124 
323 
343 
105 
871 
19 
307 
27 
16 
212 
460 
811 
54 
2 
261 391 
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ANNEX XIII -6-1 
Year  1978 
NETHER L A N D S 
MINERAL 
COAL 
LIGNITE 
NATURAL GAS 
• 
IRON 
ALUMINIUM ..(firS?). 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (oie> 
POTASH SALTS. . 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt) 
MARL 
SANDSTONE 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING . . 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY '"" 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
(DR BORE-
HOLE 
; D 
1 D 
D 
D 
0 
0 
0 
NUMBER OF 
SETES WHERE 
j MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
" 
1 
.6 
1 
1 
3 
1 
9 
<· 
PRODUCTION 
1....4.Q2....25.4. 
9..4....935...X..10..
6. 
• 
.6....4.O.7. 
2...9.3.6....8.5S. 
2 992 755 
196 000 
....3..4.;..4.2.9....Q.Q.0. 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
,...t..R.0.M 
* \ 
M!....J... 
.t...X.2-Q. 
.t 
t 
t 
.t. 
PERSONS 
- 2 4OO 
lu 
5.3 
79 
4 
*? 
S : deep mining  O : opencast mining or D 
quarring 
boreholes 393 
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ANNEX XIII  7-1 
Year:  1978 
MINERAL 
«V 
COA L 
LIGNiTE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS 
4 
IRON S.T.0.N.E 
ALUMINIUM .Xfii?.?). 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (ote). 
POTASH SALTS 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt) 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY '"" 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
(DR BORE-
HOLE 
S 
0 
S 
s 
0 
s 
s 
): 
UNITED 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
i MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
..· .411 
1.7.3 
■ 
.1 
2 
11 
1 
1 
1...3.95. 
c-
KINGDOM 
PRODUCTION 
1.Q.7....6.9.6... 
1.4....7.3.0. 
β. 
5.8.4. 
3 670 
• 
9.4.5. 
L...3.11 
j 
L..22A 
9.CL..LA6. 
TONS ROM 
"ORE OF 
MINERAL 
.1..JR.Q.M 
1000 m
5
 
±...K20. 
PERSONS 
; 
2.4.8...100 
8....4.7..7. 
2 
292 
622 
1...228. 
3.63 
1....3.3.Q. 
1.Q....5.3.3. 
S : deep mining  O : opencast mining or D : 
qu airing 
boreholes 394 
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ANNEX XIII - 7 - 2 
Year: 1978 
MINERAL 
LINESTONE 
CLAY SHALE 
CHALK & CHERT 
IGNEOUS ROCK... 
SANDSTONE 
CLAY — 
CALCSPARE 
GYPSUM & ANHYDRITE 
BARYTES 
OTHER ROCKS : 
..C.HALX_ 
GYPSUM 
UNITED KINGDOM 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE 
HOLE 
S . 
0 
s 
0 
0 
0 
s 
0 
s 
0 
S+0 
S+0 
S+0 
0 
S+0 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
6 
.4.8.9 
.1 
219. 
• 
26 
.3.Q.3. 
2 
241 
29 
158 
3. 
12 
16 
fe 
PRODUCTION 
5.5.7. 
8.5....7.9.7. 
218 
2.5....4I3. 
16...2..7.3. 
27 807 
-
10 424 
705 
4 920 
1.3 
3...3.2.2 
.5.4. 
16 321 
3....23.Q 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF PERSONS 
MINERAL 
> I 
101 
.12 264 
26 
1 660 
1 020 
5 476 
212 
2 119 
397 
4 117 
3.8 
680 
f 
1 011 
:....6..6.i._... 395 
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ANNEX XIII -8-1 
Year  1978  FRANCE 
MINERAL 
OOAL 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS 
IRON ...ORE 
ALUMINIUM ..(fiíí?). 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (ore). 
POTASH SALTS 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt) 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY "·" 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SLATE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) „ 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE-
HOLE 
S 
0 
0 
S 
S 
S 
S 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
: MINERAL IS 
! WORKED 
24 
3 
1 
•  ι 
5 
■ · 
25 
12 
.4. 
3 
.3 
20 
132 
18 
• 1...9.6.2 
PRODUCTION 
18 351 000 
ι 339 000 
1 167 000 
1...5.65....Q.Q.P. 
1 117 ooo 
il 297 ooo 
33....4.5.4....0.0.0. 
1...317....0.00 
35....200 
3.9....9.0.0. 
1 795 000 
6....1.6.9....Q.Q.CL 
84 000 
....22.8...14.0.....Q.Q.Q 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
t ROM 
t ROM| 
t ROM 
1000 m
5
 
....* 
t 
...J...J?.fe.....l. 
...±...ZXL....X. 
1..K.20 
...J? 
t 
.....t 
PERSONS 
5.4....814. 
1....6..6.8. 
6....0.36 
6.1.6. 
737 
4....5.42 
1....Q.2Q. 
6....3.4.5. 
2 000 
1.4....621 
S : deep mining  O : opencast mining or D : 
quarring 
boreholes 396 
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ANNEX XIII - 8 - 2 
Year: 1978  FRANCE 
MINERAL 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE-
HOLE 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
HARD DIMENSION STONE . 
- BUIIJJING STONE 
- PAVING STONE 
- MONUMENTAL STONE ... 
PRODUCr'ON 
HARD CRUSHED STONE . 
- FOR CONCRETE 
- ROAD BASES 
- .'SURFACING 
HARD STONE FOR CALCINATION 
- FOR LIME 
- FOR CEMENT KILNS 
CHALK 
GYPSUM. AJfi...PL.AS.T.E.R. 
OTHER ROCKS : 
URANIUM 
TUNGSTEN 
GOLD 
FLÜOSPAR 
BARYTES 
TALC 
.8.5-3 
.65 
S 
s 
TONS ROM 
' ORE OF 
MINERAL 
not available 
...ΐ22...·3·6.ο....αοο. 
PERSONS 
..4...5.1.9....6.0.0. 
<^...5L3..  .6.....Q.7.1...10..Q 
2 561 
767 
185 
260 000 
225 000 
275 000 
....* 
..9....5.0.0.., 
...3....41.6.. 
Jr. 
t 
t WOj, 
t 
t 
t 
t 
2„ 
A...2&L· 
2 106 
200 
161 
604 
173 
561 397 
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ANNEX XIII -9-1 
Year  1978 
MINERAL 
at-
COAL 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS 
SILICIOUS 
IRON ...OM 
ALUMINIUM ..(fire?). 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
PHOSPHATES 
POTASH SALTS... 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt) 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
(l) Combined 
MINE, 
'QUARRY 
OR BORE-
HOLE 
j 
}: 
L UX . E M 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
1 
' :l 
o 
BOURG 
PRODUCTION 
834 905 
• 
• 
w^Êaaum^gtrimeeaMaieoimMitamtenamtJmm/ÊM 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
t 32,55$ 
t 
0,67 % 
PERSONS 
282 u; 
(1) 
S : deep mining O : opencast mining or D 
qu arring 
boreholes 398 
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ANNEX XIII  9-2 
Year  1978 
LUXEMBOURG 
MINERAL 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE 
HOLE 
UTK.« 
HARD DIMENSION STONE 
- BUILDING STONE 
- PAVING STONE 
- MONUMENTAL STONE 
SIZED STONE 
FACING STONE 
SAND 
GRAVEL 
.FOUNDRY SAND 
HARD STONE FOR CALCINATION 
- FOR LIME 
- FOR CEMENT KILNS 
CHALK 
GYPSUM : 
SLATE 
POLISHED MONUMENTAL 
STONE 
MONUMENTAL STONE 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
3Í 
I 
PRODUCTION 
6....6.3..0.., 
1.4.., 
4.6.0.., 
72 
2 717 
..714...9.5.8.. 
-614.623 
.212.687 
2.7.7.1 
.4.·.·47·6.· 
1 363 
3 283 
568 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
..m: 
1.Q.Q.Q....V.. 
2 
...ja 
m-' 
m5 
1000 ρ 
1000 ρ  5 
R9M»Mn 
PERSONS 
54 399 
ANNEX XIV 
TEXT OF A RESOLUTION 
submitted by the Committee 
on the Environment, Public Health 
and Consumer Protection 
to the European Parliament 
(25 september 1978) 401 
By letter of 19 January 1978 the President of the European Parliament 
authorized the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer 
Protection to draw up a report on the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th reports of the 
Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission and the 12th, 13th and 14th 
reports of the Mines Safety and Health Commission. 
On 21 March the committee appointed Mr Ellis rapporteur. 
Disaussion of the draft report took place on 20 June and 2 5 
September 1978. 
At its meeting of 2 5 September the Committee unanimously adopted 
the motion for a resolution and explanatory statement. 
Present: Mrs Krouwel-Vlam, Chairman; Lord Bethell, Vice-chairman,-
Mr Ellis, rapporteur; Mr Alber, Mr Brown, Mr Edwards, Lord Kennet, 
Mr Lamberts, Mr W. Müller and Mr Noé. 402 
CONTENTS 
A - MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
Β - EXPLANATORY STATEMENT . 
ANNEX I 
ANNEX II 
ANNEX III 
ANNEX IV 403 
The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection 
hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution 
together with explanatory statement. 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th reports of the Steel Industry Safety and Health 
Commission and the 12th, 13th and 14th reports of the Mines Safety and 
Health Commission. 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th reports of the Steel 
Industry Safety and Health Commission and the 12th, 13th and 14th 
reports of the Mines Safety and Health Commission; 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and Consumer Protection (Doc.327/78 ); 
1. Confirms that for the period under review both the Steel Industry 
Safety and Health Commission and the Mines Safety and Health 
Commission have managed well, but that because of the staffing, 
administrative and partly financial difficulties that have 
arisen they have been unable to cover the whole field of safety 
and health at work; 
2. Is concerned about the shortage of staff in both organizations 
considering that the working population is the mainspring of development 
in the Community and that it. should be safeguarded for humanitarian 
and economic reasons by every possible means; 
3. Deplores the fact that the Mines Safety and Health Commission because of 
shortage of staff has not been able to extend the correlation of the statis-
tics of the Community of the 3ix and the United Kingdom to all mineral 
extracting industries ; 
4. States that the Steel Safety and Health Commission due to serious 
administrative difficulties was unable to hold any meetings of the 
Commission or its working parties in 1976; 404 
5. Deplores that for financial reasons it has been impossible for the Steel 
Industry Safety and Health Commission to organize a planned colloquy in 
1978 and that its realisation in 1979 depends on whether the Council 
finally w.vll provide the necessary funds in the next year's budget; 
6. Emphasizes the importance of completing the special study into serious 
accidents started in 1976 by the Steel Industry Safety and Health 
Commission and scheduled to enter an important and expensive phase in 
1979; 
7. Notes that the Mines Safety and Health Commission, whose responsibility 
has been extended in 1974 to all mineral extracting industries, because 
of staffing reasons has made little progress in implementing this new 
area; 
8. Invites the Mines Safety and Health Commission to devote in the near 
future more time and attention to health questions, specially to the 
major problem of dust faced by miners; 
9. Calls upon the Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission to report 
in its nroct annual report on the different studies carried out or 
being carried out, i.e. the study on the significance of accident 
statistics, their comparability and their trends and the special study 
on major accidents initiated in 1976; 
10. Calls upon the Commission and the Council of the European Community to 
provide the necessary staff and funds to both Safety and Health 
Commissions in order to enable them to operate properly and efficiently; 
11. Points out that until the question of the staffing of these two Commissions 
is settled, proposing new areas of study or new fields of action is not 
considered useful; 
12. Requests its President to forward this resolution and the report of 
its committee to the Council and Commission of the European Communities. 
- 6 - PE 54.227/fin, 40 s 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Until 1975 the European Parliament has drawn up reports at regular 
intervals on the reports of both these Commissions. However, since that date none 
of the annual reports have been published with considerable delays and it 
was not considered opportune to continue as in the past. Moreover, the 
general question of whether or not the Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and Consumer Protection should draw up reports on reports· 
has been raised. 
2. As the reports of both these Safety and Health Commissions are fairly 
voluminous and contain a large number of statistical tables, perhaps it 
would be a better idea for the future to have a representative from each 
of the organizations to come and give a brief outline of the results 
achieved during a set period than for the rapporteur to have to examine 
in detail these reports. 
3. When the Committee decided to draw up a report only the 12th, 13th and 
14th reports of the Mines Safety and Health Commission (covering the years 
1974 to 1976) and the 6th, 7th, and 8th reports of the Steel Industry 
Safety and Health Commission (also 1974 to 1976) were available. The 9th re-
Dort of the steel Industry Safety an Health Commission, covering its acti-
vities in 1977, has just been published . 
STEEL INDUSTRY SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
4. This body was set up by the ECSC High Authority in 1964 with the aim 
of encouraging an exchange of experience and research within the Community 
so that the best ways of tackling safety and health problems in the 
iron and steel industry could be found. 
5. The four reports under review outline the activities of this Commission 
between 1974 and the end of 1977 i.e. the activities of its various working 
parties and any special activities organised. A major conclusion that can 
be drawn from these reports is that fatal accidents in the iron and steel 
sectors have diminished, whereas minor accidents are on the increase*. The 
See annexes I and II f06 
reason for these trends is not known but a number of studies being carried 
out are examining this problem. 
6. Perhaps the most important study being undertaken by the Commission 
is the study of serious accidents. This study was started in 1977 and was 
expected to last for 2 or 3 years. It should result in the finalising of 
a standard questionnaire to be used in surveys on very serious accidents, 
providing initial information on the categories of causes of very serious 
accidents and the establishment of a rrethod of research into the causes 
of such accidents. The next stage of the study which will be undertaken in 
1979 could seriously be jeopardised, if the Council will not provide the 
necessary funds. 
7. The 8th report (covering 1976) starts by indicating that 1976 was a year 
of very little activity for the Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission 
due to the serious administrative difficulties. It is a fact that the 
secretariat of this Commission has always been understaffed and attention 
has been drawn to this on numerous occasions in reports drawn up by the 
European Parliament. The ludicrousness of the situation was highlighted in 
1976 when the only secretary assigned to the secretariat left, with the 
result that not a single meeting of the Commission or its working parties 
was held during that year. This is obviously an internal Commission problem 
but it is surely one that can be solved without too much difficulty. If an 
organization such as the Steel Industry Commission is to be taken seriously 
by those whom it purports to help, then it must be given the means to operate 
efficiently. 
8. In the 9th report mention is made of a decision taken by the Health and 
Safety Commission to organise a colloquy in 1978 on the results of the work 
being done by the Commission. This would be essentially aimed at those 
responsible for safety in the iron and steel industries. It is also pointed 
out that when a similar colloquy was organised in Luxembourg in 1970, over 
700 persons from 14 different countries participated and the meeting itself 
was extremely successful. 
9. For financial reasons it was not possible to organize this colloquy in 
1978 and it depends on the Budget for 1979 if it can be organized next year, 
Considering that the prime task of this Health and Safety Commission is to 
disseminate the information it obtains as a result of exchanges of 
experience, the Committee thinks that the organization of such a meeting is 
of prime importance and indeed asks why years have passed since the 
organization of the last. MIMES SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
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10. The Mines Safety and Health Commission was set up in 1957 following the 
mine disaster in 1956 in Marcinelle (Belgium) in which 262 miners died. 
A conference on Safety in Coal Mines was held shortly after the disaster 
resulting in a report containing recommendations for actions by governments 
in the field of safety, and it was the task of the Mines Safety Commission 
to continue the work of this conference and to seek solutions to the problems 
of safety in coal mines. 
11. Since that date the terms of reference of the Mines Safety Commission 
have been extended to include factors affecting health and to cover all-
mineral extracting industries. Contrary to the Steel Industry Safety and 
Health Commission, the Mines Safety and Health Commission submits proposals 
to the governments of the Member States for the improvement of safety and 
health and keeps itself informed of any action taken on these proposals. 
In recent years most of the proposals made by the Mines Safety and Health 
Commission have, in fact, been incorporated in national legislation. 
12. As far as the general activities of the Commission and its working 
parties are concerned, there is little comment to be made. In fact, the 
Commission is to be congratulated on having managed to hold so many meetings 
and to draw up and distribute so many reports in spite of severe staffing 
difficulties. For example, in 1974 although 77 meetings were held, the 
secretariat were unable to keep pace with the demands- of the Commission 
and its working parties. It was in this year that the Council of Ministers 
decided to extend the responsibility of the Mines Safety and Health 
Commission to all mineral extracting industries. 
13. In 1975 we note that the working party on health in mines met only once 
to study the problems of dust, noise and lighting. The following year, 1976, 
this working party did not meet at all due to staffing difficulties. It must 
be pointed out that while the study of major accidents and their causes is 
extremely worthwhile and must be continued, the major problem facing miners 
is the problem of dust. It is true to say that overall, pneumoconiosis and 
silicosis are ultimately more lethal than accidents. The question must 
be posed as to whether the Mines Safety and Health Commission should not 
devote more time and attention to health questions. 
For accident statistics see Annexes III and IV 408 
CONCLUSIONS 
14. The committee has no intention of criticising the work done by either 
of the two Safety and Health Commissions, that on the contrary, both 
organisations have managed extremely well in spite of the numerous difficulties 
of staffing that have arisen. 
15. The committee further points out, that until the whole question of the 
staffing of these two organizations is settled once and for all, it does not 
see the utility of proposing new areas of study or new fields of action 
for either of the Commissions. It would seem illogical to ask for either 
an extension of competence or for new tasks to be performed by an organisation 
which has difficulty in fulfilling the duties already conferred on it. 409 
ANNEX I 
STEEL INDUSTRY 
Faial accidents in tho Community of Nino 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Number of 
fatalities 
137 
110 
88 
Frequency rate 
0) 
0,13 
0,12 
0,09 
Accidents : production 
ratio 
(2) 
0,88 
0,88 
0,86 
(ï) Number of fatal accidents per million hours worked 
(2) Number of fatal accidents per million tonnes of crude steel 
Source: Ninth report of the steel industry safety and health 
commission (1977), Doc. 2164/78 health Ann.II 
STEEL INDUSTRY 
Accidents pausing
1 absence from work in the Community of Nine 
Year 
1974 
1975 
.1976 
1977 
1978 
No. of 
workers 
585.267 
568.772 
548.446 
Accidents resulting in 
^ 1 day's absence 
Number 
9O.58I 
74.854 
75.568 
f.r.O) 
85 
78 
80 
ace:prod. 
(2) 
582 
598 
563 
Accidents resulting in 
^3 day's absence 
Number 
76.394 
63.606 
63.O69 .... 
I 
. f.r.O) 
72 
67 
67 . 
Percentage of accidents 
resulting in between 
1 and 3 day's absence 
15,3 < 
14,1 
16,2 
(1) frequency rate : nuaber of accidents per million hours worked 
(2) nunber of accidents per million tonnes crude steel 
o 
Source- Ninth report of t\\¿ ¿c¿*I induahry safety and health  :ommission (1977), Doc. 2164/78 411 
MINING INDUSTRY  ANNEX III 
D. nBCAPIVJUTIOR ι COHKUHITÏ OF THE SIX 
Tear 
1958 
1959 
I960 
19¿1 
■1962' 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
δ 
■Η 
\ 
u 
I 
252 278 
240 602 
239 967 
235 84e 
233 233 
229 769 
235 007 
224 249 
210 I89 
18) 484 
181 016 
176 749 
170 355 
I64 910 
151 809 
139 700 
133 300 
129 100 
125 600 
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
 
O
.
E
.
.
 
8
.
 
(
k
g
.
)
 
1 634 
1 788 
1 958 
2 100 
2 229 
2 331 
2 395 
2 46I 
2 611 
2 824 
3 065 
3 265 
3 442 
3 514 
3 659 
3 755 
3 742 
3 632 
3 710 
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
n
s
a
n
-
h
o
u
r
e
 
w
o
r
k
e
d
 
1 260 
1 122 
1 037 
962 
' Col 
849 
841 
784 
698 
587 
522 
476 
438 
414 
369 
332 
313 
319 
301 
0 
Φ 
■π 
+> 
-f4  •a 
■s 
t«, 
770 
622 
526 
527 
840 m 
541 (4) 
465 
411 
410 
374 
269 
240 
209 
188 
182 
147 
137 
143 
110 
125 
(lì Net extraction, Blurry and d 
(2) Incl. Luioenthal explosion. 
Π) Excl. Luieenthal explosión. 
(4) Casualties were unable to re 
net. 
BUIDO work 
Λ 
1 ooo U 
■riti f, ',' 
.ÍT-.2 ° 
m «* +» 0 
■n m ι!.'.; 
U OJ 41 C) 
«1 «r* r-i (J 
17 074 
14 539 
13 459 
12 720 
12 41« 
11 686 
11 726 
10 595 
9 247 
7 781 
7 501 
7 222 
6 591 
6 249 
5 763 
5 560 
5 054 
4 795 
4 491 
η " 
ω 0 
■»« ** 
♦» 
•H ·  ■a
0 
■y *· 
α) O 
PM P. 
3,052 
2,585 
2,192 
2,235 
3,602(3) 
2,320(4) 
2,024 
1,749 
1,828 
1,779 
1,420 
1,326 
1,181 
1,104 
1,104 
1,033 
0,981 
1,073 
0,852 
0,995 
for at least oigh 
S
e
r
i
o
u
s
 
i
n
j
u
-
r
i
e
s
 
(
4
)
 
p
e
r
 
a
.
 
t
o
n
s
 
67,68 
60,43 
56,09 
53,93 
53,24 
50,86 
49,89 
47,25 
43,99 
41,06 
41,44 
40,82 
38,69 
37,8') 
26,34 
39,80 
37,91 
37,14 
35,76 
F
a
t
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
p
o
r
 
π
.
 
m
a
n
-
h
o
u
r
s
 
0,610 
0,590 
0,507 
0,548 
0,552(3) 
0,600(4) 
0,547 
0,493 
0,522 
0,536 
0,457 
0,460 
0,438 
0,429 
0,440 
0,399 
0,413 
0,456 
0,35 
0,415 
t weeks. 
■*-. · 
3 8. g 
Ο Λ 
■Η η ι 
f« <u C 
O ,Λ Çj 
•j> ft I' 
13,551 
12,950 
12,986 
13,i'27 
13,781 ' 
13,761 
13,860 
13,506 
13 ΐ. <2 
13,?46 
14,370 
15,160 
15,047 
15,083 
15,60 
16,77 
16,12 
15,05 
14,92 
UHITED KIUGDOM 
1973  130 200  3 598  306  74  490  0,568  3,76  0,242  1,60 
1974  109 200  3 26O  268  37  417  0,339  3,82  0,138  1,555 
1975  127 700  3 493  303  55  522 
W 
0,431  4,09 
t!  W 
0,181  1,722 
1ΤΒΠ D  1976  122 100  3 407  287  45  0,369  0,157 
1977 
1978 
Kote i It io only possible to compare the fi¿jero in table 1 (Community ol' tho Six) 
with those in table 2, by refering to tho explanatory notes in Section IV, 
paragraphe 4.2. 
1) Statistical tables for 1976 following the system of classification used in the Community 
of Six. 
Source: 14th report of the mines safety and health commission 
for th_e_X£ar 197.6 . MINING INDUSTRY 
Accident lertls since 1971 (Coaeunlty of th« Six) 
ANNEX IV 
4 - 20 day« * actual 
Frequency rtte 
increase/deertas« on previous 
ΤΜΓ(ί) 
21-S6 deys · κtuil 
Frequency r»te 
Increese/deertaae on previous 
ye»r (ί) 
tort than 56 days · actual 
Frequency rati 
Increase/decrease ot previous 
»ear (Í) 
Fatalities total actual 
Frequency rate 
tnereait/dtcreaae on previous 
»ear (J) 
Actual without group-accident 
(actual grcup accident) 
Frequency rate 
Increase/decrease on previous 
»ear (Í) 
1971 
47 203 
113,96 
. 
21 116 
50,98 
. . 
6 249 
15,09 
. 
182 
0,440 
. 
162 (3) 
0,391 
1972 
40 376 
109,31 
-4(») 
18 531 
50,17 
-1.59 
5 763 
15,60 
»3,4 (s) 
147 
0,399 
-10 
HI (1) 
0,382 
-2.3 
• 
1973 
37 334 
112,77 
.3,17 («) 
17 325 
52,26 
+4.17 (s) 
5 56U 
16,77 
+ 7(s) 
137 
0,413 
■ .3.9 
128 (1) 
0,385 
+1Í 
1974 
34 797 
110,97 
-1,6 (s) 
15 875 
50,62 
-3(s) 
5 054 
16,12 
-*(s) 
143 
0,456 
.10.4 
96 (2) 
0,307 
-21 (a) 
1975 
33S35 
106.67 
-3,9 (.) 
15 454 
«,5 
-*.2 (*) 
4 795 
15,05 
-6,7 {.) 
110 
0.345 
-24 
110 (0) 
0,3*5 
.12 
1976 
30 643 
101,77 
-4,8 (t) 
13 923 
46,24 
-M (.) 
-
4 791 
14.92 
-0,8 {») 
125 
0.415 
.20 
109 (1) 
0,362 
•W 
(a) significant variation 
Sou ree: 14th report of the mines safety and health commission for the year 1976 
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SUMMARI 
The 16-th Annual Report of the Mines Safety and Health Commission provides 
a general summary of its activities in I978, as well as those of its 
11 Working Parties and 11 Committees of Experts, relating to the coal 
industry and the other extractive industries, notably the prevention of 
uncontrolled "blowouts during the exploration and exploitation of offshore 
oil and gas deposits. 
The Report begins with socioeconomic statistics on the coal mines and the 
same statistics in skeleton form on the Nine's other extractive industries. 
In Section I, the Mines Safety and Health Commission's activities are 
summarized as follows: 
- 6 proposals to the Governments for changes in their regulations, three 
of these proposals concerning tests for the quality control of conveyor 
belts, mechanization in coalwinning areas and safety signs in coal mines, 
the other three relating to the prevention of uncontrolled offshore 
blowouts of gas and oil. 
- 2 information reports on conveyor belts. 
- 1 proposal for a Council directive on the design of electrical equipment. 
A summary of the information symposium for workmen's inspectors concerning 
the participation of workers in the supervision of safety and health in mines 
is also included. 
There is also a summary of the conference on 'Medical aspects of deep-sea 
diving'. 
Section II reports on the progress of the Working Parties, listing the 
working documents used} these are available in English, French and German 
upon request from the Mines Safety and Health Commission Secretariat. 
Section III deals with the action taken by the Governments on the proposals 
of the Mines Safety and Health Commission listed in Annex V. 
Section IV provides details and comments on the accident statistics for 
coal mines which are in a standardized form for the Nine. 
The 13 Annexes give the terms of reference of the Mines Safety and Health 
Commission and its Working Parties, the names of the members, the bibliography 
of the work of the MSHC, the proposals and reports adopted in 1978 and lastly 
a proposal on the construction of gateside packs and a report on self-rescuers, 
adopted at the beginning of 1979 by the MSHC. 414 
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